1. Introduction

The Japanese sentence-final word *darou* (/daɾoː/) is often analyzed as an epistemic modal with a meaning roughly equivalent to the English “probably.” Some authors also consider *darou* an evidential, indicating that the speaker lacks evidence for the proposition (Hara 2006; Takubo 2007). A typical example is:

(1) Noriko-ga paatii-ni kuru darou¹
Noriko-NOM party-to come DAROU
“Probably, Noriko will come to the party.”

However, *darou* often expresses a greater or less degree of certainty than “probably.” In question-answer discourse, it may be used to express any degree of uncertainty (from Hara 2006):

(2) a. dare-ga kuru?
who-NOM come
“Who will come?”

b. John-ga kuru darou.
John-NOM come DAROU
“John will come (maybe/probably/won’t he?).”

It may also be used as tag question in which the speaker seeks confirmation from the hearer (from Sugimura 2004):

(3) watashi-tte kirei deshou?²
I-QUOT beautiful DAROU
“I’m pretty, aren’t I?”

Clearly, the meanings in (2) and (3) are not compatible with the idea that *darou* is an epistemic modal equivalent to “probably.” Notably, (2) and (3) both hint at the overarching discourse in which the *darou*-sentence appears, suggesting that a pragmatic analysis of *darou* may be more

¹ Examples that appear without a citation are my own and have been checked with a native speaker. Abbreviations used in glosses can be found in Appendix 2.
² Deshou, the polite variant of *darou*, is often found in tag-questions, and is used often by female speakers in particular.
useful than a modal analysis. A closer look at the use of darou in context also reveals that the speaker does not always “lack evidence” for the proposition, and that an evidential analysis is likewise inappropriate for darou. As such, I intend to argue that darou has a specific pragmatic function, which falls out straightforwardly from its morphological properties.

1.1 Modal Analysis of darou

Formal truth-conditional semantics uses a system of ‘possible worlds’ in order to deal with non-extensional concepts such as modality. Kratzer (1991) puts forth a general system for modal analysis that defines two main aspects of modal meaning: quantificational domain and quantificational force\(^3\). Kratzer defines the quantificational domain in terms of both a modal base and an ordering source. The modal base includes the set of possible worlds over which the modal quantifies, usually derived from contextual circumstances or contextual evidence. The ordering source ranks those possible worlds in an order that reflects, for example, what is considered “normal” in a given world. Kratzer includes these notions in an attempt to incorporate into formal semantic definitions the contextual variance of modal meaning. In addition to quantificational domain, modal meaning also includes a quantificational force that describes the degree of certainty towards the proposition at hand, and which, in its most basic form, creates the distinction between possibility and necessity. It is mainly through the concept of quantificational force that I will form my argument that darou is not a modal.

Most Japanese scholars do not analyze modality from the point of view of Western truth-conditional semantics, instead taking a more descriptive approach. Yuki Hara attempts to unify the observations on darou in the Japanese literature with a truth-conditional modal analysis based on Kratzer (Hara 2006):

\(^3\) Also called quantificational strength or modal strength
The modal meaning of \( p\)-darou:

a. Quantificational Domain: possible worlds which are compatible with the speaker’s non-observable reasoning\(^4\)

b. Quantificational force: more than 50\% \((p\text{ likelihood} > \neg p\text{ likelihood})\)

Hara defines the quantificational force of darou in numerical terms as > 50\%, meaning that darou indicates that the speaker believes that the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. She begins by citing a previous analysis by Masuoka (1991) giving darou a quantificational force of 50\%-80\% certainty, closer in line with English “probably.” However, she expands this quantificational force to > 50\%, noting that darou may be in the same sentence with the modal adverb kitto (“certainly”)\(^5\) and explaining that the “probably” reading is derived from a conversational implicature. In this one simple formal definition, we already see disagreement on how exactly to treat the quantificational force of darou, and the Japanese literature is replete with different analyses. While most of these analyses put darou somewhere between possibility (kamoshirenai- “maybe”) and necessity (nichigainai- “it is certain”), others note that there seems to be some uncertainty even amongst native speaker judgments as to the exact quantificational force of darou (Narrog 2009).

1.2 Proposal

In this paper, I intend to argue that darou should not be analyzed as a modal of any sort, since it is not in reality restricted to a particular quantificational force. Rather, the meaning of darou falls out rather straightforwardly from its morphological properties, once an appropriate pragmatic analysis is in play. In Section 2 of this paper, I will explore the distribution of darou

\(^{4}\) While I do not agree with Hara that darou is restricted to non-observable reasoning, it will become clear that her analysis of the quantificational domain is not vital to this paper, as my argument that darou is not a modal centers on quantificational force, not quantificational domain.

\(^{5}\) In citing evidence of this sort, Hara draws on a tradition in Japanese modal literature of matching a sentence-final item (such as darou) with a free-standing adverb placed elsewhere in the sentence. This tradition is discussed in fuller detail in Section 2.
in terms of both form and meaning, and show that it does not have a restricted quantificational force over a proposition. In Section 3, I will look at the morphological breakdown of *darou* and speculate on how its interpretation may be derived from its morphological parts (*da* + *rou*). In Section 4, I will put forth a pragmatic analysis of *darou* that will explain its many uses as well as some of its other properties. I will also use this analysis to explore the possibility of *darou* as an evidential, and reject that hypothesis as well. In Section 5, I will explore possible semantic interpretations for *darou*, including whether or not *darou* may scope over some sort of possible-worlds domain.

2. Distribution of *darou*

The purpose of this section is to acquaint readers who are not familiar with Japanese with the basic properties of *darou*. I will present *darou* in terms of (i) its distribution in basic Japanese sentence forms, (ii) a description of its meaning(s), and (iii) its behavior when combined in a single sentence with free-standing modal adjectives.

2.1 Darou and Basic Japanese Sentence Forms

The distribution of *darou* is very wide, with only a few restrictions. To begin with, *darou* may follow verbs of either tense (past and non-past), and may follow verbs in the “te-iru” form of both tenses:

(4) a. Noriko-ga paatii-ni kuru darou
    Noriko-NOM party-to come DAROU
    “Noriko (will) come to the party—*darou*.”

6 Depending on the verb at hand, verbs in this form may be translated as either present or past progressive, or as the present tense of a “state” verb, such as “to know.” *Darou* may be used verbs in this form regardless of their aspeecntual meaning.
b. Noriko-ga paati-ni kita darou
Noriko-NOM party-to came DAROU
“Noriko came to the party—darou.”

c. Noriko-ga ike-de oyoide-iru darou
Noriko-NOM pond-in swimming-is DAROU
“Noriko is swimming in the pond—darou.”

d. Noriko-ga ike-de oyoide-i-ta darou
Noriko-NOM pond-in swimming-was DAROU
“Noriko was swimming in the pond—darou.”

Darou can be used in both positive and negative sentences:

(5) a. Junpei-ga yama-o noboru darou
Junpei-NOM mountain-ACC climb DAROU
“Junpei (will) climb the mountain—darou.”

b. Junpei-ga yama-o nobor-anai darou
Junpei-NOM mountain-ACC climb-not DAROU
“Junpei will/does not climb the mountain—darou.”

Darou can be used in interrogative constructions:

(6) Noriko-ga ike-de oyoide-iru darou-ka
Noriko-NOM pond-in swimming-is DAROU-Q
“Is Noriko swimming in the pond—darou.”

However, it cannot be used in imperative constructions:

Junpei-Mr. mountain-ACC climb-IMPER-please
“Mr. Junpei, please climb the mountain.”

Junpei-Mr. mountain-ACC climb-IMPER-please DAROU
“Mr. Junpei, please climb the mountain—darou.”

or with a volitional verb form:

(8) *issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you darou
together forest-in walk-take-VOL DAROU
“Let’s take a walk together in the forest—darou.”
Darou can also be used with both adjectives and nouns in addition to verbs, again with both past and non-past forms:

\[(9)\]

a. Noriko-no-fuku-ga takai darou
Noriko-GEN-clothes-NOM expensive DAROU
“Noriko’s clothes are expensive—darou.”

b. Noriko-no-fuku-ga taka-katta darou
Noriko-GEN-clothes-NOM expensive-PAST DAROU
“Noriko’s clothes were expensive—darou.”

c. Junpei-wa daigakusei darou
Junpei-TOP college.student DAROU
“Junpei is a college student—darou.”

d. Junpei-wa daigakusei da-tta darou\(^7\)
Junpei-TOP college.student be-PAST DAROU
“Junpei was a college student—darou.”

So we see that darou can be used with assertions and questions in various tenses and aspects, and with any lexical category (nouns, verbs, and adjectives). It cannot be used with the imperative or the volitional. For the most part, this is on par with Japanese sentence-final modals. Unlike other Japanese modals, however, darou’s incompatibility with the volitional most likely stems from the fact that darou itself is the volitional form of the copula (discussed in Section 3). As a form of the volitional, darou is also semantically incompatible with the imperative. However, darou is perfectly compatible with sentences in the declarative, suggesting that darou’s properties may have something to do with making assertions, as is further explored in Sections 3 and 4 below.

It is important to note that darou is almost always the final word in a sentence—that is, darou almost always has widest scope. The only other items that may have wider scope than darou are expressive verbs like to-omou (“to think”) and sentence-final particles, such as the

\(^7\) The reappearance of the copula in (9d) is discussed in Section 3 below.
question particle *ka* or the confirmation particle *ne*. We will see below that *darou* even has scope over other sentence-final modals.

