

PROOF

# 3

## Reform and Inequality during the Transition: An Analysis Using Panel Household Survey Data, 1990–2005

*Branko Milanovic and Lire Ersado*

### 1 Inequality in Europe and Central Asia: literature review

Inequality considerations are important to policy makers because they are linked not only to the economic state of affairs but also to social and political conditions of a given country. This is even more the case in the countries of Eastern Europe (EE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) that underwent transition from state-controlled to market economy in the era of globalization. However, there are a limited number of rigorous empirical studies on the evolution of inequality in the transition economies. Although there is a lack of consensus on the impact of inequality on economic growth, the limited empirical evidence that has recently become available for the transition countries shows that the effect of inequality on growth can be negative and robust (e.g., Ferreira 1999; Ivanova 2006; Sukiassyan 2007). We start with a brief review of the literature on the determinants of inequality in transition countries, with particular emphasis on the role of institutions and government policies pursued under the new economic order following transition. The study then attempts to investigate the causes of, and establish some stylized facts about, the changes in inequality using a rich database of household surveys collected over the period 1990–2005.

Empirical studies on inequality in the transition countries are relatively few in number despite the importance of the topic. There are only a handful of studies that attempt to systematically and empirically investigate inequality in the transition countries and to provide some possible explanations for its evolution since the beginning of transition (Mitra and Yemtsov 2006; Ferreira 1999; Milanovic 1999; Ivaschenko 2002; Giammatteo 2006). These studies on the distribution of income immediately before, during, and after transition show that there has been an appreciable increase in inequality in

most of EE and FSU countries, albeit at varying degrees of magnitude and pace. A widespread view is that the transition to market economy, which entailed several transformations—including liberalization of capital, goods and services, and labour markets, and their integration into regional and world markets; privatization of state-owned enterprises; and the formation of new institutions to serve the market economy—has invariably led to a significant shift in the distribution of income.

Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) provide a summary of the findings of many studies. After careful review of the existing literature, they conclude that all EE and FSU countries experienced an increase in inequality but with considerable variations. A rapid increase in inequality took place in the middle-income and low-income Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)<sup>1</sup> countries, whereas the new member states of the European Union (EU) appear to have experienced a smaller and more gradual increase in inequality. For example, in Russia, the Gini coefficient increased from 25.9 in 1989–90 to 40.9 in 1994, showing a very rapid increase immediately after the dismantling of the old communist system. In contrast, in Poland, despite a similar level of inequality in 1989–90 (Gini of 25.5), the level of inequality increased to only 32 by 1995.

Milanovic (1999) argues that the observed increase in inequality in the transition countries is driven mainly by higher inequality in wage distribution following the dismantling of the state sector with its compressed wage structure, and its replacement by the newly emerging private sector with much broader wage distribution. He also finds the effects of social transfers to have varied widely, in some cases halting further increases in inequality (Poland), and in others (e.g. Russia during the early years of transition) having the perverse effect of contributing to inequality. Ivaschenko (2002) looks at the determinants of changes in income inequality using a panel of inequality estimates for 24 EE and FSU countries for the period 1989–98. His is the first panel analysis of inequality during transition. His main conclusion is that increases in inequality are associated with privatization and deindustrialization (often the two facets of the same phenomenon). Ivaschenko also finds that there was no significant impact of unemployment rate and the size of government spending on income distribution. Another interesting finding of the study was the contrast between EE and FSU country-groups in the relationship between income inequality and per capita GDP. While there was no association between the GDP per capita level and changes in inequality in EE, Ivaschenko notes a significant U-shaped relationship (the increase in inequality was smallest among middle-income countries) between the two variables for FSU countries.

A study by Ivanova (2006) highlights the effect of government policies on inequality using evidence from Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. She shows that government policies prompted by the trend towards liberalization and privatization, such as reducing social spending, limiting access to social

assistance through strong selectivity and conditionality criteria, and introducing market-regulated (fee-based) access to many social services, have had a profoundly negative impact on socioeconomic equality and contributed to inequality's getting embedded in the transforming societies. According to this study, inequality was not only a by-product of macroeconomic policies but also a natural outcome of the particular model of society chosen by the transition economies; for instance, the choice of the minimalist safety net approach as opposed to the universalistic welfare state approach of the European social market economies.

