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Barbara Gail Montero
Campus Affiliation: Graduate Center
Degrees/Diplomas: Ph.D. University of Chicago

Research Interests

  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Metaphysics (Physicalism)
  • Cognitive Science (Expertise, Consciousness, Proprioception)
  • Aesthetics
  • Feminist Philosophy (Gender issues in the literary canon)

Courses Recently Taught

  • Bodily Awareness (Spring 2009)
  • Philosophy of Mind (core) (Fall 2007)
  • Physicalism (Spring 2007)
  • Metaphysics (Core) (Fall 2005)

Representative Publications

Mind, Body, Movement: The Relevance of the Consciousness to Expert Performance, Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

“Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?” Inquiry (forthcoming).

“What is the Physical?” in McLaughlin B. and A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press) (2009), pp. 173-188.

Philosophy of Mind, Wadsworth Press (2009), 141 pages.

“Affective Proprioception” co-written with Jonathan Cole,” Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts, Special Issue Edited by Shaun Gallagher, 9.2 ( 2007), pp. 299-317.

“Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New,” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007) pp. 176-189.

“What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?” Dialectica 60:4 (2006), pp. 383–396.

“Proprioceiving Someone Else’s Movement,” Philosophical Explorations, 9:2 June (2006) pp. 149-161.

“Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense,” Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64: 2 (2006) pp. 231-242.

“Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World” Erkentnis, 64: 2 (2006) pp. 177-191.

“The Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism,” co-written with David Papineau, Analysis, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2005) pp. 233-237.

“Consciousness is Puzzling, but Not Paradoxical,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 1 (2004) pp. 213-226.

“The Epistemic/Ontic Divide,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 2 (2003) pp. 404-418.

“New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utility: Is Every World Good, Bad or Neutral?” co-written with D. Fishkind and J. Hamkins, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80: 2 (2002) pp. 178-190.

“Post-Physicalism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8: 2 (2001) pp. 61-80.

“With Infinite Utility, More Needn’t be Better,” co-written with J. Hamkins, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 2 (2000) pp. 231-240.

“The Body Problem,” Noûs, 33: 3 (1999) pp. 183-20.