### 2.2 Meanings of Darou

In the above examples, *darou* has not been translated in the glosses, as it is difficult to pinpoint a specific English lexical item to which *darou* corresponds. In the example cited in the introduction, Hara (2006) equates *darou* roughly to English “probably,” giving it a quantificational force of > 50%. This strategy is not uncommon in the literature, with authors tending to place *darou* somewhere between *kamoshirenai* (expressing possibility, or $p \leq 50\%$) and *nichigainai* (expressing necessity, or $p = 100\%$). Unlike Hara, most of these analyses assume that *darou* cannot express necessity, thus limiting its quantificational force to slightly less than 100%, yielding something like 50-80% (Narrog 2009). Still others note that the quantificational force of *darou* seems less easy to pin down than that of other modals. This has led to a view that there are two “versions” of *darou*: a modal “speculative” *darou* and an exceptional “non-speculative” *darou* (Johnson 2003; Masuoka 2007; Narrog 2009). I believe this analysis is misguided, and that the apparently separate meanings of *darou* can be unified under one analysis. This section explores the various “meanings” of *darou*, and, in doing so, begin to show that a modal analysis is perhaps not the best kind of analysis for *darou*.

To begin with, *darou* is highly context-dependent, as demonstrated in the example below:

(10) Noriko-*ga* paatii-*ni* kuru *darou*  
Noriko-NOM party-*to* come DAROU  
a. “Noriko is probably coming to the party.”  
b. “Noriko is coming to the party, right?”  
c. “Noriko’s coming to the party, maybe.”

8 The sentence-final particle *yo* does not combine well with *darou*, since *yo* has an emphatic meaning that clashes with the pragmatic properties of *darou*. 

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The meaning of *darou* in a specific sentence simply cannot be determined out of context. The single example sentence above may be interpreted at least three different ways based on three different contexts. Example (10a) reflects the “probably” meaning that most speakers would assume (10) to have out of context, which is often assumed to be the intrinsic meaning of *darou*: a modal with a quantificational force roughly equivalent to that of English “probably”. It is important to note that the “probably” reading for a *darou*-sentence surfaces when the sentence is taken out of context. When context is given, as in (10b) and (10c), the “probably” meaning of *darou* can prove to be illusory.

The second meaning, found in (10b), reflects the use of *darou* as a tag-question. Often in this case, the polite variant *deshou* is used, especially in women’s speech, along with a rising question intonation (Sugimura 2004):

(11) `watashi-tte kirei deshou?`  
`I-QUOT10 beautiful DAROU`  
“I’m beautiful, aren’t I?”

In the context of a tag question, the extent to which the proposition is likely to be true seems largely irrelevant. The speaker might know very well that she is beautiful, and want the hearer to notice and agree. Or, she may be experiencing a moment of self-doubt and looking for a little bit of positive reinforcement from the hearer. One might argue that, as a tag question, *darou* is not being used as a modal. However, the fact that *darou* is not being used as a modal in this particular case raises the question of whether or not it should even be treated as a modal in the first place, and, if so, how it escapes modality here.

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9 Politeness does seem to play a role in some of the uses of *darou*. This relationship is explored in further detail in Section 4.
10 The Japanese quotative marker *tte* is sometimes used for a topic/subject marker in casual conversation, which this example mimics.
The third translation given above in (10c) comes as the response to a question, as in the example below.

(12) A: Dare-ga paatii-ni kuru ?
    Who-NOM party-to come ?
    “I wonder who’s coming to the party.”

    B: Noriko-ga paatii-ni kuru darou
    Noriko-NOM party-to come DAROU
    “Noriko’s coming to the party, maybe.”

In this example, speaker B is not necessarily making a strong commitment to Noriko’s party attendance. She could very well be making a blind guess in answer to A’s question. Hara (2006) explains this deviance from darou’s usual quantificational force (>50% in her account) by alluding to the focus construction involved in the answer, although she admits that the case needs to be studied closer. Hara does not specify what part of the “exception” in (12) creates the “focus” that interferes with darou’s usual modality. The focus could come from the ga-marked response to a ga-marked question word. However, (13) is also possible:

(13) A: Noriko-wa nani-o suru?
    Noriko-TOP what-ACC do?
    “What will Noriko do?”

    B: Noriko-wa paatii-ni kuru darou
    Noriko-TOP party-to come DAROU
    “Noriko is coming to the party, maybe.”

In this case, it is the predicate that is being questioned, not the subject, so nothing is marked with –ga. Still, speaker B does not necessarily commit herself to a certainty of > 50%. She may be taking a blind guess at Noriko’s planned activities, which would in this case bring the quantificational force of darou down to p < 50%.

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11 The question mark found here and elsewhere in the data denotes a rising intonation, which makes this sentence a question even though it lacks a sentence-final question particle like ka or no.
When Takubo (2007) dismisses this same exception before going on to analyze *darou* as an epistemic modal, he claims that *darou* can be decoupled from its usual quantificational force to form a “non-epistemic” usage when the sentence contains “a wh-word or a focused constituent in the premise” (Takubo 2007: 441). He gives the following example:

(14) A: Kono natsu *nani-o* ur-eba ii *darou*  
this-summer what-ACC sell-if good DAROU  
“What do you think we should sell this summer?”

B: *Ekon-o* ur-eba ii *darou*  
air.conditioner-ACC sell-if good DAROU  
“I think we should sell air conditioners.”

Takubo does not bother to include a modal in the gloss of (14B): “I think we should sell air conditioners.” Note also in this example that *darou* is used to form the question as well. Takubo does not gloss this question as “What should we probably sell this summer?” but as “What do you think we should sell this summer?” This question could also be glossed as a self-question: “I wonder what we should sell this summer.” (14) includes two *darou*-sentences that do not involve quantificational force. So it seems that the “focus” that rids *darou* of its modality may arise from the use use of a wh-question, but it still must be explained why this focus would change (or even eliminate) the quantificational force of *darou*.

Attempts at giving a simple gloss to the *darou*-sentence in (10) leads to three different meanings depending on context. Out of context in (10a), *darou* seems to be roughly equivalent to “probably”; that is, a modal a quantificational force of 50-80%. In the tag question in (10b), quantificational force seems largely irrelevant, and *darou* may express 0-100% certainty towards the proposition depending on the context. In (10c), *darou* may drop to a certainty level below 50%—Takubo even suggests that it loses its quantificational force entirely. The question

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12 Takubo also notes that other modals in the epistemic “*darou-class*” (*hazuda* “should”, *nichigainai* “must”, *kamoshirenai* “possible”) cannot be used in this manner. Once again, *darou* does not look like a modal morphologically, nor does it seem to behave the same way as other modals.
presents itself as to what analysis of *darou* can allow all three of these interpretations without relegating one or more of them to the vague realm of “exception” or without separating *darou* into two different meanings. Giving *darou* a quantificational force of 50-80% certainly cannot account for all of the examples above. Furthermore, in much of the data above, quantificational force feels largely irrelevant. What seems to be common to all uses of *darou* is that the speaker is attaching *darou* to some sort of a hypothesis, and, to various degrees, inviting the hearer to interact with that hypothesis.

So far, the contexts we have seen have involved questions—either the tag question or a question/answer exchange. Since rising intonation denotes a question in Japanese, perhaps the various meanings of *darou* can be boiled down to a function of intonation: *darou* with rising intonation is an underlying question, which allows for a wide range of certainty, as in the tag question, whereas *darou* with falling intonation may result in a lesser degree of certainty, as in the question-responses in (12) and (14) above. However, the properties of these two intonation patterns are not absolute, as the falling intonation may be used with the lesser-certain question-responses, the more-certain “probably” default case, and even in situations with complete certainty. We shall see in the examples below that context, rather than intonation, determines the degree of certainty in a *darou* sentence.

*Darou* tag questions, which use rising intonation, allow for the complete range of certainty (0-100%), so in order to argue that quantificational force is irrelevant for *darou* regardless of intonation, we must show that *darou*-sentences with falling intonation can be used with a complete range of certainty as well. The question-responses in (12) and (14) provide a clear example of a falling intonation *darou*-sentence being used with a quantificational force of < 50%. The default “probably” case is also used with falling intonation. However, the only
example of a darou-sentence with 100% certainty so far has been the rising-intonation tag question. In order to completely filter out any lingering doubts over the effects of intonation, we must also find cases with 100% certainty that use falling intonation. Examples abound. The first example comes from the dialogue below. Here, darou might be analyzed on paper as a tag question with rising intonation, but it is also possible to read the sentence with a falling intonation:

(15) Student: ashita, tabun gakkou-ni ki-masen
tomorrow probably school-to come-not
“I probably won’t be coming to school tomorrow.”

Teacher: ike-nai yo. ashita-wa shiken darou (falling intonation)
go-not! tomorrow-TOP test DAROU
“That’s no good! Tomorrow’s the test-darou.”

The teacher speaks with a falling intonation, even though he knows very well that there’s a test tomorrow, so that his degree of certainty about the test occurring tomorrow is at 100%. However, the teacher’s degree of certainty here, once again, seems irrelevant to the meaning of the darou-sentence as a whole—especially compared to the student’s apparent ignorance about the date of the test. If the teacher is 100% certain about the proposition and if he is not using tag-question intonation, why does he bother to use “modal” darou? He could simply use the regular copula da in place of darou in order to make the assertion “Tomorrow is the test.” It seems, however, that the teacher is not simply making an assertion. He is not simply throwing out the idea that there is a test tomorrow for the sake of the student learning a new piece of information, but instead for the student to interact with the fact that there is a test tomorrow and fully understand the repercussions of missing class.

