The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It

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Summary. — The paper shows that the current view of globalization as an automatic and benign force is flawed: it focuses on only one, positive, face of globalization while entirely neglecting the malignant one. The two key historical episodes that are adduced by the supporters of the "globalization as it is" (the Halcyon days of the 1870–1913, and the record of the last two decades of development) are shown to be misinterpreted. The "Halcyon days" were never Halcyon for those who were "globalized" through colonization since colonial constraints prevented them from industrializing. The record of the last two decades (1978–98) is shown to be almost uniformly worse than that of the previous two (1960–78).

1. THE MAINSTREAM VIEW

The mainstream view of globalization, at least among the people who "matter" in the countries that "matter"—the vast majority of economists, many political scientists, and political commentators—is that globalization is a benign force leading us ultimately to the era of converging world incomes (as poor countries such as China open up to the world and see their incomes rise), converging institutions as democracy becomes a universal norm, and cultural richness as people of different background interact more frequently. The most famous, or notorious, reflection of that Pollyannaish view of the world was the early announcement by Fukuyama (1989) of the "end of history." Although the ethnic warfare since then has not disproved Fukuyama's (or rather Hegel's) view, since none of the ethnic warriors had an alternative civilizational blueprint—a point which is implied in Hegel's hypothesis—the more recent debates about globalization as well as the role of Islam—a society with an alternative blueprint—do show that the end of history is not around the corner.

It is only a slight caricatureization of this naïve view to state that its proponents regard globalization as a *deus ex machina* for many of the problems, such as poverty, illiteracy or inequality that beset the developing world. The only thing that a country needs to do is to open up its borders, reduce tariff rates, attract foreign capital, and in a few generations if not less, the poor will become rich, the illiterate will learn how to read and write, and inequality will vanish as the poor countries catch up with the rich. This is the view conveyed implicitly and subliminally by many serious papers and publications as, for example, in the Dollar and Kraay (2000) often-repeated statement that "the poor and the rich gain one-for-one from openness," 1 or in Sala-i-Martin's (2002) derivative statements about inequality and globalization. While, of course, the authors are careful enough not to explicitly make such statements (e.g., Dollar & Kraay do acknowledge that gains "one-for-one" are expressed in percentage terms, so that a poor person whose income is one-hundredth of that of a rich person will also gain one-hundredth of the rich person's gain), 2

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1 The paper represents author’s own views only; the views should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organization.

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they do leave their statement sufficiently ambiguous, thus allowing more explicit and wrong Pollyannaish views of globalization to find currency in the mainstream popular magazines and newspapers. There the heavy guns of the globalization debate are not embarrassed by the finer points of relative vs. absolute gains, or with percentages or logarithms: they simply state that globalization is good for everyone. For example, *The Economist* (2000, p. 82) in a review of the Dollar and Kraay article writes: “Growth really does help the poor: in fact, it raises their incomes by about as much as it raises incomes of everybody else.” This is deemed insufficient to carry the (misleading) message. In the next paragraph, they continue: “On average, incomes of the poor rise one-for-one with incomes overall.”

Moreover, the past too is harnessed to support this dominant view of globalization. The period 1870–1913, the heyday of imperialism and colonialism, is made to appear as the period of universal growth, and catch-up of poor countries as, for example, in Lindert and Williamson (2001, p. 1) who somewhat incredulously write: “globalization probably mitigated the steep rise in income gaps between nations. The nations that gained the most from globalization are those poor ones that changed their policies to exploit it...”

Thus, globalization is regarded as a benign and automatic force that, once certain preconditions are set in place (“sound” macropolicies, protection of property rights etc.), will inexorably lead countries and individuals to a state of economic bliss. We show here that this view of globalization is based on one serious methodological error: a systematic ignorance of the double-sided nature of globalization, that is, systematic ignorance of its malignant side. We show, first, how this methodological error leads to the misreading of the 19th century economic history; second, we argue that the Pollyannaish view of globalization severely distorts the lessons of the most recent period, 1980–2000, and third, we show how a more accurate and realistic reading of globalization requires, in many respects, different policies from the ones suggested by the naïve (or self-interested?) globalization cheerleaders.

2. THE TWO FACES OF GLOBALIZATION

In contrast to the view of globalization as a purely benign force which we have briefly sketched above are two other views. One, the Left view, regards globalization as a malignant force that leads to child labor in the South and takes away middle-class jobs in the North. For the Left, to be anti-globalization is a very difficult task since the Left is, by definition, internationalist. But what the Left resents is that today’s globalization is led by a triumphant, and often, unbridled capitalism. Unbridled capitalism does produce the effects of which the Left complains: destruction of environment, obliteration of indigenous cultures (e.g., how many Mayas still speak Mayan?), and exploitation of the weak.

The conservative, and often xenophobic, Right also agrees that globalization is a malignant force. That view is more prevalent in Europe, with its history of xenophobia, than in the United States. In Europe, globalization engenders not only fear of losing jobs to the poor masses in the South, but of losing cultural homogeneity that many European countries have acquired through a long process of obliteration of local cultures (where are the French Bretons today?) and three centuries of capitalist development. Their homogeneity is threatened, moreover, by the people of different color, culture, and way of life. Silvio Berlusconi’s recent quip about Islam, Fallaci’s (2002) diatribes against Muslim immigrants, and Heider’s, Le Pen’s and Fortuyn’s political support is all part and parcel of the fear engendered by a more globalized society.

Can these two views, the dominant one, and the critical too, be correct? Yes, they can be—because globalization being such a huge and multifaceted process presents different faces to different people. Depending on where we live, whether we are rich or poor, where we stand ideologically, we are bound to see the process differently. But this is nothing new. Globalization as it played out from the mid-19th century to 1914 was also a contradictory force, with both its benign and malignant features. Thus, we believe, today too, as in the past, globalization has two faces: the benign one, based on voluntary exchanges and free circulation of people, capital, goods and ideas; and the other face, based on coercion and brute force.

