

# GLOBAL DESIGN HISTORY

Edited by Glenn Adamson, Giorgio Riello and Sarah Teasley



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## THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE DEUTSCHER WERKBUND

### Design reform, industrial policy, and German foreign policy, 1907–1914

*John V. Maciuika*

What role did the German Imperial government and individual states play in the development of early twentieth-century modern German design culture?<sup>1</sup> A twentieth-century historiographical tradition in architectural history and design history suggests hardly any at all.<sup>2</sup> Yet in the opening years of the twentieth century, the Prussian Ministry of Commerce and Trade emerged as an unexpected sponsor of path-breaking modernist design principles through its economic development policies. Operating at the point where economic development, design aesthetics, and educational reform converged, the Prussian Commerce Ministry institutionalized a veritable catalogue of modernist design doctrines between 1903 and 1907 through the reform of its top three dozen schools for arts, crafts, and trades, or *Kunstgewerbe- und Handwerkerschulen*.

Overseen by the government architect and Prussian civil service veteran Hermann Muthesius, the Commerce Ministry's reforms transmuted the values of the British Arts and Crafts movement into the techniques of proto-industrial design at state schools from Aachen in the west to Königsberg in the east, and from Flensburg by the North Sea to Breslau in Silesia.<sup>3</sup> The reforms fulfilled a mandate issued by Muthesius's superior in the Prussian government, Commerce Minister Theodor Möller. Minister Möller explicitly sought to train a new generation of artisans, building trades workers, and other members of Prussia's traditional "old" *Mittelstand* for service to a modern consumer economy.<sup>4</sup> By conferring upon artisans what it called "the advantages enjoyed by large enterprise," the Commerce Ministry hoped to revolutionize the design and production of Germany's applied arts goods and boost the country's competitive position in international markets. At the same time, the Commerce Ministry sought to overhaul a nineteenth-century German reputation for exporting products that one government official, reporting from the German section of the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition in 1876, had notoriously labeled "cheap and bad."<sup>5</sup>

It would be erroneous to claim that the Prussian Ministry of Commerce was the only state institution exploring new directions in arts, crafts, and trades in the early twentieth century. On the contrary, the German states of Bavaria, Württemberg, Hessen, Weimar, and Saxony all witnessed highly individualized private and public design reform efforts which, taken together, led to the formation of the Deutscher Werkbund in October of 1907. Prior to the First World War, the Werkbund, a private, non-profit middle-class association for design reform, was far and away the most advanced organization for the promotion of fresh approaches to design across Germany. Uniting a diverse group of artists, craftsmen, architects, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, cultural critics, and government officials, the Werkbund, according to one of its early slogans, furnished multiple platforms for the "improvement of German production through artistic intervention."

Between 1907 and 1912, leading Werkbund figures met frequently to debate how business, the applied arts, and industry could best reform and modernize German production, distribution, and consumption. Beginning in 1912, however, and in a development that is less well documented and understood, the Werkbund began aggressively building a foreign network in tune with changes taking place in the landscape of German industrial and foreign policy. This was not simply a "normal" or predictable phase in the growth of a private, non-profit association, however. It was the full-fledged mobilization of the Werkbund by forces in government for the purpose of the global commercial expansion of the Wilhelmine Empire.

More than a century after the creation of the Werkbund in 1907, a legacy of disciplinary divisions into art history, design history, German history, German studies, etc. has bequeathed scholars with a series of more or less aesthetically oriented accounts of the famous "Werkbund debates" of 1914. This well-known conflict pitted backers of Hermann Muthesius, who forcefully promoted the "making of industrial types" (*Typisierung*) as the new focus of Werkbund industries' activities, against the supporters of Henry van de Velde, an artist, designer, and passionate defender of "artistic individualism." Indeed, events surrounding the 1914 debate are sufficiently murky that even its participants at the time admitted to some confusion about the nuances of the various positions. The achievement of clarity requires a fairly deep understanding of the organization, its leading players, and the historical context in order to make sense of the debate.<sup>6</sup>