Furthermore, there are also cases using falling intonation in which darou is said to represent a straightforward future tense. Usually, examples are cited of televised weather
forecasts, in which the use of \textit{darou} has become ritualized. Note that the use of \textit{darou} in this case is purely optional from a grammatical point of view:

\begin{verbatim}
(16) ashita, ame-ga furu darou
tomorrow rain-NOM falls DAROU
“It will rain tomorrow.”
\end{verbatim}

The future tense reading could be the result of a conversational implicature. Saying “It will rain tomorrow” and saying “Probably, it will rain tomorrow” are largely the same thing, due to human limitations on predicting the future. In fact, it seems that if one were dead-set on it raining tomorrow, one would not use \textit{darou} in making an uttering a rain-prediction. Intriguingly, however, such an analysis would suggest that (16') is bad. However, this is not the case:

\begin{verbatim}
(16') ashita, ame-ga zettai furu darou (falling intonation)
tomorrow rain-NOM absolutely falls DAROU
“It will absolutely rain tomorrow—\textit{darou}.”
\end{verbatim}

Here, we see a clear case of \textit{darou} being used with 100% certainty. So we see that \textit{darou} can support a full range of certainty in sentences with both a rising intonation and a falling intonation.

In the cases provided in this section, analyzing \textit{darou} as a modal seems unnecessary and inaccurate. As shown in (10), \textit{darou} can be translated into English as “probably,” “maybe,” or “right?” In (15) and (16'), we see cases where \textit{darou} accompanies a proposition about which the speaker is 100% certain. Sentence intonation is irrelevant in terms of degree of certainty. If \textit{darou} is a modal, its quantificational force seems to range from that of English “maybe” to English “definitely,” or, roughly, 0-100% certainty, depending on context. This does not make \textit{darou} a very useful modal.
2.3 Interactions with other modals

The exploration of the meaning of *darou* in 2.2 suggests that it may not be a modal after all. In the following section, we examine the tradition in the Japanese literature of combining two modal elements in a single sentence in order to define the modals involved. A close look at this method poses further problems for a modal analysis of *darou*.

2.3.1 Combining *darou* with modal adverbs

Modality in Japanese largely comes in two morphological forms: the free-standing modal adverb, and the sentence-final modal. Interactions between modal adverbs and sentence-final modals have been oft-studied in the literature, and such interactions have been used to diagnose and classify various semantic properties of the lexical items involved. Hara (2006), for example, uses them as evidence for her semantic definition of *darou*, as well as its status as a non-propositional modal. Hara presents (17a) and (17b) as largely synonymous, but notes that (17c) is also perfectly allowable:

(17) a. ashita kare-ga kuru darou
    tomorrow he-NOM come DAROU
    “He will come tomorrow—*darou*."

    b. tabun ashita kare-ga kuru
        probably tomorrow he-NOM come
        “Probably, he will come tomorrow.”

    c. tabun ashita kare-ga kuru darou
        probably tomorrow he-NOM come DAROU
        “Probably, he will come tomorrow—*darou*."

Following Sugimura (2004)\(^\text{13}\), Hara then cites the following data on the interaction of sentence-final *darou* with “probability adverbs.”

\(^{13}\) See Sugimura’s argument cited below. His conclusions differ from Hara’s.
(18) kare-wa tabun/kitto/*moshikasuruto kuru darou
    he-TOP probably/certainly/maybe come DAROU
    “Probably/Certainly/*Maybe, he will come-darou.”

Since *darou* cannot be used with the low-probability *moshikasuruto*, Hara argues that *darou* indicates a bias toward a proposition; that is, that it has a quantificational force of $> 50\%$.

Under her definition, *darou* is an evidential “with a modal flavor” that indicates “the speaker’s bias for $p$” (Hara 2006: 123). She argues that other attempts to restrict the quantificational force of *darou* to 50-80% are the result of conversational implicature. Asserting a bias towards an assertion implicates that the proposition is not a belief, hence the 50%-80% reading of (19a) derives not from the intrinsic quantificational force of *darou*, but from the fact that, had the speaker wanted to express complete certainty, s/he would have used (19b):

(19) a. ashita kare-ga kuru darou
    tomorrow he-NOM come DAROU
    “He will (probably) come tomorrow.”

b. ashita kare-ga kuru
    tomorrow he-NOM come
    “He will come tomorrow.”

Hara needs the quantificational force of *darou* to reach 100%, because, under the system of matching up two modals in one sentence, the compatibility of *darou* with the modal adverb *kitto* (“certainly”) calls for it. While this is all well and good, the question immediately arises as to why (17c) and the non-starred versions of (18) are not redundant in terms of quantificational force. We could simply assume that these sentences do contain some redundancy, but it is equally plausible to propose that *darou* adds some other additional meaning apart from quantificational force.

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14 The use of percentages to express different grades of possibility and necessity is not uncommon in the literature, and so I sometimes use it here. It is important to remember that these percentages are not important mathematic findings, but simply an approximate tool for shading degrees of possibility.
Furthermore, Sugimura (2004) makes the obvious point that defining modals in terms of each other is circular. He emphasizes that free-standing modal adverbs like *tabun* (“probably”) and sentence-final items like *darou* each have their own distinct aspects of meaning, and that these meanings must be understood before modal interactions can be fully explained. It is the interaction of these distinct meanings that causes certain combinations to be infelicitous, but the element of meaning responsible for the mismatch is not necessarily quantificational force (or any other modal element of meaning for that matter).

Furthermore, Sugimura provides the following examples that contradict the usual “modality scale test” based on *kitto, tabun, and moshikasuruto*:

(20)  

(a)  

ashita-wa {kitto/tabun/osoraku} gakkou-ni iku darou  

Tomorrow-TOP {certainly/probably/perhaps} school-to go DAROU  

“{Certainly/probably/perhaps} I/we/you/he/she/it will go to school tomorrow-darou.”

(b)  

kare-wa {kitto/*kanarazu} kimi-no koto-ga suki-nan-deshou  

he-TOP {certainly/*certainly} you-GEN things-NOM like-IMPL-DAROU  

“He certainly (kitto)/*certainly (kanarazu) likes you-darou.”

*Darou* combines perfectly well with *osoraku* (“perhaps”). Whatever the problem with combining *darou* and *moshikasuruto* (“maybe”), it is not a mismatch of quantificational force.\(^{15}\)

Furthermore, in (20b) while *darou* can combine with *kitto* (“certainly”), it cannot combine with *kanarazu*, which also means “certainly.” Since *kitto* and *kanarazu* have the same quantificational force, there must be some other reason why *kanarazu* doesn’t work with *darou* in (20b). Hara (2006) attempts to get around a similar problem, noting the acceptability of *darou* with the < 50% modals *kanousei-ga-aru* “there is a possibility that” and *kanousei-ga-hikui* “there is a low possibility that.” She classifies Japanese modals into two groups: propositional and non-propositional. *Darou* belongs to the latter group, while the troublesome *kanousei-ga-aru* and

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\(^{15}\) Although *moshikasuruto* is problematic, the similar *moshikashitara* is fine. There may be scope interactions here between *darou* and the conditional –to and –tara suffixes.
*kanousei-ga-hikui* belong to the former group. Only interactions on the same propositional level can result in conflicts of quantificational force. However, even the propositional/non-propositional split cannot rectify the problem with *kitto* and *kanarazu*, since *kanarazu* is one of the modal adverbs Hara analyzes as propositional, and is, as such, immune to interactions with non-propositional *darou*. Even if *kanarazu* were non-propositional, it would still remain a mystery as to why *kanarazu* and the non-propositional *kitto* (with which *darou* does not have a conflict) act differently with *darou* when they should both have the same quantificational force. Interactions of meaning may be making (20b) bad with *kanarazu*, but whatever interactions they are, they don’t necessarily involve *darou* or quantificational force.

### 2.3.2 Combining *darou* with sentence-final modals/evidentials

In addition to combining with modal adverbs, *darou* may also be combined with other sentence-final elements. Combining *darou* with other sentence-final modals leads to sentences that, if somewhat infelicitous, are not usually judged to be outright ungrammatical. Out of context, combining *darou* with an evidential is judged much more harshly:

**Modal + darou**

(21) ?Junpei-ga Noriko-to mori-de sanpo-suru kamoshirenai darou  
Junpei-NOM Noriko-with forest-in walk-take maybe DAROU  
“Junpei and Noriko (will) maybe take a walk in the forest—*darou*.”

(22) ?Junpei-ga Noriko-to ima mori-de sanpo-shiteiru hazu darou  
Junpei-NOM Noriko-with now forest-in walk-taking should DAROU  
“Junpei and Noriko should be taking a walk in the forest right now—*darou*.”

(23) Junpei-ga Noriko-to mori-de sanpo-suru nichigainai darou  
Junpei-NOM Noriko-with forest-in walk-take surely DAROU  
“Surely Junpei and Noriko (will) take a walk in the forest—*darou*.”

---

16 As Japanese has only two tenses, past and non-past, these “present” tense sentence may also be translated into future tense, hence the “will” in parenthesis in the gloss.
The tentativeness of the acceptability judgments for (21)-(23) is reflected in the literature. Even within the same article, one combination may be given as bad in one sentence while the same combination may be given as good in another sentence. Sugimura (2004) at one point notes that *darou, when used as a tag question, can be combined with kamoshirenai “maybe” but not nichigainai “it must be.”

(27) a. ashita-wa ame-ga furu kamoshirenai daro?
tomorrow-TOP rain-NOM fall maybe DAROU
“You think maybe it’ll rain tomorrow?”

b. *ashita-wa ame-ga furu nichigainai daro?
tomorrow-TOP rain-NOM fall surely DAROU
“It’ll surely rain tomorrow, don’t you think?”

This is all well in good, but Sugimura also gives us the data set in (28). Note that *darou is acceptable after the modals in (28b) and (28c), but is outright bad with the evidentials in (28d) and (28e):

(28) a. ano otoko-wa supai darou
that man-TOP spy DAROU
“That man is a spy-*darou.”

b. ano otoko-wa supai kamoshirenai darou
that man-TOP spy maybe DAROU
“That man is perhaps a spy-*darou.”
c. ano otoko-wa supai nichigainai darou
    that man-TOP spy must be DAROU
    “That man must be a spy-darou.”

d. *ano otoko-wa supai no you darou
    that man-TOP spy GEN seem DAROU
    “It seems that man is a spy-darou.”

e. *ano otoko-wa supai rashii darou
    that man-TOP spy seem DAROU
    “It seems that man is a spy-darou.”