3. BY RAILROADS AND GUNSHIPS

These two faces have been very clearly in evidence during the previous period of globalization a century ago. On the one hand, there was a manifold increase in output and trade
between Western European countries and their overseas offshoots (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand); there were millions of Italian, Polish, or Irish migrants who traversed the Atlantic in search of a better life (and found it), bringing moreover a wage and income convergence between Europe and the United States by putting a downward pressure on wages in the United States, and allowing European wages to go up (O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999). Telegraph cables and railroads were built to bring the world closer and to accelerate the transfer of goods. In Cuba, the main producer of sugar, railroads were built before any existed in Italy or Holland (Bairoch, 1997, vol. 2, p. 574). Foreign capital flowed from the capital-rich England and France to the lands capital-poor, yet rich in opportunities, such as Argentina and Russia. In Keynes’ (1998, 1918, pp. 11–12) famous phrase, wistfully regretting the passing away of a world that was destroyed by the Great War, a Londoner could secure... cheap and comfortable means of transport to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could dispatch his servant (sic!) to the neighboring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs...

While to the Keynes’ Londoners, globalization indeed presented that clean, friendly face, was the same true for the others? Not really. Globalization was brought to the many at the “point of a gun,” and many were “globalized” literally kicking and screaming, from Commodore’s Perry ultimatum which opened Japan, to British and French gunboat diplomacy in Tunisia, Egypt and Zanzibar, to the Opium wars and gunboats that patrolled Chinese internal waterways. Worst of all, for many millions who were sold in slavery, or who toiled 16 h a day on plantations from Malaya to Brazil that too was globalization. Globalization was not merely accompanied by the worst excesses of colonialism; colonialism was not an accident. On the contrary, globalization was colonialism because it is through being colonies that most of the non-European countries were brought to the global world. The Dutch East Indies company that, according to conservative estimates by Maddison (2001, p. 87) pillaged during 1868–1930 between 7.4% and 10.3% of Indonesia’s national income per year, the genocide in Congo that might have killed up to 10 million people, are only the worst excesses (see Hochschild, 1998).

Economists who deal in models of individual rational behavior are not well equipped to treat conquests and plunder. Thus, they prefer to stick to the “nice” face of globalization, to describe how the global working of the “invisible hand” brought late 19th century technological marvels. It is, for example, remarkable that in an influential article on the 19th century globalization by two distinguished economists, Jeffrey Williamson from Harvard and Peter Lindert from University of California (2001) never once were the words “colonialism,” “colony,” “slavery,” or “colonization” mentioned. This omission is all the more interesting because 1870–1913 (or 1820 which they also choose as the beginning year) was not only the epoch par excellence of colonialism, but of slavery too. Just pro memoria, in the British colonies, slavery was banned in 1833; in the French colonies, after the 1848 revolution; in the Dutch colonies, it continued until 1863; in the (Southern) United States, it was abolished in 1865, while in Brazil, it went on until 1878. It is thus, to say the least, very odd to ignore the existence of slavery when talking about globalization in the 19th century.

From this “clean-shaven” world of voluntary exchanges, the unpleasant facts of slavery and conquest are simply banished. So, when we reflect on what globalization then brought to those who were enslaved, and to those who could “send their servant to the neighboring office of a bank” in London, are we surprised that people today might also have similarly divided views about globalization?

4. INCOME DIVERGENCE DURING THE 19TH CENTURY

The dominant, economists’ view, of the 19th century globalization is indeed based on what Williamson calls “the Atlantic economy,” that is, the exchange of goods, migration, and capital flows between Western Europe, and Northern America (where Argentina and Uruguay too make a few cameo appearances). As already mentioned, economists are well-placed to deal with this benign face of globalization because their key methodological construct is a self-interested individual, and when there is no external coercion (slavery or gunboats), economists can best study how individuals, following their own interests, bring out economic
changes that our textbooks tell us should happen.

The problem with this approach is twofold. First, it applies only to a limited part of the world. Colonialism, pillage, and slavery were no less part of globalization than the voluntary movement of Irish peasants to the United States, or the voluntary transfer of British funds to Argentina. So, if we want to discuss the North Atlantic economy alone, the Williamson–Lindert approach is fine: they can afford to ignore the rest of the world. But, if we want to use the parable of the North Atlantic economy to argue that this is what globalization is, then it is wrong because it is only one, and possibly a less important, facet of globalization.

Second, and more importantly, we have to look more carefully at the claim that globalization brings convergence of income among the participating countries with poor countries growing faster and presumably catching up with the rich. This is an important tenet in the mythology of benign globalization because it is supposed to show the benefits of globalization reaped by the poor countries. (Notice that the proper unit of analysis here is country. We are not concerned with whether globalization makes the world more equal or not, in which case we would need to calculate inequality across world citizens, as for example done by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2000). Here, we are simply concerned with the so-called theory of convergence—namely that the poor countries, when they open up, grow faster than the rich.) Indeed Lindert and Williamson (2001) make that conclusion by showing the wage convergence between the densely-populated Western European economies and the sparsely populated (and resource-rich) “New World.” As people migrate from Western Europe to the United States or Argentina, wages and income per capita converge. Apodictically, Lindert and Williamson write (2001, p. 13): “Real wages and living standards converged among the currently-industrialized countries between 1850 and World War I.” They do accept that even as migration and trade contributed to wage equalization among the participants, capital flows which favored the richer countries (that is, flowed toward the rich rather than toward the poorer countries) were an “anti-convergence force” (p. 17). Yet, on balance, their conclusion is that “prewar [World War I] globalization looks like a force equalizing average incomes between participating countries” (p. 18). But let us see if that was really so.

We have three sources of data on incomes (GDP per capita) for the period stretching from the early 19th century to 1913. They are produced by Maddison (1995, 2001); Bairoch (1997) and Prados de la Escosura (2000). The countries we want to include—and they are mostly the only ones for which the data are available—are those that were all part of the broader Atlantic economy, the key participants in globalization. These are the rich WENAO (Western Europe, North America, and Oceania) countries. Their number varies between 18 and 20 in Bairoch’s series, 13 (but only in 1850) and 21 in Prados de la Escosura’s series, and 19 in Maddison’s data. Consequently, the country coverage is fairly standard and constant.