By contrast, and for the history of modern architecture during most of the twentieth century, the pitting of "individualists" against the "backers of industrial types" was at the core of a modernist teleology in which, supposedly, standardization and an accompanying tendency toward machined abstraction were the inevitable results of the progress of industrial culture. Individualist artist-designers with roots in such heavily ornamented styles as Art Nouveau, this argument implied, were merely out of date and doomed to fade from the scene of international developments. Just how widespread this sentiment was can be seen through the fact that even such vociferous critics of the Werkbund as the Viennese architect Adolf Loos helped further the anti-ornamental attitudes of early twentieth-century designers

with his landmark essay, "Ornament and Crime," itself the subject of recent critical re-evaluation by scholars.<sup>7</sup> But regardless of current re-evaluations of this important era for German and worldwide design developments, the Werkbund debate on the eve of World War I has remained a signal event for artistic upheavals that later manifested themselves in the Weimar Bauhaus and the International Style.

German historians, for their part, have taken note of the Werkbund mainly from an internal, organizational point of view. As a result, for example, when the historian Joan Campbell published her classic study of the Werkbund in 1978, the so-called "Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts" in her book's subtitle referred mostly to the politics within the organization. The book spends far less time investigating, for instance, the developments in national politics and economic policy that are examined below, and which, it turns out, had an enormous impact on the development and ambitions of the Werkbund.

To Werkbund leaders like Hermann Muthesius, Friedrich Naumann, and Ernst Jäckh, the Werkbund operated at the intersection of art's claims to represent a civilizing German *Kultur*, on the one hand, and, on the other, industry's demands for a political influence commensurate with its growing pre-eminence in German economic life. Jäckh, a Naumann disciple from southern Germany, replaced Wolf Dohrn as the managing director of the Werkbund in April 1912. This move was seen as crucial for enlarging the sphere of the Werkbund's international activities, as Jäckh prided himself on his close contacts with the German Foreign Office and with newspaper editors throughout German-speaking Europe.

It was no coincidence that Jäckh's debut at the Werkbund annual conference in June of 1912 coincided with the first truly "expansionist" meeting of the Werkbund membership. Held on foreign soil in the Imperial Hapsburg capital of Vienna, the Werkbund conference featured speeches by leaders like Peter Bruckmann, a south-German silver manufacturer who had served as the organization's president since 1909. Before an audience that included unprecedented representation of government officials from both German and Austro-Hungarian government ministries, Bruckmann, in an address entitled "The Next Tasks of the Deutscher Werkbund," announced that the Werkbund was now poised to become the official representative of German foreign trade and finished goods' industries abroad.<sup>8</sup> When one considers that April 1912 also marked the transfer of the Werkbund headquarters from Karl Schmidt's offices at the garden city of Dresden-Hellerau to an office managed by Ernst Jäckh in Berlin, it is clear that the Werkbund was rapidly entering a new phase of its development.

Most art histories cite the run-up to the First Werkbund Exhibition, planned for the summer of 1914 in the historic Rhineland city of Cologne, as the primary reason for these changes. Yet this is only one part of the story. It is a story that emphasizes the Cologne Exhibition as a landmark pre-war spectacle of art, architecture, and design. However, profound political changes were also afoot beginning in January 1912 that vaulted the Werkbund to the forefront of German commercial and foreign policy. That winter ushered in events in Wilhelmine German history that earned the designation of a period of "stable crisis" from the respected German historian

Thomas Nipperdey.<sup>9</sup> What happened, in short, is that the socialists of the Social Democratic Party captured the majority in the Reichstag elections of January 1912—in spite of the fact that there was a discriminatory, three-class voting system in Wilhelmine Germany that placed this party's non-property owners at a distinct disadvantage.<sup>10</sup>

In the clamor following these elections the government struggled to keep control, and was forced to navigate among a series of unattractive political choices. For one, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg rejected calls from outraged conservatives in the military, heavy industry, and agriculture to dissolve the Reichstag (parliament) and to ban political demonstrations in support of the Social Democrats. At the same time, Bethmann-Hollweg also refused socialists' calls to convert Germany to a democracy. This was a central demand on the part of the victorious Social Democratic Party, who wished for a system of one-man-one-vote for its constituency of workers and other disenfranchised groups. The compromise struck by Bethmann-Hollweg and Interior Minister Clemens Delbrück, who shortly before had been Muthesius' boss at the Prussian Commerce Ministry, is telling: the government hoped to overcome the sudden gridlock in domestic policy caused by the Social Democratic victory by aggressively promoting commercial expansion both at home and abroad. The major agents of this commercial expansion were to be the Deutscher Werkbund and Gustav Stresemann's Association for Light Industry (*Bund Deutscher Industriellen*, or BDI), a group that represented the makers of German finished goods.<sup>11</sup>