It is true that *darou in (28) is not necessarily being used as a tag question, but if the combination of *nichigainai and *darou is bad in tag-question (27) but not in the non-tag-question in (28), then the mismatch of meaning is most likely coming from the tag-question usage, not from the interaction between the two “modals.”

How useful is it to classify *darou based on its distribution with other modals? While we may gain some insight into its meaning, there are certainly a host of variables at play. In any given example, the “goodness” or “badness” of a sentence may result from a disparity of meaning between *darou and the “other” modal item in question. However, the “badness” of a sentence may just as well result from interactions among the many other variables found in the sentence, such as tense, aspect, or specific lexical features of the predicate in question. The acceptability of *darou with *kanarazu (“certainly”) or *nichigainai (“it is certain”) may be fine in one sentence but not in another. As far as modal interactions go, they seem to vary from case to case, with judgments varying among different speakers across different contextual situations.

The use of *darou with sentence-final evidentials, however, seems universally bad, consistently eliciting stars in the literature. The problem is not morphological. The *da in *sou-da “seem”/”I heard” and *you-da “seem” is the same copula *da from which *darou is derived, but turning *sou-da and *you-da into *sou-darou and *you-darou does not result in a felicitous sentence.
Perhaps this is because the *sou* and the *you* are doing what the volitional verb form is doing in *darou*; all three forms involve the copula, but they also involve some sort of speculative/speech-act-oriented bit of meaning. This point will be further explored below.

We have seen in this section three important points: (i) *darou* can occur with almost any basic verb tense/aspect/polarity as well as any lexical class. It can occur in questions but it cannot combine with the volitional or the imperative; (ii) *darou* cannot be associated with a specific quantificational force, making its status as a modal highly questionable; (iii) using modals to define modals is circular and potentially misleading, as assumptions are being made as to why infelicitous combinations occur. The conflicts between *darou* and other modals (as well as evidentials) are not necessarily rooted in modal mismatches, and could just as easily be the result of mismatches of other aspects of meaning. The fact that *darou’s* acceptability with other modals varies supports the idea that such mismatches should be looked at on a context-based, case-by-case basis. In examining the meaning of *darou* in this section, I conclude that *darou* should not be analyzed as a modal. In the next section, we will explore the morphology of *darou* to see how *darou* might be defined separately from a modal analysis.

3. **Morphology of *darou***

*Darou* is often thrown into the category of Japanese modals, or, if the distinction between the two categories is made, evidentials. The individual items within these two categories (modals and evidentials) themselves display a diverse range of morphological properties. Some are combinations of a noun followed by the “copula” *da*. Others behave morphologically like verbs or adjectives. *Darou* itself is a form of the copula *da*, and the bound volitional morpheme
–(y)ou. No other Japanese modal has a morphological form quite like this one. A brief morphological analysis of selected Japanese modals/evidentials appears below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modal</th>
<th>Morphological Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>darou</td>
<td>volitional form of copula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hazu da (should)</td>
<td>noun + da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beki da (ought)</td>
<td>noun + da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nichigainai (must)</td>
<td>particle + verb + negative verb morpheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kamoshirenai (maybe)</td>
<td>particle + particle + verb + potential + neg. verb morpheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidential</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yoo da</td>
<td>noun + da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rashii</td>
<td>adjective (conjugates as such)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soo da</td>
<td>noun + da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitai da</td>
<td>verb + “want” + da</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is clear from these examples is that, morphologically, there is no other sentence-final modal linked exclusively to a verbal conjugation in the same way that darou is. All of the other sentence-final modals are listed above in what is called in traditional Japanese grammar “shuushikei” or “sentence-final form.” This non-past tense form is usually considered the neutral “default” form, and is used for dictionary entries. Even the modals that feature other verb morphology (negative or potential morphemes) remain in this non-past, “sentence-final” form. Only darou is not available in the shuushikei form. By its very nature, it must be in the volitional form; otherwise, it is simply the “copula” da. It seems reasonable to hypothesize, therefore, that the “modal-ness” of darou comes from the fact that it is in the volitional form. Already one is left wondering what exactly the “volitional” form of a copula is. Another look at the status of da as copula may be useful. While it is usually considered to be the plain form of the copula, some authors (Sugimura 2004; Maynard 1999) consider it an evidential, marking a strong assertion. Darou, therefore, contains a volitional morpheme and the copula, which can

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17 The interplay between da’s copular functions (allowing na-adjectives and nouns to conjugate) and assertive aspects require further investigation, but I believe that both can be subsumed under a singular analysis, much as darou’s various meanings are analyzed here.
be used to form assertions. As we will see, however, although *darou* is built from aspects of each of these two morphemes, it also varies significantly from them, forming its own unique meaning.

In comparing *darou* to *da*, we find that *darou* can appear in certain constructions in which *da* cannot:

(29)  

a.  Noriko-wa tafu/ichinensei da
    Noriko-TOP tough/freshman DA
    “Noriko is tough.”/”Noriko is a freshman.”

b.  Noriko-wa tafu/ichinensei darou
    Noriko-TOP tough/freshman DAROU
    “Noriko is tough-*darou*.”/”Noriko is a freshman—*darou*.”

(30)  

*a.  kono-ringo-wa takai da
    this-apple-TOP expensive DA
    “This apple is expensive.”

b.  kono-ringo-wa takai darou
    this-apple-TOP expensive DAROU
    “This apple is expensive-*darou*.”

(31)  

*a.  Junpei-wa mou ofuro-ni haitta da
    Junpei-TOP already bath-in enter DA
    “Junpei already took a bath.”

b.  Junpei-wa mou ofuro-ni haitta darou
    Junpei-TOP already bath-in enter DAROU
    “Junpei already took a bath-*darou*.”

*Da* can be used following a noun (ichinensei—“freshman”) or a certain class of adjectives called *na*-adjectives (tafu—“tough”). *Darou* can also be used with these two lexical categories. However, *da* cannot be used with verbs (haitta—“entered”) or a separate class of adjectives called *i*-adjectives (takai—“expensive”). Nouns and *na*-adjectives need the copula to conjugate (past/non-past; negative). Verbs and and *i*-adjectives contain morphology that allows them to conjugate of their own accord. Since *darou* is allowed to follow verbs and *i*-adjectives where the
copula *da* is forbidden, the meaning of *darou* must contain some element of meaning both beyond the copula and beyond the abilities of verbs and *i*-adjectives to express through their own morphology.

Furthermore, as seen in (9) in Section 2 (repeated below), *darou* may appear *with* the copula when the copula is in the past tense:

(9)  

c. Junpei-wa daigakusei darou  
   Junpei-TOP college.student DAROU  
   “Junpei is a college student—*darou*.”

d. Junpei-wa daigakusei da-tta darou  
   Junpei-TOP college.student be-PAST DAROU  
   “Junpei was a college student—*darou*.”

In (9c), the copula *da* is absent. However, *da* resurfaces in its past-tense form *datta* in (9d).

Some authors (i.e. Sugimura 2004), consider *da* to be in variation with ∅ in sentences like (9c). This seems to be the case, as *da* resurfaces as *datta* in (9d) in order to support the past tense morpheme *-ta*. So in both (9c) and (9d), *darou* is appearing alongside the copula. Hence *darou* must be doing something more than just the duty of the copula.

Given the morphological form of *darou*, it is most likely the volitional from which it gets these extra aspects of meaning. However, it is also a mistake to say that *darou* and the volitional form of a verb are interchangeable. First of all, morphological volitional tense may apply directly to a verb or an *i*-adjective, but the combination of the verb plus *darou* yields a different meaning.

(32)  

a. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you    
   together forest-in walk-take-VOL  
   “Let’s take a walk together in the forest.”

b. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-suru darou  
   together forest-in walk-take DAROU  
   “They’re probably taking a walk together in the forest.”  
   “They’re taking a walk together in the forest, maybe.”
“They’re taking a walk together in the forest, aren’t they?”
“We’re taking a walk in the forest, aren’t we?”

The meanings of (32a) and (32b) are hardly interchangeable. They also demonstrate an important grammatical distinction between the volitional and *darou*: the former can never occur with a third person subject, while the latter can:

(33) a. eigakan-e ik-ou
    movies-to go-VOL
    “Let’s go to the movies.”
    “I think I’ll go to the movies.”

b. eigakan-e iku darou
    movies-to go DAROU
    “I/He/she/we/they (will) go to the movies—*darou*.”

Just as *darou* is a little more volitional than the assertion marker *da*, it is also a little more assertive than the volitional morpheme.

In this section, we have seen that *darou* is broken down morphologically into two parts: the copula *da* and the volitional verb suffix. *Da* is a copula, used to connect a subject to a predicate when there is no available morphology in the lexical category involved (nouns, *na*-adjectives). *Darou*, on the other hand, occurs with all lexical categories, even those that don’t need any help with predication (verbs, *i*-adjectives). The volitional verb form can itself be attached directly to verbs, but its function seems to be different from *darou*. *Darou* also differs from the volitional verb form in that the former can be given a third person interpretation where the latter cannot. What exactly *darou* is doing in the sentence remains unclear—it is synonymous with neither the copula nor the volitional but seems to have properties of both.
4. Pragmatic interpretation of *darou*

4.1 Delaying Predication

In examining its distribution and various uses in Section 2, we found reason to doubt that *darou* is a modal. In Section 3, we noted that *darou* is morphologically a combination of the copula and the volitional morpheme. Where do we go from there?

