Book Reviews

territory. What one is left with upon closing the covers of this “intellectual biography,” it should be further noted, is something more than an identification of the sociocultural milieu in question, something more than a drawing out of the interrelation of the life and work of the subject, and something more than a comprehensive investigation into the historical implications of each: one is left, whether or not it was the author’s intention, with an ever deepening sense of compassion for one of the greatest thinkers, founders even, of the modern era.

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Like the course of true love, psychoanalytic historiography never has run smooth. From the beginning, with Freud’s seminal discoveries, conceptualizations of psychic life and its unconscious dimensions have been subjected to, and have informed, changing understandings of relations between selves and the social and cultural dimensions of the Western world and beyond. In both enormously generative and narrowly defensive ways, the use of psychoanalytic concepts has played consequential roles, from conservative to revolutionary, in a wide range of politically charged controversies. When in 2009 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl and Christine Dunbar constructed a timeline of psychoanalysis from 1900 to 2000, their challenge was to encompass the interplay of shifting generational, national, theoretical, institutional, social, and cultural differences and conflicts within an historiographic design that could also acknowledge major individuals and scores of important texts. The result was a foldout book replete with color-coded information on both sides, some nine feet long when the book is fully extended. The complexity and overdetermination of the subject demands extensive learning, imaginative
design, and careful, lucid expression, especially since reductive and tendentious characterizations and uses of psychoanalysis have stalked its public presentation for over a century.

In *Cold War Freud: Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes*, Dagmar Herzog meets the challenge of psychoanalytic historiography superbly. Her book joins a growing list of innovative biographical studies of Freud (see, e.g., Edmundson 2007; Phillips 2014; Roudinesco 2016; Whitebook 2017) and historical contextualizations of psychoanalysis by scholars like Mari Jo Buhle (1998), Sander Gilman (1993), George Makari (2008), and Eli Zaretsky (2004, 2017). A distinguished historian at the CUNY Graduate Center, Herzog has written extensively and brilliantly about sexuality, fascism, and religion, central topics that have occupied the intersections of debates within psychoanalysis and controversies between psychoanalysis and surrounding public contexts.

In *Cold War Freud*, Herzog takes up the “uneasy encounters” between psychoanalytic ideas and the “calamitous events of World War II and beyond” (p. 1). She tells one overarching story in six chapters. That story is about “the inescapable reality of continual mutual imbrication of selves and societies” (p. 11), despite Ernest Jones’s 1949 directive to avoid “extrapsychic dynamics” (p. 3). Social crises throughout the postwar period and into the present “all demanded that the constant intricate interplay between inside and outside, fantasy and reality, be theorized anew” (p. 215). In three sections of two densely argued chapters each, Herzog concentrates on the themes of sexuality (“Leaving the World Outside”), trauma (“Nazism’s Legacies”), and post-Freudian cultural transformations (“Radical Freud”). Herzog’s interweaving of public, personal, institutional, and theoretical facets of controversial historical issues makes her enormously erudite presentations immune to brief summary, but let me sketch each chapter’s main elements to help convey the book’s range and richness.

Herzog’s opening chapter takes up the controversies over the place of sexuality during the “halcyon days” (p. 22) of high prestige and major funding of American psychoanalysis in the two decades following World War II. Beginning in the 1930s, neo-Freudians—Franz Alexander, Erich Fromm, Harry Stack Sullivan, and, most centrally for Herzog, Karen Horney—had rejected Freudian libido theory, turning their attention to social anxieties. Horney displaced the Freudian oedipal framework, instead focusing on the sense of powerlessness, the need for safety, and “the desire for reassurance” (p. 28) and, like Fromm, on “self-preservation” (p. 30). Although her ambition and theoretical differences generated
internecine conflict in the New York Psychoanalytic Society and with its representative, Lawrence Kubie, and although neo-Freudian views were denounced by more politically radical interpreters of Freud, figures like Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, as “offensively platitudinous” (p. 36) and responsible for the desexualization of psychoanalysis, Herzog forcefully argues that Horney “extensively theorized both sexuality itself and the relationships between sexual and other realms of existence in ways that were far ahead of her time” (p. 36).