We look at whether there was convergence or not of mean incomes (GDPs per capita) by calculating Gini coefficient across GDPs per capita of these countries, with each country being given the same weight. If there is convergence, the Gini coefficient should go down. Yet as Figure 1 shows, the story is not at all that simple.

According to Bairoch, during the peak period of globalization 1870–1913, incomes between the rich countries continued to diverge: the Gini coefficient of their GDPs per capita increased by five Gini points, or by almost a third, rising from 15.8 in 1870 to 20.9 in 1913. According to Maddison, inequality is about the same at the beginning and at the end of the period. Both Bairoch and Maddison use GDPs per capita expressed in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms anchored, respectively, in US 1960 prices and 1990 international prices (Geary–Kramis dollars). Prados de la Escosura uses current PPP exchange rates—which means that his GDPs per capita are not comparable across time—to derive the rankings of about the same set of countries over 1850–1938. Only his data show an income convergence among the rich countries starting in 1860 and ending on the eve of the WW I. Thus, the evidence of income convergence among the subset of rich globalization participants which we were led to expect was the norm during the previous globalization episode turns out on a closer inspection to be far from watertight. We see that depending on the author and on the PPP rates used, rich countries show either a divergence, or stability, or convergence of their incomes during 1870–1913.
Having criticized the dominant approach for showing only a selective picture of globalization, we need to extend it in two additional directions. First, we extend the picture over time by considering the same WENAO countries during the period prior to 1870, on a well-founded assumption that globalization had started by the turn of the 19th century. There we notice, according to Bairoch’s data, a strong divergence during 1800–70—a divergence which makes sense when one reflects that at the turn of the 19th century income differences between European countries were minimal. The Gini, according to Bairoch, more than doubles from 6.2 in 1800 to 15.8 in 1870. Even Maddison’s data show a significant increase in inequality, with the Gini rising from 17.1 in 1820 to 20.5 in 1870 (that is, by 20%). Thus, among the rich countries, once we extend our gaze past the peak period of globalization, there was a clear process of income divergence.

Second, we need to extend the analysis in space, by including other countries. Here we are, of course, on shakier grounds because none of the authors presents consistent series for both the rich (WENAO) countries and some of the most important future Third World countries. Yet, if we reflect that in 1760, Indian per capita income was between 10% and 30% less to the British per capita income (Bairoch, 1997, vol. 2, p. 845), while in 1800, Chinese per capita income was equal or higher than the British, it becomes clear that, on a global scale, there must have been divergence over 1800–1913, and that during the heyday of globalization in 1870–1913, divergence must have continued unabated.

Moreover, income declines among the non-European participants in the globalization process were an integral part of the process itself: Indian deindustrialization is directly linked to the British colonial commercial policy; large transfers out of Indonesia and most of Africa were part and parcel of globalization. Most important, a typical “colonial contract” or (more properly called) a “colonial diktat” (see Bairoch, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 665–669) precluded autochthonous industrial development of the conquered parts of the world. According to Bairoch, the “colonial contract” was the main cause of nontransmission of industrial revolution outside Europe since it implied that (a) colonies could import only products from the metropolis and tariff rates had to be low, normally 0%, (b) colonial exports could be made only to the metropolis from which they could re-exported (c) production of manufactured

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goods that could compete with products of the metropolis was banned, and (d) transport between colony and metropolis was conducted only on metropolis' ships. Economic policy of the colonies (to the extent that there was any independent economic policy) was therefore entirely subjugated to the interests of the metropolis, the most important objective being to prevent industrial competition from the colony. 11

While we lack, as already mentioned, generally accepted estimates of GDP per capita for the future Third World countries, we do have estimates of their levels of industrialization. Since these are closely linked with GDP per capita (and in the 19th century were even more so), 12 we can observe not only the relative decline of the Third World but its absolute impoverishment over the 19th century (see Table 1 reproduced from Bairoch, 1997, vol. 1, p. 404).

There we clearly see that other facet of globalization: there can be little doubt that globalization was responsible for the economic decline of the countries that at the turn of the 19th century were at about the same level of development as Western Europe, that is, India and China. For other conquered lands which were less advanced than Western Europe, 19th century globalization brought colonialism, which prevented their industrialization and thus development. Now, this is not to argue that the underdevelopment of the Third World was the cause of the First World’s development as some hold (Frank, 1998). It suffices to take a much more moderate and well-argued position as Bairoch’s and to see globalization and colonialism as a cause of Third World decline, but not as a cause of First World success—the latter one having been essentially endogenous to the West. 13

In conclusions, we find first, that during the 19th century, globalization was accompanied by a growing divergence in income between the countries of the world, and second, that even among the leaders in this process, the rich countries, there is no conclusive evidence that income differences did not widen. So, basically, it is divergence all around that was brought by the previous bout of globalization.

Let us now move to the interpretation of the more recent economic record made by the unconditional partisans of “real” globalization. 14

5. MISINTERPRETING THE RECENT ECONOMIC RECORD

Consider Tables 2 and 3. Let us then suppose that we show them to a Martian visitor endowed with elementary arithmetic knowledge and tell him three things: first, that more growth (higher income) is better than lower growth (and lower income); second, that WENAO is the richest region and that we would ideally like to see differences between the rich and poor regions decrease; and third, that there are two periods of globalization. The first period (1960–78) comprises “import substitution” in Latin America and most of Asia, and Africa; Communism in Eastern Europe/FSU, China, Vietnam; and “welfare state” in the rich countries. The second period is the era “structural adjustment” in Latin America and Africa, “transition to market economy” in Eastern Europe/FSU, and “retrenchment of welfare state” in the rich world. Then we ask him to choose which period he thinks was better.