Here are two of our example sentences with *darou* from earlier in this paper. (34a) is from Sugimura (2004), while (34b) is one of my own:

(34)  a. ano otoko-wa supai darou
     that man-TOP spy DAROU
     “That man is probably a spy.”
     “That man is a spy, maybe.”
     “That man is a spy, isn’t he?”

     b. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-suru darou
        together forest-in walk-take DAROU
        “They’re probably taking a walk together in the forest.”
        “They’re taking a walk together in the forest, maybe.”
        “They’re taking a walk together in the forest, aren’t they?”
        “We’re taking a walk together in the forest, aren’t we?”

The volitional is often translated as “Let’s.” What’s to be done with a volitional form of a copula? “Let’s be”? Clearly, this is no good for (34) above:

(34')  a. “Let’s be that man is a spy.”
   b. “Let’s be they’re taking a walk together in the forest.”

Another option for the volitional copula is something roughly equivalent to “I’m thinking of” or “I intend to”, which would give us the following English paraphrases:

(34'')  a. “I’m thinking of that man is a spy.”
   b. “I’m thinking of they’re taking a walk together in the forest.”

This analysis is somewhat of an improvement: a replacement of “of” with “that” results in two coherent sentences. Still, *darou* is not the same as *omou* “to think,” which can just as easily be used to say “I think that that man is a spy.”
There is another interpretation of the volitional verb form in Japanese, once the utterance is marked with some sort of question morphology or rising intonation.

(35)  

a.  issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you  
   together forest-in walk-take-VOL  
   “Let’s take a walk together in the forest.”

b.  issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you ka  
   together forest-in walk-take-VOL  Q  
   “Shall we take a walk together in the forest?”

Keeping this in mind, an English paraphrase of (34a) and (34) could be:

(34’’)  

a.  “Shall it be that man is a spy?”

b.  “Shall it be they’re taking a walk together in the forest?”

English paraphrases can only take us so far, but they can hint at what is going on with *darou*: an assertion is not quite being made. As I hypothesize below, the speaker is purposefully not quite making the assertion. For various reasons, the speaker wishes to hedge on making a full-fledged assertion.

Fiengo (2007) examines the use of sentence forms to ask questions in English. Fiengo claims that the forms speakers use to ask questions reflect some sort of lack that needs to be met with an answer from the hearer. In the case of English wh-questions, this “lack” is reflected in the use of a sentence-form with a wh-word. English yes/no questions, on the other hand, are a bit more complicated. In this case, the inverted form of an assertion (i.e. “Is Jack fat?” vs. “Jack is fat.”) indicates a lack of “glue” between subject and predicate—that is, the saturation of the predicate is itself in question. The questioner has the idea of “Jack” and the idea of “fatness,” and s/he wants to know if those two can be put together to make a fully-predicated assertion.

*Darou* is not used to form yes/no questions in Japanese, although Japanese yes/no questions work in a similar way to the English ones described above—an explicit question morpheme rather than inversion puts the connection between argument and predicate in doubt.
Furthermore, as I show in Section 3 above, *darou* does in fact reflect a manipulation of an assertion form: the assertive *da* is morphologically modified into its volitional form. A *darou*-sentence is not quite a question, yet not quite an assertion. I hypothesize that *darou* blocks predication, but not in the same way as a Yes/no question. *Darou* reflects the speaker’s intention to saturate the predicate—but the speaker, in using *darou*, has not done so yet. This use follows from a combination of properties of the copula *da* and the volitional verb form:

(i) *da* is used to make assertions  
(ii) the volitional is used to make known the intentions of the speaker (and only the speaker)  
(iii) *darou* is used to show that the speaker has the intention of completing predication of (i.e., asserting) a sentence, but is not yet fully committed to doing so

It is important to note that once *darou* is in play, the volitional aspect of the verb suffix has shifted from speaker’s intention to do the activity expressed in the verb to the speaker’s intention to saturate the predicate with the argument and make an assertion. That is, as Hara (2006) claims, *darou* is not working on the propositional level. Hence, sentences with *darou*, unlike those with regular volitional verbs, are free to contain the third person, since the third person in the sentence is not the one whose intention is at hand. For example, to repeat (34a):

(34) a. ano otoko-wa supai darou  
*that man-TOP spy DAROU*  
“That man is probably a spy.”  
“That man is a spy, maybe.”  
“That man is a spy, isn’t he?”

The intention of “that man” as to whether or not he is planning to be a spy is irrelevant. The relevant intention is that of the speaker towards saturating the predicate—toward making the assertion that “that man” is a spy. The intentionality has shifted to outside of the sentential predication. For this same reason, *darou*, unlike *da*, can occur after a verb. A verb does not need *da* in order to be completely predicated (it only needs an argument), but *darou* is delaying
predication, something the verb cannot do on its own. In noun phrases, *darou* appears alongside the copula itself (both the past-tense copula *datta* and its zero-morpheme non-past alternation). The copula is present in the sentence in order to do the eventual predication of the proposition. *Darou* is present in the sentence in order to indicate the intention of that predication.

However, in order to fully explain the range of interpretations for a *darou*-sentence, it is also important to remember the second meaning of the Japanese volitional verb form: “let’s.”

(33) a. eigakan-e ikou  
    movies-to go-VOL  
    “Let’s go to the movies.”  
    “I think I’ll go to the movies.”

The choice between interpreting the volitional as “let’s” vs. “I intend to” is context-dependent. The former reading can usually be forced by the presence of a word such as *issho-ni* “together.”

(35) a. issho-ni mori-de sanpo-shi-you  
    together forest-in walk-take-VOL  
    “Let’s take a walk together in the forest.”

Is this interplay still at work with *darou*? Unfortunately, there is no equivalent to *issho-ni* available on the non-propositional level to force a test. However, the “let’s” interpretation still affects the meaning of *darou*. *Darou* not only alerts the hearer that the speaker is intending to make an assertion (but isn’t quite ready to yet), but also makes the hearer aware that s/he is part of the process. The speaker is unwilling to go through with committing to the predication because s/he is waiting for the hearer’s confirmation of the assertion. I therefore revise (iii) to the following:

(iii) *darou* is used to show that the speaker has the intention of completing predication of (i.e., asserting) a sentence, but is not yet fully committed to doing so until getting confirmation from the hearer

Once the hearer has acceded to the proposed assertion, the two parties may continue their conversation/activities as if the assertion has been made. If the hearer does not accede to the
assertion, then the assertion is either dropped, or the speaker must argue his/her position more aggressively.

The various meanings of *darou* fall out from its description in (iii) above. The “default” interpretation of *darou*—out of context and with neutral inflection—is something akin to “probably.” That is to say, with all other things being equal, the yet-unfilled intention to saturate the predicate comes across as the speaker expressing a modal meaning with a quantificational force of 50-80%. This quantificational force is an illusion caused by conversational implicature. If the speaker had wanted to make an assertion, s/he would have used *da* or the plain *verb/adj*-adjective form. If the speaker was completely unsure as to whether or not the predication should take place, s/he would have used a question. By using *darou*, the speaker isn’t quite asking a question, but isn’t quite making an assertion either. In the absence of context, the most likely interpretation of *darou* is that the speaker is fairly certain of the facts at hand, but not completely willing to commit to making an assertion—hence the notion of *darou* being equivalent to “probably.” This is akin to Hara’s notion that *p-darou* expresses the speaker’s “bias towards p.” Unlike Hara’s interpretation, however, *darou* has no quantificational force, as it is not a modal.

The pragmatic analysis of *darou* proposed here can easily explain the tag-question usage of *darou* (from Sugimura 2004):

(11) watashi-tte kirei deshou?
    I-QUOT beautiful DAROU
    “I’m beautiful, aren’t I?”

In this case, the speaker intends on making the assertion at hand, but wants her interlocutor to make the predication, either as reassurance if she’s having a looks-based self-esteem crisis, or as a recognition of her beauty if she’s trying to flirt. Tag questions by their very nature seek hearer input towards the assertion in question, so it seems natural to propose that *darou* may be used in
this way since it shows that the speaker intends to connect the predicate and the argument upon getting confirmation from the speaker\textsuperscript{18}.

In addition to the tag-question usage, Section 2 of this paper also noted several other usages of \textit{darou}, which, due to falling or flat intonation, cannot be interpreted as tag questions. We will reconsider these cases below, beginning with the cases in which the speaker certainty seems to be absolute. One may wonder why \textit{darou}, which is used to show that the speaker is hesitant to complete predicate saturation, would be used in these situations. The key lies in the fact that the speaker using \textit{darou} is waiting for confirmation of the assertion from the hearer. The speaker may be waiting for the hearer’s confirmation for reasons other than uncertainty.

Here, we re-examine the teacher and student example from Section 2.2:

\begin{verbatim}
(15) Student: ashita, tabun gakkou-ni ki-masen
       tomorrow probably school-to come-not
       “I probably won’t be coming to school tomorrow.”

   Teacher:  ike-nai yo. ashita-wa shiken darou (falling intonation)
           go-not ! tomorrow-TOP test DAROU
           “That’s no good! Tomorrow’s the test-\textit{darou}.”
\end{verbatim}

As mentioned before, the teacher is in no way uncertain about the date of the test, as all test-date decisions lie squarely within his authority. However, he delays saturation of the predicate (test) and argument (tomorrow) so that the student must be the one to put the two together. In this way, the teacher not only reinforces the fact that the test is tomorrow, but also that the student should have known as much before deciding to miss class. The onus of making the assertion falls on the student, as does the responsibility for showing up for the test.