By 1913, and working with Jäckh, Naumann, Muthesius, and Gustav Stresemann (who was also a Werkbund member), the Chancellor's office and the Foreign Office were enlarging the Werkbund's network by contacting German embassies and consulates around the world. German diplomatic outposts in Rio de Janeiro, Beirut, Calcutta, Genoa, and other cities received instructions about the Werkbund and its central role in improving the quality of German products and supporting German culture through the cooperation of artists, manufacturers, and merchants. The Chancellor's Office also requested that consulates furnish it with addresses of all German businesses and professionals operating in foreign territory who could serve as conduits for Werkbund propaganda, which the ministry wished to have businesses disseminate as widely as possible in these countries.<sup>12</sup>

The shorthand for Germany's aggressive expansion into world markets at this time was known as "Weltpolitik," or global politics, to secure well-designed German products a place in the "Weltwirtschaft," or world economy.<sup>13</sup> In this new system, Germans from the working to the middle classes, and from manufacturers to business professionals, would benefit as a flood of revenues from the expanding export and manufacturing economy would raise its participants on a rising tide. In this vision, AEG appliances by the artist-architect Peter Behrens, or silverware and flatware from the firm of Werkbund president Peter Bruckmann, would move from being Werkbund exemplars of German "quality work," or *Qualitätsarbeit*, to becoming leading German export items for distribution on a global scale.

Architectural and design historians have seldom placed emphasis on this explicit

foreign and commercial policy goal. German historians, for their part, have tended to focus on pre-World War I German naval fleet expansion, or on the gunboat diplomacy that came into fashion in 1911 with the so-called "Morocco Crisis." Yet there are some important and under-appreciated ways in which the economics of military expansion dovetailed nicely with global commercial success for Werkbund designers and companies. The legendary Krupp Steelworks, one of the largest Werkbund firms, is an example of a company that took maximum advantage of the government's new outlook. Working with company patriarch Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Bethmann-Hollweg's office arranged free passage on a luxury steamer from South America to Germany for Major João Simplicio de Carvalho, Brazil's incoming Minister of Transport and one-time War Ministry attaché, so that he could tour the planned Werkbund Exhibition of 1914. Major Simplicio de Carvalho was to be shown German industry's finest examples of locomotives, passenger train cars, automobiles, and planes, and was to be treated as an honored minister of state throughout his visit. As the Chancellor noted in a letter to the German consul in Brazil, the Krupp Company, one of Germany's only heavy industries to join the Werkbund, would also take de Carvalho on a tour through the legendary Krupp steelworks, a family-owned global German company in possession of eighty factories in nearby Essen alone.<sup>14</sup> Here family patriarch Gustav Krupp would usher the Brazilian dignitary through detailed explanations of the Krupp steel production process, followed by a visit to sales displays of Germany's finest steel-plated armor, naval guns, artillery field pieces, and railway wheels and rails.<sup>15</sup> Between the Werkbund Exhibition and the Krupp tour, Foreign Office officials expressed confidence that Major de Carvalho's "far-reaching influence would soon be of benefit to German commerce, German industry, and shipping" in the form of sizable contracts from Brazil.<sup>16</sup>

It is in this context that we can understand such invited Werkbund design competitions as the project for a House of German-Turkish Friendship for Istanbul in 1916. The Stuttgart-based automotive giant Robert Bosch, a major Werkbund patron, underwrote the competition, which drew designs from such invited Werkbund architects as Bruno Taut, Peter Behrens, Hans Poelzig, and German Bestelmeyer. Colonial expansion and a certain orientalist outlook informed German efforts to gain influence over Ottoman territory as one of the few portions of the globe that had not yet come under the sway of another colonial power. Werkbund managing director Jäckh's web of connections extended to the Ottoman Empire, where he had served as a diplomatic attaché for years. Jäckh was active as the head of the German-Turkish Union at the same time as he managed the Werkbund, and conveniently had its offices located on a different floor of the same Berlin building as the Deutscher Werkbund.<sup>17</sup>