His decision should not be too difficult. He would first observe that whether he looks at the world mean unweighted GDP per capita only (so that each country counts the same) or at the population-weighted world GDP per capita, growth rate was between two and three times greater in the first period. Then, he will notice that whatever region he selects, and whatever concept of growth he uses, growth rate is always higher in the first period than in the second. That would provide him with some additional confidence that the first period was better.

| Table 1. Level of industrialization (manufacturing output per capita), 1800–1913 (UK 1900 = 100) |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                 | 1800 | 1830 | 1860 | 1880 | 1900 | 1913 |
| Total developed countries | 8   | 11  | 16  | 24  | 35  | 55  |
| Total Third World       | 6   | 6   | 4   | 3   | 2   | 2   |
| United Kingdom          | 16  | 25  | 64  | 87  | 100 | 115 |
| United States           | 9   | 14  | 21  | 38  | 69  | 126 |

He might then remember our instruction that we would also like regional incomes to converge. Yet there too, he will notice that according to unweighted GDP per capita, in the first period, two out of four poorer regions grew faster than WENAO, while in the second, all of them grew slower than WENAO. If he wanted to confirm that finding by looking at what happened to an average citizen of each region, he would notice again that in the first period, average per capita incomes in Eastern Europe/FSU and in Asia grew faster, and in Latin America about the same, as in WENAO. But in the second period, average incomes in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe/FSU were about stagnant or mildly declining (with per capita growth rates ranging from −1 to +0.8 p.a.), while WENAO grew by 1.6% p.a., and Asia, mostly thanks to China, by 3.6% p.a. Thus, he would conclude that, by the regional convergence criterion, the first period was better.

In addition, we might provide our Martian visitor with some further statistics. Consider Figure 2 which shows the average GDP per capita growth rates of all countries in the world (save the rich WENAO) during 1960–78 and 1978–98. Out of 124 countries, 95 grew faster in the first period. Notice not only that most of the dots are to the right of the 45-degree line, but also that there is a large number of the dots in the Southeastern quadrant. These are countries whose growth rates have switched from being positive—and often highly so—in the first period, to being negative in the second.

Then, our Martian visitor would come back to us, and naively announce that he has definitely concluded that the first period was better since most countries grew faster then, and most of the poorer regions tended to catch up with the rich world. He would think that the test was rather easy and that he had done pretty well. Unfortunately, our Martian is not a good economist. Our mainstream economist would have to convince him that the second period—the period of structural adjustment and globalization—was actually better. It would be a hard sell, but it could be done. First, our economist would concede the fact that there was a divergence in countries’ performance

### Table 2. Unweighted regional GDP per capita levels and growth rates, 1960–98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>GDP per capita (in 1995 international prices)</th>
<th>Growth rate of GDP per capita (% p.a.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>2,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1,971</td>
<td>5,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3,458</td>
<td>5,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Europe/FSU</td>
<td>2,093</td>
<td>5,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WENAO</td>
<td>8,257</td>
<td>14,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>3,277</td>
<td>5,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using the data from World Bank SIMA (Statistical Information Management and Analysis) database, countries’ statistical yearbooks, Maddison (2001) and Penn World Tables.

*Each country is one observation.

### Table 3. Population-weighted regional GDP per capita levels and growth rates, 1960–98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>GDP per capita (in 1995 international prices)</th>
<th>Growth rate of GDP per capita (% p.a.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3,297</td>
<td>5,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Europe/FSU</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>5,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WENAO</td>
<td>9,792</td>
<td>16,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>4,940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using the data from World Bank SIMA (Statistical Information Management and Analysis) database, countries’ statistical yearbooks, Maddison (2001) and Penn World Tables.

*Each country is one observation, but each observation is weighted by country’s population.
since the end of the 1970s and that poor countries have tended to grow slower (or even to decline) than the rich countries. As shown in Figure 3, the Gini coefficient of the GDPs per capita of all countries in the world, after being roughly stable during 1960–78, has inexorably risen since 1978, from a Gini of about 46 to a Gini of 54 today—a huge increase of almost 20%.

The economist will claim however, that the divergence in incomes is due to some “bad” countries which, unwilling to globalize, have chosen the wrong policies. So, he would like to expunge the world of these “bad” countries and to show that there was indeed a convergence in incomes among countries that adopted “good” policies and globalized.

This approach, the “weeding” of the “bad” from the “good” countries was adopted by Dollar and Kraay (1999) and by the recent World Bank report on globalization (World Bank, 2002). These studies select countries that are globalizers using the ratio of exports and imports over GDP (that is, trade openness) and then show how highly open countries’ GDP per capita has either tended to catch up with rich countries’ GDP per capita, or how their growth rates have gradually accelerated from decade to decade as openness ostensibly progressed. We shall show in detail, largely following Rodrik (2000), what is wrong with this selection criterion. But before we move to that, consider the prelude. Since the catch-up is defined in terms of mean population—weighted income of the “globalizers,” and since China is among these, and since China has had such a remarkable growth record over the last two decades, the authors should not have even bothered to include other countries. All that is needed to obtain the desired conclusions is that China’s growth accelerate (as shown in World Bank, 2002, Figure 1.12).

Because China is a favorite example of the “openness is good for you” school, it is worth considering in somewhat greater detail. Now, one may find it rather strange that the key proof of beneficence of global capitalism is provided by one of the few remaining Communist countries. Of course, the partisans of “real” globalization argue that China is a Communist country in name only, and that what matters is its integration with world economy and de facto introduction of markets. Yet, the fact that a Communist country’s record is wheeled out to defend capitalism is not merely a boutade. Almost one-third of China’s
industrial output is still produced by state-owned enterprises, and almost 20% of total GDP, a fraction higher than in any country in the world save for North Korea, Cuba, and a few former Soviet republics—a level of state involvement unlikely to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Second, one of the preconditions for China’s growth was arguably the set of policies that is also anathema to today’s mainstream view: nationalization, widespread and free education at all levels, impediments to the free circulation of labor which kept lots of people from migrating into cities, land reform and abolishment of large landholdings—all hardly a favorite policy prescription for a developing country. Finally, little noticed is a paradox pointed out by Weitzman and Xu (1997) that, by far, the most dynamic sector of the Chinese economy is that of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) whose property rights are the very example of nontransparency: a TVE is legally owned by a “community,” village or a township, is run by managers, or capitalists, and seeks private capital but pays no dividends. In effect, TVE is all that an efficient enterprise should not be. Yet it is this sector that shows the most significant progress. Thus, China, on these grounds alone, can hardly be taken as an example of success of the current mainstream economic policy prescriptions.