This analysis of \textit{darou} also explains the weather report examples:

\begin{verbatim}
\textsuperscript{18} It is important to note that although \textit{darou} has been glossed as “isn’t it” or “aren’t I” in tag questions, it does not morphologically correspond to the English “negative copula” forms used in the glosses. There is a separate Japanese tag-question \textit{fyanai}, which is actually the negative form of the copula.
\end{verbatim}
This usage on television news reports is highly ritualized, so that the intentions of individual weathercasters are largely moot at this point. However, it is easy to see how this usage originated. The weather reporter cannot say for certain that it will rain tomorrow, so he delays predication, inviting the audience to make the final conclusion that rain is coming. In doing so, he distances himself from responsibility for what the (unpredictable) weather actually does. This analysis of *darou* can also explain the non-ritualized variant of (16):

(16') \text{ashita, ame-ga zettai furu darou} \quad \text{“It will absolutely rain tomorrow—*darou.”} \\
\text{tomorrow rain-NOM absolutely falls DAROU}

We come back to a similar question as we had in the student-teacher dialogue above, and a similar situation will suffice. Say a typhoon is on its way, but a child keeps whining to her father that she wants to go hiking tomorrow. The father does not want to inform his daughter that it will rain tomorrow; rather, he wants her to realize the foolishness of her request. He therefore gives her the two main pieces of the puzzle—“tomorrow” and “definitely rain”—and makes her put the two together.

We also saw previously that *darou* can be used to both ask and answer a question, as in this example from Takubo (2007):

(14) A: \text{Kono natsu nani-o ur-eba ii darou} \quad \text{“What do you think we should sell this summer?”} \\
\text{this-summer what-ACC sell-if good DAROU}

B: \text{Eakon-o ur-eba ii darou} \quad \text{“I think we should sell air conditioners.”} \\
\text{air.conditioner-ACC sell-if good DAROU}
In (14B), the hearer answers with *darou*. If the hearer had possessed a firm conviction that air conditioners were going to be in high demand this summer, he would probably have left off the *darou*, and perhaps replaced it with an emphatic sentence-final particle such as *yo*. As it is, out of context and without intonation, (14B) could indicate any level of certainty on the part of its utterer. Like the speaker, the hearer in B may not have a strong answer to the question at hand. As such, his answer is tempered with *darou*, awaiting the reaction of A to his suggestion. In this case, his degree of certainty may range from “maybe” all the way through the “probably” level. With a sharp falling intonation, however, B may be making a much stronger argument for selling air conditioners—like the teacher in (15) above, he’s absolutely certain of himself, but he wants his interlocutor to make the final connection between predicate and argument. Perhaps B has been telling A for weeks that air conditioners are the way to go, but A keeps stubbornly putting off the decision. B can’t believe that A is asking once again about what to sell this summer, so he uses *darou* to try to force A to admit that they should sell air conditioners. Once again, in (14B) the speaker’s degree of certainty can vary anywhere from very low to 100%, and this degree of certainty has nothing to do with the *darou*. The *darou* simply says that the speaker wants to make an assertion, but he’s waiting for feedback from his interlocutor.

The use of *darou* in the question in 14A is trickier. Usually, questions must be marked with either a sentence final morpheme (*ka or no*) or with rising intonation. Without *darou*, since (14A) contains a wh-word, it would sound strange without one of these two question markers. With *darou*, however, neutral or falling intonation is fine, and results in (14A) reading as a self-question: “I wonder what we should sell this summer”, or as Takubo glosses it in his paper, “What do you think we should sell this summer”? In this case, the speaker is doing two things: he seeking an item to “fill in” the wh-word, and he’s delaying assertion until getting some sort of
confirmation from the hearer. In doing so, he’s allowing the hearer to both provide an answer to the question, and also letting the hearer know that he has no expectations of the hearer asserting the answer, or even making an answer at all. In this particular case, it is perfectly natural that the hearer provides an answer, but also delays assertion of that answer by once again using darou. If the hearer had been dead-set on selling air conditioners this summer, he could have answered without the darou, and if he had not felt himself informed enough on the issue, he could have answered with “I don’t know” or even not answered at all.

A straightforward question brings with it the expectation that the hearer have an answer; a self-question leaves the hearer open to answer with varying degrees of confidence, ranging from “I don’t know” to “Definitely p”\(^{19}\). Hence we find Takubo’s instinctive gloss of “What do you think we should sell this summer?” even though the individual lexical items in the sentence make no actual use of the word “think” (or an equivalent) or even of the word “you.” The invitation of the hearer’s thoughts on the matter comes from the use of darou. The question is most certainly not glossed as “What should we sell this summer?”, which would be the equivalent of (14A) without darou.

When darou is analyzed as a modal with a specific quantificational force, various examples need to be relegated to the realm of the footnote, passed off as exceptional, non-epistemic “versions” of the word. The pragmatic interpretation of darou given in this section unifies all of the “versions” of darou by dismissing the idea that darou is a modal and relegating degree of certainty to context. The degree of certainty may also be further specified by the addition of a modal—either adverbial or sentence-final. The fact that darou can be used with a wide range of other modals reflects the fact that it is not a modal itself, and as such does not

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\(^{19}\) Japanese does not have a single lexical item that corresponds to English “wonder,” and Japanese uses very different strategies to form self-questions. In addition to darou, English “wonder” self-questions may be translated with another sentence-final item kana or by embedding a “whether”-question under “I don’t know.”
interfere with the quantificational force of any other lexical item. Alleged “mismatches” of modality can be explained by interactions among other sentence variables besides quantificational force. In fact, the subjective nature of such “modal-interaction” judgments is reflected in the fact that different scholars (and different speakers) give conflicting judgments on similar combinations. Out of context, such judgments cannot be decisively made.

4.2 Further evidence

Darou as defined above can resolve a variety of phenomena surrounding darou in the literature, including scopal properties, politeness, and its interaction with evidentials.

4.2.1 Scope of darou

In his 2006 paper, Takubo notes that darou, unlike the evidentials youda and rashii, does not scope over both clauses in the case of a multi-clause sentence:

(36) Koteibuai-ga  sagar-eba, keiki-ga  yoku-naru  darou.
Official.discount-NOM  fall-if,  economy-NOM  good-become  DAROU
“If the official discount rate goes down, [the economy would improve].”

(37) Koteibuai-ga  sagar-eba, keiki-ga  yoku-naru  youda.
Official.discount-NOM  fall-if,  economy-NOM  good-become  {appear/seem}
“It appears (to be the case) that [if the official discount rate goes down, the economy will improve (accordingly)].”

These scopal features are reinforced by the fact that the two clauses in (36) can be split across two speakers, while they cannot be so split in (37):

(38) A:  Kooteibuai-ga  sagatta-yo.
Official.discount-NOM  fell-EMP
“The official discount rate has been lowered.”

B:  Zya, keiki-ga  yokunaru  darou.
Then  economy-NOM  good-become  DAROU
“Then, the economy would improve.”

20 This is a somewhat awkward translation, left as it was in the original paper. Something like “Then, the economy might/probably will improve” sounds better in English.
A: Kooteibuī-ga sagatta-yo.
    Official.discount-NOM fell-EMP
    “The official discount rate has been lowered.”

B: %%Zya, keiki-ga yokunaru youda.
    Then economy-NOM good-become appear
    “Lit. Then, the economy appears to improve.”

This scopal property of darou as opposed to youda and rashii can be easily explained by our analysis. Darou is concerned with the predication of the argument and predicate in the clause to which it is attached. It is not concerned with the connection of the first clause and the second. Youda and rashii, on the other hand, seem to be concerned with the connection between the clauses, although the specific nature of this property will not be explored in detail here.

Furthermore, darou must almost always appear clause-finally; that is, it must have widest scope over the clause it is attached to. The only elements that may appear after darou in the clause are sentence-final particles, such as the question particle ka, or expressive verbs like to-omou “to think.” Darou must come after the verb, any verb auxiliaries, and any modal. Sugimura’s examples of darou following a modal become markedly worse when the order is switched:

(28) b. ano otoko-wa supai kamoshirenai darou
    that man-TOP spy maybe DAROU
    “That man is perhaps a spy-darou.”

b'. *ano otoko-wa supai darou kamoshirenai
    that man-TOP spy DAROU maybe
    “That man is a spy-darou perhaps.”

c. ano otoko-wa supai nichigainai darou
    that man-TOP spy must be DAROU
    “That man must be a spy-darou.”

c'. *ano otoko-wa supai darou nichigainai
    that man-TOP spy DAROU must be
    “It must be that that man is a spy-darou.”
In formal truth-conditional semantics, modals take propositions as arguments and predicate them of possible worlds. The denotation of the modal, therefore, is the set of possible worlds in which the proposition is true. Therefore, no modal can take a *darou* underneath its scope because *darou* has delayed the predication of the proposition that the modal would have taken as an argument. On the other hand, *darou* may scope over a modal. The group of lexical items handed over to the hearer includes the modal, which has not yet acted on the proposition, since the proposition itself has not yet been formed. It is up to the hearer to complete predication of the proposition, and then to apply the modal to the proposition.

4.2.2 *Use as a Politeness Marker*

*Darou*, in its morphologically “polite” form *deshou* may be used as a marker of politeness. This use easily falls out of the pragmatic analysis of *darou* given above: the speaker delays predication out of a fear of being too presumptuous in the eyes of the hearer. This use of *darou* as a politeness marker conforms to Akio Kamio’s territory of information theory. Kamio defines this theory in terms of a psychological scale for each speaker and hearer, on each of which a piece of information is placed.

```
information
Speaker  |--------|-----------|--------|
          1       n       0

information
Hearer   |-----------|--------|
          1       n       0
```

The “n” represents an arbitrary bound on the scale: if the piece of information is on the “1” side of n, then it is said to be in that interlocutor’s territory of information. The rest of the scale is necessary, since a given piece of information may fall in both interlocutor’s territories, but into
one deeper than the other (with the same being true for levels of being “outside” the territory on the 0-side of n). Various sources of information, such as internal direct experience, professional (or other) expertise, direct experience, and hearsay, determine the level to which a piece of information falls into each interlocutor’s territory.