In concert with official policies, Friedrich Naumann and especially Ernst Jäckh stepped up measures to sketch a pre-war road map for imperialism in the Wilhelmine Empire's backyard. Friedrich Naumann's *Assistance (Die Hilfe)* generally "took a strongly imperialist line," while Jäckh, a regular contributor, launched a series of additional publishing projects to spell out the terms for a bold, expansive,



German-led alliance.<sup>18</sup> The foundation of the German-Austro-Hungarian Economic Association in September 1913, only a year after the Werkbund's Congress in Vienna, lent fuel to Jäckh's vision of a gigantic trading bloc dominated politically and economically by Germany.<sup>19</sup> Such programs for customs' unions and various degrees of unification of East Central Europe under German hegemony were certainly part of a long tradition of discussions among pan-Germanists and colonialists like Albert Ritter, Heinrich Class, Paul Rohrbach, and others.<sup>20</sup> Jäckh optimistically and perhaps naively assumed that a German challenge to the British Empire at two of its "sores spots," namely Egypt and India, could succeed without provoking war.<sup>21</sup> He was certainly not alone among factions of German industry in advocating a "Berlin to Baghdad line"—a rail line and axis of trade projected to stretch well beyond Germany, Austria-Hungary, through the Balkans and Turkey, and ultimately to the Persian Gulf.<sup>22</sup>

The imperial visions of Jäckh, Naumann, and Stresemann hinged on a relatively straightforward, interlocking mercantile scheme: Germany would be able to purchase such raw material supplies as oil, iron, and bauxite it desperately needed from newly secured markets in the Balkans, Turkey, and from Ottoman-Arab holdings extending around the Red Sea. In exchange, these allies and trade partners would have privileged access to products from Germany's burgeoning finished-goods industries—i.e., Werkbund industries. German commercial, banking, and industrial interests generally backed these types of measures, while Jäckh's patriotic and boosterist propaganda publications detailed ambitions for challenging England's "Pax Britannica" with an alternative "Pax Germanica." To promote this cause Jäckh produced such publications as *Germany in the Near East Following the Balkan War* (1913), *Greater Germany* (1914), *The Rising Crescent: On the Path to German and Turkish Union* (1915), and *Werkbund and Mitteleuropa* (1916).<sup>23</sup> Jäckh's program was notably more expansive than Naumann's calls for a pan-German and East Central European *Mitteleuropa*, although Naumann's book of the same name, published in 1915, espoused similar economic ambitions. Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* was, in fact, to become the politician's best-selling, most-translated, and most-discussed publication.<sup>24</sup>

Jäckh's pre-war publications are just the furthest projection of a pan-German global economic and political power scenario that squared with the evolving policies of government and the lobbying efforts of Germany's largest industrial associations between 1911 and 1914. They are also of a piece with Muthesius' July 1914 lecture at the Werkbund's annual congress in Cologne, "The Future Work of the Werkbund," and with Naumann's address a few days later, "The Werkbund and the World Economy." Barely six weeks after these speeches and the heated Werkbund debates that so came to dominate pre-World War I German design history, the outbreak of World War I and the general mobilization of German military forces eclipsed the Werkbund's expansive program for commercial domination. Even though the Werkbund would never be the same following the outbreak of the war, it is worth noting just how closely the agenda of many leading Werkbund designers and policymakers matched the German government's pre-World War I politics of global competition and commercial expansion.

Immediately following the contentious Werkbund congress, Jäckh, Muthesius, Naumann, and Bruckmann would unflinchingly use the power of the press, and particularly Rudolf Mosse's newspaper, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, to dissipate and eventually to dismiss entirely the dissension arising from Henry van de Velde and other Werkbund "individualists." Well into World War I, the Werkbund leadership's propaganda and policy efforts pointed the way toward a far-reaching program of "types" for manufacturing, production, and export. However, wartime prerogatives, a militarized economy, and growing international isolation would preclude the realization of the pre-war Werkbund's ambitious plans.