The very process of “selecting” the good globalizers based on trade ratios is flawed, as argued by Rodrik (2000). He points to several technical and data-selection problems in the Dollar and Kraay analysis, of which two seem most important. First globalizers are selected based on a combination of an outcome indicator (trade over GDP) over which policymakers have no control and another which they do control (level of tariff rates). There is an additional problem with this selection criterion. As Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) show, most of “nonglobalizers” were unwilling nonglobalizers in the sense that their trade/GDP ratios had declined because their exports were heavily dependent on natural resources and primary commodities whose terms of trade declined in the 1980s. Consequently, countries’ export revenues dropped, and they in turn had to curtail imports, reducing trade/GDP ratios on both accounts. In addition, they ran into balance of payments problems that required contractionary policies, and it is therefore not surprising that there was a positive correlation between openness and growth. Birdsall and
Hamoudi (2002, p. 5) write: “Dollar and Kraay have not isolated the benefits of ‘participating in the global trading system’, but rather the ‘curse’ of primary commodity dependence.” Second in both India and China, which, as mentioned, are used as the prime examples of “good” globalizers, the main trade reforms took place after the onset of faster growth. The Chinese case is, as Rodrik (2000) writes, well known: high growth began in the early 1980s, while trade liberalization followed more than a decade later. Throughout the 1980s and until 1995, the average weighted tariff rate in China was about 40% (Figure 4)—a rate twice as high as the average for developing countries, and more than four times the average of industrialized countries. It was only in 1996 that the average tariff decreased to 26%, and has since decreased further to a level of about 16%.

Rodrik (2000) shows that the same pattern holds for India: while growth accelerated in the early 1980s, trade reform did not start until 1991–93. There, too, growth and expansion of trade took place under the protection of an even higher tariff wall than in China: in the 1980s, the weighted tariffs averaged 80–90%, and gradually came down, to the still very high level of about 40% (Figure 4). Dollar and Kraay (1999) have clearly fallen prey to one of (what Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996 call) the enduring myths of economic theory, namely that “liberalization [is] an important driving force behind rising trade.” On the contrary, trade often increased the most during the mild protectionist phases, since the latter saw acceleration in growth, and it is growth that generally leads to trade—not vice versa (Bairoch, 1997, p. 310; Yotopolos, 1996).

How hazardous the Globalization, growth and poverty report’s (World Bank, 2002) conclusions are can be observed from the two figures below which chart China’s and India’s per capita growth rates and their average weighted tariff rates over 1980–99. Notice that in the India graph, it is very difficult to see any correlation between the two: the growth rate oscillates around 4% p.a., no matter what happens to the tariff rate. The China graph is not much different, except that there, if anything, we notice a correlation between the slowdown in growth rate in the last five years and a reduction in tariff rates—a relationship that is exactly the opposite of the one the World Bank report claims to have found. We cannot put much store by this finding: it obviously covers a very short period, and the rate of growth responds to a myriad of factors other than tariff rates. But the figures illustrate the perils of a monocausal approach to the evidence.

The authors of World Bank (2002) are aware that their preferred causality, low tariff rates ⇒ high export and import growth ⇒ high GDP growth cannot be proven. They are aware also that both China and India grew behind very high protective walls. How then do they deal with these issues? With respect to the first point, they do so in a rather peculiar manner, as throughout the report there are scattered statements denying that causality can be inferred from or proven by their numbers. But these statements are often ignored, and there are a number of precisely such—causal—statements. The second point is elegantly circumvented by showing the change in average tariff rates among the “globalizers” and “non-globalizers” (World Bank, 2002, p. 36). But since we saw that China and India had particularly high tariff rates, it is not surprising that they reduced them more than say, Barbados or Belize which started the 1980s with tariff rates of 15%.

Our conclusion regarding the most recent period of globalization is twofold.

—The last two decades, which witnessed expansion of globalization, are, in terms of overall growth and income convergence between poor and rich countries, vastly less successful than the preceding two decades.

—The attempt to explain divergence of incomes by “eliminating” the countries with “bad” policies and focusing solely on those with “good” policies is flawed because the successful countries, and China in particular, did not follow the orthodox economic advice. One can be pretty confident that if China had exactly the same policies, but a miserable record of economic growth, those who hail it now would flaunt it as an example of how harmful to growth are state ownership, undefined property rights in TVEs, and high tariff barriers.

6. THE TWO NARRATIVES AND THE NEED FOR “READJUSTMENT OF ADJUSTMENT”

We can illustrate the difference between the dominant focus on the benign aspect of globalization alone from a more even-handed presentation of globalization’s two sides: the
benign and the malignant. Consider the following two historical narratives of the same set of events.

The dominant narrative goes approximately as follows. Toward the end of the 18th century, there was Industrial Revolution that spread...
from Europe slowly and unevenly, to the rest of the world. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, the world entered a period of almost uninterrupted peace lasting 100 years. During that period global capitalism appeared: it spread to the rest of the globe, connecting Europe with the Americas, Asia, Africa. The leading countries of the period grew the fastest, their incomes converged as trade blossomed, people freely migrated to better places, and capital flowed wherever it wanted. Then, suddenly, the calamity of WW I struck, the world was inflamed, Communism and Fascism emerged, nationalism and protectionism became rampant, trade declined, countries’ incomes diverged, until another, worse, calamity of the WW II struck. For a period after the war, global capitalism could not get a free rein because large parts of the globe fell under the Communist sway. It is only in the 1980s, as China liberalized and the Soviet empire broke up and abandoned Communism, that globalization, with its attendant growth for most, if not all, could resurge. “Happy days are here again,” but we must not forget that the ogres of nationalism and protectionism lurk behind the corner. So give freedom to capital, let profit be your guide, and growth is guaranteed to all.