_Darou_ is one of the forms directly mentioned by Kamio for a specific situation:

a. direct form: S > n  
b. indirect form: S < n  
c. (obligatory) _ne_: 1 = H ≥ S  
d. _darou_: S ≠ H, S > n and H > n

_Darou_ is used when the information falls into both the speaker and the hearer’s territory of information, but further into one than into the other. This works perfectly with the analysis of _darou_ explored above: _darou_ delays predication until the speaker can get a reaction from the hearer. The speaker may be deferring to the hearer, assuming that the hearer is a greater authority on the matter at hand. Or, the speaker may think that s/he is the greater authority, but since s/he also believes that the hearer has some authority in the matter, s/he hedges by using _darou_.

Perhaps the most interesting point that Kamio makes is to connect evidentiality to politeness via his territory of information theory (all of which he places under the general heading of modality):
How far the information falls into an interlocutor’s territory is determined at least in part by factors associated with evidentiality: internal experience, heresay, etc. Based on these territories, a speaker decides which forms are used to defer (or not defer) to the hearer, which is a matter of politeness. This mapping is useful in analyzing darou, since in the literature darou usually falls somewhere in between modal and evidential—but without authors noting that it is sometimes used as a polite form of deferring to another speaker. Unfortunately, I believe that darou is neither an epistemic modal nor an evidential (nor an “evidential modal”), and therefore doesn’t quite fit into this scheme. However, just because darou doesn’t seem to fit into these two categories doesn’t mean that it does not fit into Kamio’s system as described above. In terms of form, darou is what it is: the copula in volitional verb form. In terms of function, darou may be used to mitigate discrepancies found between the territories of information of speaker and hearer. However, this use is just one of several that falls out from the definition given in (iii) above. Darou may be used in other situations as well, and its ability to be used in these situations does not fall out of any sort of evidential properties, nor does it fall out of a modal meaning. It falls out of its formal status as the volitional form of the copula.

4.3 Darou and evidentials

We saw in Section 2.3 above that judgments on sentences that combine darou with a modal can be conflicting from scholar to scholar (or even within the same paper), suggesting that the interactions in such sentences are highly context-dependent and fall out of several variables specific to the individual sentence. However, there is no such conflict on another facet of darou’s distribution: darou does not mix well with evidentials. For example, note that in Sugimura’s series of examples presented in (28) that the sentences that attempt to combine darou
with an evidential are the only ones that are marked as unequivocally bad (i.e., given stars instead of question marks, consistently judged to be bad):

(28)  

d. *ano otoko-wa supai no you darou 
that man-TOP spy GEN seem DAROU 
“It seems that man is a spy-darou.”

e. *ano otoko-wa supai rashii darou 
that man-TOP spy seem DAROU 
“It seems that man is a spy-darou.”

There are two ways to analyze this data in light of our interpretation for darou. Either such combinations are bad because darou is an evidential, and mixing two evidentials results in a conflict, or they are bad because the meaning of darou and the meanings of the evidentials youda and rashii result in conflict. The choice ultimately boils down to one of classification. Is darou in this circumstance troublesome because it is also an evidential, or because something in its meaning causes it to be troublesome?

I believe that there is little reason to classify darou as an evidential. When darou is classified as an evidential, it is usually said to mark the speaker’s lack of evidence (Hara 2006; Sugimura 2004). However, the speaker may have several reasons for using darou other than lack of evidence (and, as we have seen, may not lack evidence at all). The conflict, therefore, must arise from some other aspect of meaning besides “evidentiality.” Before speculating as to the identity of that aspect, we must first find definitions for our example evidentials, rashii and youda.

The proper analysis for evidentials like rashii and youda is as heavily debated as the proper analysis of modals (where darou is usually found in the literature). Yuki Johnson in a book on Japanese modality attempts a consensus of previous sources, defining rashii as an evidential “used to represent a speaker’s presumptive judgment that is derived from outside
information” (Johnson 2003: 77). She describes youda as an evidential “used to express a speaker’s supposition based on visual evidence and sensory impressions” (Johnson 2003: 85).

These two evidentials are at times interchangeable, and there is a long literature that attempts to pull the two apart, with a tentative consensus that rashii is closer to relating hearsay or second-hand information, while youda reflects a conclusion based on the speaker’s own observations. From these definitions, it is easy to see that using these evidentials with darou may result in redundancy. Speakers use darou to delay predication—to hedge on an assertion. Rashii and youda also somewhat hedge on assertions. Rashii suggests that the speaker is not responsible for the factual reliability of the assertion being made. Youda suggests that the speaker has made a judgment based on observation, but does not feel strongly enough about that judgment to flat-out assert it. In both cases, there are propositions being made that are not fully asserted. Certainly, there is some semantic overlap here between evidentials and darou. But is it enough of a conflict to result in the consistent judgment that evidentials and darou cannot mix in the same sentence?

With evidentials, we run into a similar problem as we did for modals. It seems that evidentials (or at least Japanese evidentials) scope over an entire proposition. However, although sentences with evidentials contain propositions that are not being asserted, the evidential sentences themselves are making assertions—that there is evidence for the proposition at hand. In (28’)

\[21\text{ Adapted from Sugimura 2004}\]
Remember that with modals, darou is still managing to block predication of the proposition over which the modal has scope. Why can’t darou do the same thing here with evidentials? In attempting to combine darou with the hearsay-based rashii, we run into an immediate problem. Speakers use rashii to note that the embedded proposition has come from a source outside the speaker. The speaker cannot delay predication of the proposition because the proposition has already been asserted by someone else. This analysis makes the prediction that youda, which is based on the speaker’s own observations, should fare better with darou than rashii. This is, to some extent, true.

It is true that most scholarly works mark combinations of youda and darou such as (22d) as bad sentences. With youda, the speaker is expressing a conclusion they have reached based on observable evidence. Youda expresses that this conclusion may be wrong, but it’s the best conclusion that the speaker has at this point. Furthermore, the conclusion may be verified by looking at objective evidence. In using youda, the speaker is working his or her way towards expressing a fact. Adding darou at this point weakens this process—the speaker is delaying assertion of a conclusion based on their observable evidence that they hope to assert. This doesn’t seem like a useful speech act. However, it can be. If one considers another use of youda, felicitous examples of you-darou suddenly become much more numerous.

Youda has a metaphorical use that is often listed as “another meaning” separate from the meaning described above (in the same way that some uses of darou are also often regulated to realm of “another meaning”). In the example below, the two different readings have been forced by the addition of the optional initial adverb (Johnson 2003, citing Teramura 1984):

e. [ano otoko-wa supai] rashii
   that man-TOP spy seem
   “It seems (from what I’ve heard) that man is a spy.”
In (40a), the speaker is making a conclusion based on the observation that something she is looking at is actually a live fish. In (40b), the speaker is looking at something that is not a live fish, but that reminds her of one for some reason. This metaphorical use of youda seems fine with darou. A quick internet search yielded millions of examples of this combination, two of which are cited below:

(41) a. sakuranbo-no you-deshou
  cherry-GEN YOU-DAROU
  “They looks like a cherries, don’t they?”

b. mone-no e-no you-deshou
  Monet-GEN painting-GEN YOU-DAROU
  “It looks like a Monet painting, doesn’t it?”

(41a) is accompanied by a photograph of cherry-sized apples. (41b) describes a photograph of a green Japanese-style bridge over a pond full of lily pads. This pattern is robust, but often ignored in scholarly works that look at modal/evidential combinations. Johnson dismisses the metaphorical use of youda in a footnote. A book by Heiko Narrog contains a corpus-based chart listing the number of hits for each modal-evidential combination. The combination of you and darou is given the symbol #, which “indicates that a collocation formally exists but with a different meaning or function” (Narrog 2009). However, the metaphorical “meaning” of youda
seems to be very close to the evidential meaning described above: the speaker is stating a metaphor, but that metaphor is based on observable evidence.  

Metaphors, unlike assertions based on observable evidence, cannot be objectively proven. When a speaker uses youda non-metaphorically, he or she is attempting to state a proposition that approaches fact—something that can be proved based on observable evidence. Hence, using darou to hedge on this proposition is counterproductive, and sounds odd, especially out of context. Using darou with metaphorical youda, however, is not problematic. True, the speaker is making a statement based on observable facts, but that statement is an opinion, not a fact. Delaying predication of that opinion can be useful, for any of the reasons that using darou is useful. The speaker may wish that the hearer make the same metaphorical connection between objects—but wants the hearer to arrive at that connection on his/her own in order to reinforce its impact. Or the speaker may doubt their metaphorical connection and may be looking for confirmation from a second party.

We have seen in this section that conflicts between darou and two specific evidentials do not result from conflicts of evidentiality. Rather, they result from conflicts of meaning between the evidentials and the use of darou as delineated in (iii) above. Darou does not combine with rashii because the speaker cannot delay a predication that has already been made by a source outside of the speaker. Darou theoretically can combine with youda, since the proposition in youda is made based on the speaker’s own observed evidence. However, it is not usually in the speaker’s interest to use darou with youda, since the latter is used to make a conclusion approaching fact based on objective, observable evidence. It is, however, in the speaker’s interest to use darou when making a metaphorical observation with youda, since metaphors

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24 While a complete unification of meaning between metaphorical youda and evidential youda falls within the scope of a separate paper, a working assumption helps elucidate the relationship between darou and evidentials.
cannot be objectively proven as fact. We see that such examples are plentiful. Once again, it is in examining *darou*’s relation to specific lexical items that reveals why certain combinations are good and others are bad. Dismissing combinations based on broad categories such as modality or evidentiality leads to countless “exceptions” that slip through the cracks. Even pronouncing *darou* and another lexical item as 100% incompatible is problematic—exceptions may arise here as well, once one fully examines the broadest uses of said lexical item.