Nearly a century later, what is important to realize is the degree to which divergent disciplinary interests have kept both historians of German architecture and design and historians of modern Germany from considering the interpenetration of political history, economic history, and architectural and design history examined briefly here. The unique character of the Wilhelmine era—a time that Kaiser Wilhelm II himself privately described in 1903 as "an infinitely difficult period of history" requiring "the reconciliation of traditional and modern times"<sup>25</sup>—calls on historians and architectural historians to at least do this much: to employ current interdisciplinary methods, in other words, to capture the layered, nuanced dynamics of the Wilhelmine era and its particular—and likewise interdisciplinary—times.

## Notes

- 1 The present chapter developed out of state-by-state analyses first explored in John V. Maciuika, *Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics, and the German State, 1890–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See especially Chapters 1 and 7.
- 2 The Werkbund has been most trenchantly analyzed in the following: Joan Campbell, *The German Werkbund: The Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Frederic J. Schwartz, *The Werkbund Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War* (New Haven: Yale, 1996); on pre-World War I Bauhaus precedents see also Hans M. Wingler, *Das Bauhaus 1919–1933: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin* (Bramsche: Verlag Gebr. Rasch, 1962); Gillian Naylor, *The Bauhaus Reassessed: Sources and Design Theory* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1985).
- 3 Muthesius began serving as a civil servant in the Prussian Ministry of Public Works in 1893, and began working for the Commerce Ministry in 1897. See Hermann Muthesius, "Mein Lebens- und Bildungsgang" (25 September, 1900), Muthesius Estate, Berlin Werkbund Archives; see also Eckhard Siepmann and Angelika Thiekötter, eds., *Hermann Muthesius im Werkbund-Archiv*, (Berlin: Werkbund-Archiv, 1990), pp. 105–28.
- 4 During late nineteenth-century industrialization an "old" *Mittelstand* of artisans, tradespeople, and shopkeepers was joined by a "new" *Mittelstand* of white-collar clerks, secretaries, and office workers in business and civil service. See Heinrich A. Winkler, *Mittelstand, Demokratie, und Nationalsozialismus* (Koeln: 1972); Herman Lebovics, *Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914–1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 6–11; David Blackbourn, "The *Mittelstand* in German Society and Politics, 1871–1914," *Social History*, 4 (1977), pp. 409–33.
- 5 "Denkschrift über die Begründung eines Landesgewerbeamts und eines Ständigen Beirats," in *Anlagen zum Staatshaushalts-Etat für das Etatsjahr 1905*, II. Band [Nr. 16, Beilage G, Handels- u. Gewerbeverwaltung], p. 92. The famous phrase "cheap and bad" issued from the pen of Franz Reauleaux, a government reporter writing his *Letters from Philadelphia* as a detailed review of German applied arts goods at the Centennial Exhibition of 1876 in Philadelphia. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