This is, with some poetic embellishment, the most common view of events of the last two centuries, perhaps (one might surmise) because the people who subscribe to that narrative have tended to experience only the benign side of globalization. The objective of that narrative is not to stimulate discussion, but to stifle it, similarly to the dominant narratives used in the Communist countries where too the main purpose of the accepted view of history was to generate the acquiescence to the dogma. The point is well made by Said (2002):

In this day, and almost universally, phrases such as “the free market,” “privatization,” “less government” and others like them have become the orthodoxy of globalization, its counterfeit universals. They are staples of the dominant discourse, designed to create consent and tacit approval... The main goal of this dominant discourse is to fashion the merciless logic of corporate profit-making and political power into a normal state of affairs.

It is relatively easy to explode this rosy story of the world, told by the first narrative. One needs only to ask three simple questions: (a) where are conquest, colonialism, and slavery in this narrative? (b) how does the narrative explain the outbreak of WW I? and (c) why did capitalism suddenly become more tamed and civilized (“social market economy”) after the end of WW II? To answer these questions, consider the following narrative of the same events.

After the technological and social revolutions occurred in Europe, its Northwestern part became the most advanced region of the world. It set out, at first timidly and often out of adventurism, then more seriously to conquer the rest of the world. As Europe conquered other countries, the winners established rules that were economically advantageous to themselves, developed further the already-existing slave trade, and by flooding markets of their colonies (devoid of independent commercial and economic policy) with their own manufactures, contributed to colonies’ deindustrialization. All the while, gross coercion, wars, and even genocides went on in the colonies—perhaps not much noticed in Europe. So, the days of universal peace were quite far from being truly so.

European powers bent on conquest were, at the same time, in a struggle with each other. Their imperialism begot the Great War—the very war whose impossibility, because of intricate economic ties between leading countries, was proclaimed in the famous Angell book published just years prior to the carnage. After a truce of 20 years, the Second WW erupted—a straight continuation of WW I. Fascism was defeated but Communism came out stronger and spread to cover one-third of world’s population. Under Communist threat from the outside, and under pressure of growing social-democratic and Communist movements at home, the capitalist regimes, already enfeebled by the Great Depression, conceded to dramatic and far-reaching social reforms. The nature of wild capitalism of the 19th century changed dramatically with the introduction of unemployment benefits and pensions, paid vacations, 40-h working week, guaranteed and free education, health care for all, trade unions, and protection of workers’ rights. In the Third World countries that became liberated, dreams of industrialization and catching-up could be realistically entertained as countries grew quickly and import-substitution became the dominant approach to development. But then under the shock of rising petroleum prices, high interest rates, and large debts, Third World growth sputtered. In the West, the ideological pendulum swung against the welfare state. The social-democratic movement weakened, the collapse of Communism eliminated the external
threat, and made global capitalism again, as in
the 1870s, entirely free to pursue unhindered its
objectives of profit maximization—without
much regard for social consequences.

To question the profit objective is not to
denigrate its importance, much less to argue
that it should not be an important, perhaps the
most important, criterion. But it should not be
the sole criterion. It needs to be tempered by
other considerations, akin to the way that na-
tional capitalisms after WW II were “civilized”
by the role of the state and strong social-dem-
ocratic parties. The erection of “financial via-
bility” as the only acceptable norm will not lead
to imperialist wars as it did in 1914, but will
exacerbate the negative effects of global capi-
talism which we already see, and which have
grown in importance during the last decade or
so—precisely the period during which the ear-
ier constraints on the free play of capital were
weakened or abandoned. 23 Let me mention a
few of these effects: very high and/or increasing
spatial and interpersonal inequality, blatant
theft of public resources masquerading under
the name of privatization and cheered on by
most economists and international organiza-
tions, growth of slums, deteriorating labor
conditions, return of the long-forgotten dis-
eases such as tuberculosis, declines in education
enrollment rates, dramatically increased mor-
tality in most of the former Soviet republics and
Africa, deforestation, growth of worldwide
networks of mafias and drug cartels, even
modern-day slavery through development of
piracy and abduction of women and children
for prostitution. 24 Capitalism left to itself will
always produce these effects. If people want to
sell themselves, why should not they? If parents
do not want to send children to school, why not
allow them the choice? If university education
is no longer free, perhaps a child from a poor
family can borrow to pay for it? If people do
not have money to pay for a cure or a drug, what
else can be done to ensure cost recovery? 25

While overt colonialism is a thing of the past,
the rules are far from being even-handed as
between the poor and the rich countries. They
are slanted in favor of those who wield power.
Khor (2001) gives some examples from the
multilateral trading system: the well-known
example of intellectual property rights, 26 dif-
ferential treatment of subsidies (subsidies for
R&D are exempt from counteraction while the
subsidies used by developing countries, for in-
dustrial upgrading, are not), standards that are
being set without effective participation by the
less-developed countries (LDCs), and the high
costs of raising and pursuing a trade dispute.
We can compare the last point to the problem
that Jewish survivors in Eastern Europe faced
in trying to get the money impounded by the
Swiss banks: how is a grand-mother surviving
on $100 a month, and not speaking English or
French, going to sue a Swiss bank?

Because we are now dealing with global capi-
talism, the role of “moderator” can no
longer belong to the nation-state, but to inter-
national (global) actors. It is where the inter-
national financial institutions (IFI), such as the
World Bank, enter. Continued misinterpreta-
tion of the disastrous results brought to most of
Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe by
about two decades of unabashedly free market
policies will not prompt a review of these pol-
icies, and will, on the contrary, allow their
continuation with probably equally bad re-
sults. 27 It is therefore incumbent on us to ex-
amine the actual results, and not the ideology
of what these policies should have brought had
they worked as originally intended. We must
thus address some uncomfortable issues. Let
me mention but three.