In the American public arena, Herzog shows, the postwar suppression of radical politics and the advent of a “sex-normative psychoanalysis” (p. 37) were part of a larger battle between psychoanalysis and religion. The so-called “Jewish science” became “profoundly Christianized” (p. 22). A prime example is the response by Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen to the best-selling Peace of Mind by Rabbi Joshua Loth Liebman in 1946, a book that presented Freud’s “spiritual purpose” (p. 37) as integral to distinctly Jewish assimilation. Sheen loosed a barrage of accusations against Freudian “materialism, hedonism, infantilism and eroticism” (p. 39). It would not be hard to hear anti-Semitic echoes in Sheen’s statements that transference is “only used when the patient is a young and very beautiful woman” and that psychoanalysis “cater[s] only to the rich” (p. 39). Herzog chronicles the controversy’s numerous variations, and the Christian trend toward seeking compromise and accommodation, so long as “impure waves” of the “the pansexual method,” as Pope Pius XII put it, did not delve too deeply into “the world of sexual suggestions and tendencies” (p. 51). Psychoanalysis needed to be made safe for original sin and the avoidance of promiscuity.

In the intertwining of sex, science, and the soul, it fell primarily to the Menninger brothers, practicing Christians, to defend psychoanalysis while avoiding the Scylla of neo-Freudianism and the Charybdis of non-normative sexuality. Relying heavily on Time magazine, “ever attuned to mainstream concerns” (p. 44), Herzog recounts Karl Menninger’s work to promote psychoanalysis, to educate and reassure its detractors simultaneously, and “to ward off the slightest hint that psychoanalysis had any non-conventional intentions” (p. 50).

Even as these tensions over religion persisted, the Kinsey reports and the sex research of Masters and Johnson disrupted the conventional understanding of heterosexual marriage in the late 1940s and 1950s. In her second chapter, Herzog describes how “psychoanalysts reacted with a combination of creative flexibility and furious tenacity” (p. 57). Psychoanalysts “as a guild
[were] uniformly and extraordinarily critical” (p. 58). Condemnation of homosexuality helped make psychoanalysis acceptable to mainstream America, and analysts like Edmund Bergler, Irving Bieber, and Charles Socarides, rejecting feminist and gay activism, promoted pathological interpretations of homosexual development, even as the paradigm shift from oedipal to preoedipal explanations took hold. Herzog recounts the long struggle to depathologize homosexuality, a struggle that would not formally succeed until 1991, when the American Psychoanalytic Association adopted a nondiscrimination policy, followed by the IPA in 2002. It was during the postwar period, Herzog adds, that “the claim that loveless sex was pathological” (p. 66) took hold in the United States.

By the mid-1970s, with the status of psychoanalysis declining within American psychiatry, the American Psychological Association had removed homosexuality from the DSM, and creative analysts like Robert Stoller and Judd Marmor were responding brilliantly to their reactionary peers. “No one,” Herzog, writes, “turned the mirror around onto the heterosexual male norm as forcefully—at once mockingly and earnestly—as Stoller did” (p. 77). Refocusing the issue on fantasies and distinctive individual styles, Stoller moved “from drive to drama” (p. 80), opposing the biomedical DSM model, as well as endemic homophobia and the “love doctrine” (p. 82). His work thus joined the landmark studies of Kenneth Lewes (1988) and Nancy Chodorow (1992), which “insisted on the importance of pluralizing sexualities and heterosexualities alike” (pp. 83–84).

In her third chapter, Herzog turns to a comprehensive account of the emergence of the concept of PTSD, “an ‘invention-discovery’ born of multiple, overlapping conflicts” (p. 89). Her central aim is “to reintegrate the history of post-Holocaust trauma into the history of PTSD” (pp. 93–94). In 1956, a West German law providing for small pensions to Jewish Holocaust survivors triggered a heated debate over the nature and consequences of traumatic experience, and psychoanalysis could be enlisted both by “rejecters,” often overtly anti-Semitic, who denied the specific effects of the Holocaust (said one, “Once again the ‘Chosen People’ are . . . dancing around the ‘golden calf’” [p. 97]), and “sympathizers” who insisted on its profound and lasting impact. Herzog recounts the affect-laden complications of memory, ideology, and political pressure that suffused the debates until German psychiatrists like Kurt Kolle could document the sufferings of survivors and point to the “entangled play of forces” (p. 105) that accounted for each individual case. All the issues besetting trauma theory were at play: childhood vs. adult experience; the
role of devastating environments; the capacity for and time of recovery; the meanings of chronic symptomatology; the conscious and unconscious motivations of “experts”; etc. In controversies and conflicts that extended up to 1980, when PTSD entered the DSM, and into the present, moral outrage could not easily be supported by clear theoretical coherence, but within this historical turmoil, Herzog shows, “politics . . . literally moved the science forward” (p. 93).