5. Semantic Interpretation of *darou*

The pragmatic interpretation of *darou* as explored above seems to capture much of *darou*’s behavior. However, is it possible to capture *darou* in terms of formal semantics? If *darou* is not an epistemic modal, how can this be done? We want *darou*’s meaning to fall out of its morphological form: the volitional form of the copula. Can the volitional—which necessarily involves the will of the speaker—be formalized under truth-conditional semantics without undue mixing of pragmatic and semantic levels?

One possible analysis would treat *darou* as something akin to an attitude verb like the English “believe.” Below is a basic formal definition of “believe” from an introductory semantics textbook (Heim and Kratzer 1998):

\[
[[\text{believe}]]^w = \lambda p \in D_{s,t,s}. [\lambda x \in D. p(w') = 1, \text{for all } w' \in W \text{ that are compatible with what } x \text{ believes in } w]
\]

There are two formal problems with such a formalization of *darou*, regardless of the differences between the particular lexical items (i.e., *darou* is not equivalent to *believe*). The first problem is
that the agent of *darou* must necessarily be the speaker.\(^{25}\) In the definition of “believe” above, the agent of “believe” is the subject of the sentence, which composes neatly into the formula via “x.” This works whether the subject of the sentence is “I”, “you,” or any other person. However, *darou* must take the speaker as its agent, a point that derives from the “volitional” aspect of *darou*’s meaning. Therefore, any formalization of *darou* would need to make explicit mention of the speaker. The second formal problem is that attitude verbs like “believe” take a proposition as their argument, and predicate that proposition over belief-world arguments. Our pragmatic analysis of *darou* claims that it blocks predication of the proposition in the first place. Therefore, *darou* cannot take a fully-formed proposition as the predicate for a belief-world.\(^{26}\)

Even if we ignore the problem that *darou*-sentences do not involve a fully-formed proposition, and even if we relegate the problem of speaker-as-agent to the rest of the grammar,\(^{27}\) we still have difficulty in keeping apart the semantic and pragmatic domains. One attempt:

\[
\text{(44)} \quad [[[\text{darou}]]] = \lambda p. \lambda x. x \text{ intends to assert } p
\]

Both “intend” and “assert” are still operating on a pragmatic level and need to be reformulated. Let’s begin by addressing “intend.” What does it mean for an intentional sentence to be true or false? A person can intend to do an action even if s/he never actually carries it out. A possible solution would be to say that for such a case, there must be at least one possible world in which the agent of intention actually carries out his or her plan. Also, since “intention” implies the action will occur in the future, we should introduce some sort of world-time pairing:

\[
\text{(45)} \quad [[[\text{darou}]][\text{w}]] = \lambda p. \lambda x. x \text{ asserts } p \text{ in at least one } w' \in W \text{ at an } i' \in I \text{ such that } i < i'.
\]

\(^{25}\) Usually, this is the first person argument, but it can also be subject of an attitude verb (i.e., “Junpei” in (43)). In this case, the agent of *darou* is still the speaker, only this time, the speech is reported:

(43) Junpei-wa Noriko-ga kuru darou to-omote-tei-ta.
    Junpei-TOP Noriko-NOM come DAROU QUOT-think-PROG-PAST
    “Junpei thought that Noriko was coming—*darou.*”

\(^{26}\) This may occur when *darou* scopes over a modal, but not when it scopes over a simple argument/predicate.

\(^{27}\) for example, assuming that sentences with a non-speaker agent do not exist for *darou*, or that the speaker-agent relation is some sort of implicature
Even if we decide that such truth conditions truly capture the intentional, the formula in (45) still makes reference to “asserting,” which belongs to the realm of speech acts and not to the realm of compositional semantics.

It seems that any sort of truth-conditional semantic analysis for *darou* must necessarily mix in ideas from the pragmatic level—namely, the speaker and the speaker’s intention to predicate the proposition. While many semantic formalizations, such as Kratzer’s theory of modals described in Section 1, do make explicit mention of contextual features, I do not think that *darou* necessitates such a strategy. One way to look at *darou* sentences is to say that, semantically, nothing happens in them. *Darou* delays predication, passing an argument and a predicate off from speaker to hearer without the formation of a proposition. The hearer then has the option of saturating the predicate with the argument following straightforward predicate calculus. *Darou*, rather than containing the complex aspects of meaning found in a modal, is semantically vacuous, which may reflect its status as a form of the copula *da*. Its main function is pragmatic—it allows by default a kind of speech act that is neither question, nor command, nor assertion. It allows the speaker to hand off the ingredients for a sentence to a hearer for the hearer to assemble, and then accept or dismiss as s/he sees fit.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined *darou*, a specific Japanese lexical item that is usually classified as a modal and/or an evidential, and we have concluded that it is neither. The distribution of *darou* and its varied possible meanings (noted in Section 2) reveals that *darou* cannot be assigned any specific quantificational force without putting aside some of its uses as exceptions, which would require us to say that *darou* has more than one “meaning.” Rather, as
seen in Section 3, *darou*’s meaning emerges from its morphological form: the volitional form of the copula *da*. *Darou*’s properties go beyond the properties of both *da* and the volitional, landing it squarely in the non-propositional sphere.

Section 4 presented a pragmatic analysis: *darou* serves to delay predication by noting the speaker’s intention to predicate once s/he has the cooperation of the interlocutor in making the assertion. If the hearer accepts the assertion, the conversation continues as if the assertion has been made. If not, the speaker must drop the assertion or argue for the assertion more aggressively. From this interpretation, we can explain the distribution and various context-dependent “meanings” of *darou*, as well as its scopal properties, its use as a politeness form, and its interaction with certain evidentials. Furthermore, we concluded that there is no need to classify *darou* as an evidential, as “evidence” seems to be irrelevant in the speaker’s choice of *darou*. The speaker may be delaying predication due to lack of evidence, or may have plenty of evidence but want the hearer to confirm the assertion for other reasons. *Darou*, therefore, is neither a modal nor an evidential. When *darou* is used in tandem with a modal or an evidential, conflicts may arise due to the interaction of meaning between *darou* and the specific lexical item involved, but these conflicts do not arise as the result of two quantificational forces, two quantificational domains, or two evidence types. Section 5 explored potential semantic analyses for *darou*, ultimately concluding that *darou* is semantically vacuous.

Examining the meanings of modals and evidentials necessarily leads into the realm of context—even Kratzer’s formal semantic analysis of modals incorporates contextual aspects. Like modals and evidentials, *darou* cannot be explained without looking at the wider discourse. However, this property alone does not make *darou* a modal or an evidential, and attempting to define it as one or the other results in a too-narrow account replete with exceptions. Close
examination of *darou*’s morphology and use, without any in-going assumptions based on classification schemas, reveals a pragmatic analysis that encompasses all of *darou*’s various interpretations. Once this analysis has been made, the interaction of *darou* with other lexical items can be made, and conflicts of meaning can be explained by looking at the aspects of meaning of each individual item. Categories such as “modal” or “evidential” are useful tools in semantic analysis, but in the case of specific lexical items such as *darou*, premature classification may result in a convoluted interpretation that may be simplified by closer examination of the specific properties of that item, such as its morphology and its behavior in different contexts.
APPENDIX 1: The Japanese Copula

Darou derives from the form de aru, a more formal/literary version of the copula da/desu. In spoken conversation, the copula da is used (or dropped) in informal situations, where desu is used in more formal situations. De aru is today used almost exclusively in the written language, although it may be use in formal ceremonial occasions (sometimes appearing in the even more polite forms de arimasu or de gozaimasu). Nevertheless, darou is considered a contraction of dearou, the “volitional” form of dearu. Darou and dearou have (largely) the same meaning and distribution, with one exception: dearou can appear before a nominal in a relative clause, whereas darou cannot. This restriction parallels a similar one, in which the copular form dearu can precede a nominal, but da cannot (Makino-Tsutsui 1995):

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{a.} & \text{itsuka} & \text{okoru} & \text{dearou} & \text{oojishin} \\
& \text{ sometime} & \text{ occur} & \text{DEAROU} & \text{big earthquake} \\
& & & \text{“the big earthquake that will probably occur at some time”} \\
\text{b.} & \text{itsuka} & \text{okoru} & \text{darou} & \text{oojishin} \\
& \text{ sometime} & \text{ occur} & \text{DAROU} & \text{big earthquake} \\
& & & \text{“the big earthquake that will probably occur at some time”} \\
\end{array}
\]

Three forms of the Japanese copula:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“non-past”:</th>
<th>da</th>
<th>dearu*</th>
<th>desu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“volitional”:</td>
<td>darou</td>
<td>dearu*</td>
<td>deshou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“past”</td>
<td>datta</td>
<td>deatta*</td>
<td>deshita</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

usage: informal, casual | formal, literary | polite

* can be used before nominal in relative clause
APPENDIX 2: Abbreviations

ACC = accusative
COP = copula
EMP = emphatic
GEN = genitive
IMPER = imperative
IMPL = implicative
NOM = nominative
PEF = perfective
POL = politeness marker
Q = question particle
QUOT = quotative marker
TOP = topic
VOL = volitional marker

28 In casual conversation, sometimes used a subject or topic marker.
Works Consulted:


Sugimura, Y. (2004). Gaizensei o arawasu fukushi to bunmatsu no modality keishiki [adverbs of probability and sentence-final modality expressions]. *Gengo Bunka Ronshuu*, 25(2)