(i) How to explain that after sustained in-
volveinent and many structural adjustment
loans, and as many IMF’s Stand-bys, African
GDP per capita has not budged from its level
of 20 years ago? Moreover, in 24 African
countries, GDP per capita is less than in
1975, and in 12 countries even below its
1960’s level. 28
(ii) How to explain the recurrence of Latin
crises, in countries such as Argentina, that
months prior to the outbreak of the crisis
are being praised as model reformers. 29
(iii) How to explain that the best “pupils”
among the transition countries (Moldova,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia) after
setting out in 1991 with no debt at all, and
following all the prescriptions of the IFIs,
find themselves 10 years later with their
GDPs halved and in need of debt-forgive-
ness?

Something is clearly wrong. 30 Maintaining
that globalization as we know it is the way to
go and that, if the Washington consensus pol-
cies have not borne fruit so far, they will surely
do so in the future, is to replace empiricism
with ideology. Unfortunately, it has been done
before, but the consequences were not very
good.
1. In effect, the very first sentence of the abstract reads: “Income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall growth.”

2. In another of their papers, Dollar and Kraay (2002) do make a point that for (a) countries cursed by “poor geography” (e.g., Mali or Chad) or (b) those with inefficient or exploitative institutions, trade liberalization alone cannot be expected to bear much fruit.

3. As Anderson (2002) rightly points out, to the European antonym: internationalism vs. nationalism, the United States, somewhat uniquely, presented a different one: internationalism vs. isolationism. Hence specifically European xenophobia rooted in ethnicity and “blood and soil” was never much of an ideology in the United States.

4. Even in terms of the Dutch income at the time, the amounts were staggering: the transfers amounted to between 5.5% and 8.9% of Dutch GDP over the period of 60 years. This dwarfs the Marshall plan whose net transfers were about 4% of recipients’ countries GDP over the period of about five years (Bairoch, 1997, vol. 3, p. 120). Of course, it makes puny today’s official aid contributed by the rich countries which is about 0.3% of their GDPs.

5. The countries are: Austria–Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom in Western Europe; United States and Canada in North America, and Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. Note that Finland, Ireland and Norway were not independent countries for most of the period; Greece, up until 1830, while Germany and Italy are presumably included in their post-Unification shapes.

6. This is a variant of the so-called σ convergence, but a preferred one, we hold, because Gini is a better and more common measure of inequality than standard deviation.

7. One explanation of the fact that inequality measured by using current exchange rates (Prados) declines, while inequality measured using PPP-constant exchange rates increases (or stays the same) is that price structures between the countries have become more similar (see Dowrick & Akmal, 2001, p. 16).

8. By the way, even the alleged divergence (Lindert & Williamson, 2001, pp. 18–20) during the interwar “globalization backlash” is not evident: according to Bairoch, incomes converged during that period, according to Prados de la Escorsura, they diverged.

9. Braudel (1984, p. 534), using Bairoch’s calculations, gives Chinese GDP per capita as $282 (at US 1960 prices). According to Bairoch (1997, vol. 2, pp. 252–253), British GDP per capita in 1800 was $240. Maddison (2001, p. 90) estimates British GDP per capita in 1820 at $2,121 (in 1990 international dollars), China’s GDP per capita at $600, and India’s at $533. If we then set United Kingdom = 1 in both Bairoch and Maddison, China is 1.17 in Bairoch and 0.29 in Maddison; India is 0.7–0.9 in Bairoch, and 0.25 in Maddison. Although the differences between the two authors are often large for other countries as well (e.g., Maddison gives Australia’s GDP per capita in 1850 at $3,070; recalculated in the same prices, Bairoch’s estimate for the same year is $1,680), differences in the estimates of the Chinese and Indian GDP per capita are even larger.

10. Their maximum was often set at 5%, but at times when such a maximum was imposed for fiscal reasons (as in India in 1894), British industrial interests demanded that a similar local tax be imposed on Indian products so “as not to discriminate British exports” (Bairoch, 1997, vol. 2, p. 860). After the first Opium war, Britain imposed to China a maximum tariff range between 5% and 9%. In a historical curiosum, note that similar tariff preferences were imposed by Venice, and later by Genoa, on the declining Eastern Roman Empire from 12th century onward (see Runciman, 1932).

11. Parts of the “colonial contract” (e.g., ban on production of competing manufactured products) applied to the European offshoots as well. This was, in effect, one of the main motivations behind the drive for American independence. North American producers were not allowed to process pig iron, and had to sell it to Great Britain only where of course it would be processed and reexported (Bairoch, 1997, vol. 2, p. 667, & vol. 1, p. 462).

12. The correlation between level of industrialization and GDP per capita in both 1900 and 1913 is about 0.7 (calculated from Bairoch, 1997).

13. Furthermore, if we extend the origin of globalization back in time, say dating it from the European
conquest of the Americas, then the same conclusion is only reinforced. The Spanish conquest produced a dramatic decline in population and average incomes in the South and Central America (note that prior to the conquest, Central America’s urbanization rates were probably greater than Europe’s). As Bairoch (1997, vol. 2, p. 546), while growth of slave trade did the same for Africa.

As Bairoch (1989, p. 238) writes: “...I hasten to insist on the fact that if colonization did not play an important role in explaining ‘why we [the West] became rich,’ it played a crucial role in explaining ‘why they [the Third World] remained poor’ and even why, at a certain stage of history, ‘they became poorer.”

14. For those who have not had the chance to follow Communist jargon, the “real” is a pun on the “real socialism,” the appellation invented by the Soviets in the 1970s, and similarly meant to convey the feeling that their Communism, like today’s globalization, was the only right one—because “real.”

15. All the current countries are projected backward using their past republican/provincial growth rates. This therefore represents probably the most detailed country growth database (see Milanovic, 2002). The main building blocks for the database were World Bank SIMA, countries' statistical yearbooks, Penn World Tables, and Maddison (2001). All GDPs per capita are expressed in 1995 international dollars.