It was courageous “sympathizers” who turned the tide. Herzog singles out William G. Niederland, Irving Krystal, and, especially, Kurt Eissler. Eissler “dismantled the rejecters’ strategies piece by piece” (p. 107), pointing to their countertransference bias and lack of empathy. New studies (e.g., Robert Jay Lifton’s writing about Hiroshima survivors) contributed to understanding common features of survivor experience, but, in an historical version of Nachträglichkeit, “it took Vietnam to bring the Holocaust fully into focus” (p. 110). In the 1970s a host of individual and mass catastrophes came to be recognized as causes of “post-traumatic disorders” (p. 112); “by a twist of historical fate,” Herzog writes, “it . . . took the catastrophic decline in the USA’s moral authority internationally due to the war in Vietnam . . . to bring not just soldiers’ but also survivors’ traumas into American public consciousness and into official nomenclature and professional policy” (p. 113).

The designation of PTSD, however, carried other problems, such as the “amoralization of trauma” that “blurred the differences between victims and perpetrators” (p. 113), and the focus on the individual rather than on traumatizing environmental conditions that continue to proliferate worldwide. Herzog emphasizes the work of Hans Keilson (1992) and David Becker (2006) in defining the immediate and deferred effects of traumatic experiences, and the “recursive relationships” (p. 118) in traumatic processes. Nowhere in her book is her central thesis more fully vindicated than here: “intrapsychic processes were always in imbrication with the sociopolitical environs” (p. 117).

Herzog’s center of gravity moves to postwar Germany in her fourth chapter, as she takes up the controversy over the nature of aggression. Is human aggression to be understood as innate and universal or as culturally determined? How is aggression related to sexual frustration and sexual liberation? The vexed issue of Freud’s death drive became intertwined with the return of psychoanalysis to West Germany, as the crucial work of Alexander Mitscherlich, exemplified in The Inability to Mourn (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1967), encountered “the astonishing public
success” (p. 129) of Konrad Lorenz’s On Aggression (1963). Tensions between Mitscherlich’s efforts to promote tolerance, ego strength, and critical thinking (in sharp contrast with Lacan’s unstable ego) and Lorenz’s “vigorou
puzzle of what attracts human beings to particular political stances” (p. 156). (Parenthetically, I would note that a search of the PEP archive fails to identify even one reference to *Anti-Oedipus*, though Herzog footnotes many sources outside its purview.)

In Herzog’s reading, *Anti-Oedipus* assaults “reductionist versions of Freudianism and Marxism both . . . in a chaotically joyful remix of idiosyncratic original ideas” with philosophical, psychoanalytic, and literary concepts (p. 153). Central to this project is the search for answers to the question “Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” (p. 160), a question of serious contemporary relevance. Deleuze and Guattari found in Klein’s language of part objects and projective identification, and in Lacan’s ideas of unstable, sliding signifiers and the ego’s misrecognitions, a response to what they “perceived as a willful and appalling myopia in familialist thinking” (p. 167). In a reflection of the political turmoil they sought to comprehend, they mocked the sacrosanct trope of the oedipal triangle, especially in more conventional French psychoanalysis, and developed a philosophic-psychoanalytic language of flows and intersections of desire that attempted to evoke and capture a reality in which inner and outer, private and social, were continually interpenetrating. In their metaphor, the psyche was a factory, not a theater, and the social field was immediately invested with desire.

Herzog associates their project with other, more sober, shifts in psychoanalytic thought about political realities, and with writings that moved the emphasis of theory “from Oedipus to Narcissus” (p. 177). Mitscherlich, Kohut, and Loewald, for example, shared in and contributed to this shift, which was accompanied by both a sense of psychoanalysis in crisis and an increasing diversity of perspectives on psychic life. The crisis of authoritarian structures unleashed forces of institutional destruction, but also contained seeds of renewed, politically engaged vitality, especially in Western Europe and South America. (Perhaps Herzog’s focus on political engagement helps account for the absence of Erik Erikson in *Cold War Freud*, though his *Childhood and Society* [1950] was widely read and taught for decades in the United states and he was the only psychoanalyst except Freud ever to appear on the cover of *Time*.)