- 6 For analyses of the debates in historical context see Maciuika, *Before the Bauhaus*, Chapter 7.
- 7 See Christopher Long, "The Origins and Context of Adolf Loos's 'Ornament and Crime'," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 68, Nr. 2 (June 2009), pp. 200–23.
- 8 Deutscher Werkbund, *Die Wiener 5. Jahresversammlung des Deutschen Werkbundes vom 6. bis 9. Juni 1912* (Berlin: Geschäftsstelle des Werkbundes, n.d. [1912]), pp. 10–11.
- 9 Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte, 1866–1918*, Zweiter Band: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992), pp. 748–57.
- 10 *Ibid.*, pp. 745–48; Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 224–35. For a more recent analysis of electoral practices in Wilhelmine Germany see Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 11 Hans-Peter Ullmann, *Der Bund der Industriellen*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 21 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), pp. 27–33; also Dirk Stegmann, *Die Erben Bismarcks, Parteien und Verbände in der Spätphase Wilhelminischen Deutschlands: Sammlungspolitik 1897–1918* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1970), p. 33.
- 12 German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv-Berlin), BArch R901/18350, replies from German Consulates in Genoa, Jassy, Beirut, Singapore, Calcutta, and Batavia to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 10 April 1913; 8 April 1913; 16 April 1913; 24 December 1913; 24 January 1914; and 7 February 1914 respectively; German Consulates in Beirut, Kristiania to Deutscher Werkbund Geschäftsstelle, 16 April 1913; 29 April 1913; pp. 53–142.
- 13 This is most clearly expressed in the title of Friedrich Naumann's keynote address at the annual meeting of the Werkbund in Cologne in July of 1914, "Werkbund und Weltwirtschaft."
- 14 Correspondence between Imperial Foreign Office and Freiherr von Stein, German Consul of Porto Alegre; between Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (Im Auftrag gez. Johannes) and Freiherr von Stein; and between Bromberg & Cie.–Hamburg and Foreign Office, numerous letters all related to de Carvalho's arrangements and dated between 4 May 1914 and 30 June 1914, BArch R901/18350, 147–151b.
- 15 Where the Werkbund would enter into a hopeful new phase by welcoming foreign dignitaries to an exhibition for the first time in 1914, Gustav Krupp, the "Cannon King" (*Kanonenkönig*), was adding to a long list of foreign customers: Krupp sold armor, artillery, shells, and other materials to fifty-two foreign governments before World War I, and sold 24,000 artillery pieces to the German military as well. See William Manchester's exhaustive study, *The Arms of Krupp: 1587–1968* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 263–64.
- 16 Freiherr von Stein, German Consul in Porto Alegre to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, 8 April 1914, BArch R901/18350, p. 148b.
- 17 For a discussion of this competition see Wolfgang Pehnt, *Expressionist Architecture*, translated by J. A. Underwood and Edith Küstner (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), pp. 71–2. See also primary sources such as Jäckh, *Werkbund und Mitteleuropa* (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenhauer, 1916), pp. 16–18; *Der goldene Pflug: Lebensgeschichte eines Weltbürgers* (Stuttgart: Klett Verlag, 1957), pp. 202, 322–34; and especially Deutscher Werkbund and Deutsch-Türkischen Vereinigung, eds., *Das Haus der Freundschaft in Konstantinopel, ein Wettbewerb für Deutscher Architekten* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1918).
- 18 Quotation from Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, translated by Marian Jackson (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1975), p. 236. See also Campbell, *The German Werkbund*, pp. 93–8.
- 19 Fischer, *War of Illusions*, p. 237.
- 20 See Klaus Wernecke, *Der Wille zur Weltgeltung: Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit im Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1970), pp. 288–310.
- 21 In 1913 Jäckh wrote, for example: "Helgoland and the fleet can protect Germany and hold England at bay. Baghdad and the Railway can threaten England at its sorest spots –

- at the Indian and Egyptian borders. This is what England has to fear." Ernst Jäckh, *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg* (Strassburg: Verlag Singer, 1913), as quoted in Wernecke, *Die Wille zur Weltgeltung*, p. 292.
- 22 See Fritz Fischer's discussion of "Groups and Associations aiming at Berlin-Baghdad as the 'New German Objective'" in *War of Illusions*, pp. 446-58. The historian Karl Erich Born calls the Berlin-Baghdad railway project, which was first conceived by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1887, "the most spectacular enterprise undertaken abroad by German banks." See Karl Erich Born, *International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, translated by Volker R. Berghahn (Warwickshire: Berg Publishers, 1983), pp. 138-46.
- 23 Ernst Jäckh, *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg*; Ernst Jäckh and Paul Rohrbach, *Das Grössere Deutschland*, as described by Paul Rohrbach in "Zum Weltvolk hindurch!", in *Preußische Jahrbücher* (1914): p. 4, as cited in Fischer, *War of Illusions*, pp. 448-49, 449 n. 20; Ernst Jäckh, *Der aufsteigende Halbmond: Auf dem Weg zum Deutsch-Türkischen Bündnis* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915); Ernst Jäckh, *Werkbund und Mitteleuropa*.
- 24 Friedrich Naumann, *Mitteleuropa*, in Naumann, *Werke*, 4: pp. 485-835.
- 25 Thomas A. Kohut, *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership* (Oxford, New York, 1991), p. 159, as cited in James Retallack, *Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 1.

# GLOBAL DESIGN HISTORY

Globalism is often discussed using abstract terms, such as 'networks' or 'flows' and usually in relation to recent history. *Global Design History* moves us past this limited view of globalism, broadening our sense of this key term in history and theory.

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