16. The first, to my knowledge, to have noticed and discussed, with a great wealth of detail and econometrics, the discrepancy between the “improved” policies in LDCs during the last two decades, and more than disappointing results (worse than in the previous two decades) is Easterly (2001a,b).

17. This is incidently the wrong way to formulate the convergence question. Convergence is always defined in terms of countries. If we were interested in whether the world were becoming a more equal place, the proper way would be to study distribution of income among all citizens of the world. The criterion used in World Bank (2002) is neither, and is moreover the only one capable of producing the desired results.

18. These numbers refer to 1998 and include only the value added of industrial and construction sector State-owned enterprises (SOEs). They do not include mixed-ownership sector or TVEs. Calculated from the Statistical Yearbook of China (1999), pp. 55, 432, 473.

19. As Rodrik (2000, p. 1) writes: “Saying that ‘participation in world trade is good for a country’ is as meaningful as saying that ‘upgrading of technological capabilities is good for growth’ (and equally helpful to policy makers).”


21. The choice of this particular causality is all the more intriguing since there is no reason whatsoever why high exports (themselves a components of GDP) or imports should be bad for growth. I do not know if anyone has ever made such a claim. At issue is precisely the low tariffs ⇒ high growth causality, which would be very hard to prove.

22. I do not know how to interpret otherwise statements such as: “As they reformed and integrated with the world market, the ‘more globalized’ countries started to grow rapidly, accelerating steadily from 2.9% in the 1970s to 5% throughout the 1990” (World Bank, 2002, p. 36), or the statement approvingly taken from Lindert and Williamson (2001), “We infer that this is because freer trade stimulates growth in Third world economies today, regardless of its effects before 1940” (World Bank, 2002, p. 37). Or as Dollar and Kraay (2001) write: “We provide evidence that, contrary to popular beliefs, increased trade has strongly encouraged growth and poverty reduction and has contributed to narrowing the gaps between rich and poor worldwide.”

23. Gunter Grass (2002) puts it as follows: “In the fifties, sixties, and even in the seventies, a relatively successful attempt to civilize capitalism was made across Europe. If one assumes that socialism and capitalism are both indigenous, wayward children of the Enlightenment, they can be regarded as having imposed certain checks on each other. Even capitalism was obliged to accept certain responsibilities. In Germany this was called the social market economy... The consensus broke down in the early eighties. And since the collapse of the Communist hierarchies, capitalism—recast as neoliberalism—has felt it could run riot, as if out of control. There is no longer a counterweight to it. Today even the few remaining responsible capitalists are raising a warning finger... and see neoliberalism repeating the mistakes of communism—issuing articles of faith that deny that there is any alternative to the free market and claiming infallibility.”

24. Kanbur (2001) writes of the spread of “obnoxious goods.”
25. The day after I distributed the first version of this paper, a newspaper article in the Washington Post tried to answer the question why, more than a decade after the end of Communism in the Soviet Union, and two decades after the rejection of Maoist legacy in China, a Maoist movement in Nepal (a multi-party democracy) is making progress and can claim support among most of Nepal's peasantry. The explanation (Odenheimer, 2002) is worth quoting in extenso: “The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often made economic conditions worse for poor Nepalese. Heeding advice from the Bank and the IMF, the Nepali government cut state subsidies, including those that helped farmers buy fertilizer and seeds. The country's education and health systems were privatized to the point that most Nepalese, even if they work 14-h days, cannot afford to send their children to school or take them to the doctor when they are sick. Meanwhile, the World Bank supported huge hydroelectric and other massive infrastructure projects that brought windfalls to international companies and corrupt Nepali officials, while utility costs for the average Nepali continued to rise. In the face of this poverty and corruption, the Maoists have been playing the role of Robin Hood. Tenant farmers told me that they had been freed from the grip of their landlords after a few well-placed Maoist threats. Maoists have swooped down on agriculture banks and recaptured the land deeds that had been put up for collateral by poor farmers who had taken development loans that they couldn't repay. The Maoists set up people's courts where disputes were tried without fees or bribes. Women used the people's courts to successfully prosecute cases of wife beating and rape. Agents who enticed village girls to India and then sold them as prostitutes in Bombay—which happens to about 5,000 young Nepalese women a year—were caught and punished. Previously they often escaped by giving a cut of their profits to officials.”

26. That poor countries have no money and expertise to enforce even the rules that may favor them is well known. I have recently noticed that there is such a thing as French feta cheese. But I remember how Armenian cognac, known to all under such a name, had to change its appellation because “cognac” is a registered trademark.

27. For a review of these policies see Easterly (2001a,b).

28. Meanwhile, from a much higher level, US GDP per capita has increased by a third since 1975, and has doubled since 1960.

29. Including in the World Bank report on globalization, issued a month before the Argentine crisis, where Argentina proudly belongs to the group of “well-known” reformers (World Bank, 2002, p. 35). It has been demoted from that august group though in Dollar and Kraay (2002) published in February 2002. By then the crisis was all too obvious. Note that that in 1999 and 2000, The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom, an ultra-right-wing think-tank, scored Argentina's economic policies about the same as Chile's, that poster-child of the neoconservatives. Even in 2001, Argentina was scored only marginally worse (2.25 vs. Chile's 2), yet much better than 3.25 given to Brazil.

30. The typical excuse that the policies were right but were badly implemented is wrong and is a very lame excuse indeed. It reminds me of the constant litany under Communism, that the Communist ideas were very good, but were either poorly implemented, or people were too wicked for such beautiful ideas. (I saw through that when I was less than 20. I am surprised that many smart people do not see through similar excuses today; but then it is true that, at 20, I did not have a stake in not seeing the truth.) A policy that does not take into account the actual situation and people as they are is inadequate. Furthermore, it is not true, even on IFI's reckoning, that the governments always failed to fully implement the programs. Even when they did implement them, the results—as in the transition countries—were often relentlessly bad.

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