The final chapter of *Cold War Freud* surveys and celebrates the remarkable careers of Paul Parin, Goldy Parin-Matthèy, and Fritz Morganthaler, who developed the theories and practices of “Ethnopsychoanalysis,” a term coined by George Devereux. Although psychoanalysis and anthropology had been in contentious dialogue since Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret
Mead in the 1920s, it was the work of this Swiss-based trio that explored the uses and limitations of psychoanalytic theories and practices among decolonized populations in West Africa and elsewhere from 1960 to the 1980s. Believing that “to ignore extrapsychic contexts was not just politically ignorant but also, quite simply, scientifically wrong” (p. 192), they allowed themselves to form a “mutually transformative relationship” (p. 193) with their informants, anticipating later practices in both fields. In their most famous book, *The Whites Think Too Much* (1963), which later achieved cult status among left-leaning students, they explored gender relations, sexual practices, and the intermixing of pagan and Muslim cultures among the Dogon in Mali. This and many other writings showed how the “conventional ego psychologists’ version of the Oedipus complex was not universally applicable but rather a capitalist-culture-bound genital-primacy-bound one” (p. 199).

Morganthaler’s ethnopsychoanalytic perspective also led him to challenge other traditional European pieties. Herzog details the arguments of an “utterly chaotic but soon to be extraordinarily influential essay” of 1974 in *Psyche* titled “The Position of the Perversions in Metapsychology and Technique,” in which Morganthaler draws on the ideas of Heinz Hartmann and Phyllis Greenacre to argue that symptoms “could also be the products of an individual’s efforts at self-healing” (p. 200). Creating a “signature concept,” Morganthaler designated a “perversion or a preferred orientation as a *Plombe,* literally a ‘filling,’” and thus an ego achievement, “a sexualized attempt to solve a more primal existential issue” (p. 200). This essay and other generative works by Morganthaler and the Parins made them heroes of the post-1968 counterculture in West Germany, not least in the “antihomophobic pushback” of the 1970s (p. 204).

Writing of the Parins and Morganthaler, Herzog states a general feature of her historiographic vision. Their work, she says, shows “once more . . . how in the history of psychoanalysis ideas can often take hold and accrue import in the oddest of sequences, not all at once, but selectively in some instances, cumulatively in others—and with lines of connection between concepts and their consequences running backwards and forwards and sideways in time” (p. 181).

Stated this way, psychoanalytic history seems remarkably similar to the psychoanalytic process as it unfolds clinically. In an afterword, Herzog points out that the antipsychoanalytic literature misses “an astonishing array” of—often mutually incompatible—psychoanalytic concepts of human selfhood (p. 219). The superb scholarship and recognition of
overdetermination in Cold War Freud exemplify how this “astonishing array” has been responsive to the challenges and deep conflicts of the past century. Her sympathies are with the individual and collective liberating potentials of psychoanalysis, the restless questioning of the status quo of the “extraordinary plasticity to the thought-system that evolved under the aegis of the name of Freud” (p. 220). Cold War Freud is a major achievement.

REFERENCES


This remarkable book, published ten years ago, has gone through several editions, selling in the neighborhood of fifty thousand copies. This is an unusual phenomenon in the Peruvian book market.

This extraordinary achievement has been possible because Jorge Bruce is a *sui generis* psychoanalyst: besides working with patients on the couch, he writes a weekly column in one of the country’s most prestigious newspapers about the political and social conflicts in Peruvian life. In that column he clearly evinces a psychoanalytic perspective.

Thus, this book combines the perspective of the columnist with that of the psychoanalyst, providing us an illustrated account of prejudice and racism, realities evident in all aspects of Peruvian life. This book has not been written exclusively for psychoanalysts; rather, it aims to engage as many people as possible who are interested in the subject of racism in Peruvian society.

Bruce covers in his book a variety of topics, from the public sphere to everyday life, from the public domain to the privacy of home or the couch, analyzing the perspective of the discriminated against, as well as the