While inequality increased in the transition region overall, country-specific studies provide a clearer trend of changes in inequality within each country. A study of Poland's income distribution before and during the transition (Keane and Prasad 2002) reveals significant increases in inequality as measured by wages from formal employment. Keane and Prasad also find that the reallocation of workers from a public sector with a compressed wage distribution to a private sector with much higher wage inequality accounts for the bulk of increased earnings inequality during transition. They highlight the role that increased social transfers had in limiting the increase in inequality. The unemployment benefits, pensions, family and child allowances that provided economic protection for the most vulnerable citizens prior to the transition underwent major transformations. Giammatteo (2006) looks at the impact of state transfers (and taxes) and market-oriented reforms on gross and disposable income inequality. His study uses the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) data for Poland, Hungary, and Russia and concludes that these changes led to an increase in inequality in these countries during 1990–2000. He shows that Russia had the most unequal market and disposable income distribution, followed by Hungary and then Poland. The study concludes that the redistribution policies in some countries played a key role during the transition period, allowing the government to contain inequality during the period of profound economic and social reforms. The inequality-decreasing effects of state transfers were robust and continued to be effective during the latter part of the 1990s, particularly in Poland and Hungary.<sup>2</sup> More recently, Gorodnichenko, Peter, and Stolaryov (2010), using 10 years of panel data (1995–2004) from the Russian Longitudinal Household Survey, record decreasing (but still high by international standards) inequality in Russia, which they ascribe to reduced volatility in income (and hence in consumption as well).

## 2 Main trends

In this study, we use a newly created database of inequality statistics for 26 transition economies. This has three important characteristics: (i) it is the largest database because it includes detailed inequality data for more

# PROOF

*Branko Milanovic and Lire Ersado* 87

than 200 country/years covering the 16-year period of 1990–2005; (ii) it is overwhelmingly calculated from micro (household-level) survey data; and (iii) we are therefore able to go, in the empirical analysis (sections 3 and 4), beyond the use of synthetic inequality statistics (such as the Gini coefficient) and to use decile shares. The advantage of the last point is that it allows us to make many more observations and, more importantly, presents a much more nuanced and accurate picture of the entire distribution than a single number can, be it a Gini, a Theil, or any other synthetic inequality indicator. Household surveys of income or expenditure (or consumption) are of course the most common tool for the study of income distribution.

The issue has been raised recently (Atkinson et al. 2011) that surveys may systematically underestimate top-of-income distributions because rich households refuse to participate in surveys or under-report their incomes, particularly so property incomes. This is almost certainly the case in many post-communist countries where new millionaires or billionaires ('the oligarchs') are thought unlikely to agree to participate in surveys even if selected to be part of the random sample taken among the population. This is, for example, one of the reasons why we have decided to omit data from Azerbaijan, which show an unrealistically low inequality in all years. However, when discussing the possible omission of the rich and thus the downward bias to inequality, one has to keep in mind that (i) in all countries studied here, the super-rich are a tiny proportion of the population and that even if their refusal rates were not different from the rest of the population, a random sample would seldom include them anyway, and (ii) their omission may influence the average income of the top decile but would leave the rest of the income distribution unchanged. Thus most of our analysis is unaffected.

Figure 3.1 summarizes the evolution of inequality in the transition countries over the period 1990–2005. The top line shows the share of the top decile in total income, the bottom line the share of the lowest decile. The biggest distributional changes occurred between 1990 and 1995, and since then the distributions have, on average, been stable. Between 1990 and 1995, the share of the top decile increased from about 20 per cent of total income to about 25 per cent (and it has been remarkably stable since), while the share of the bottom decile dropped from about 4.5 per cent of total income to 3 per cent. The top and bottom deciles registered the biggest swings: positive by about a quarter of its previous share for the top decile and negative by almost a third for the bottom decile. In contrast, the shares of the middle deciles did not change much: the share of the fifth decile dropped from about 8.6 to 8.1 per cent and the share of the sixth from 9.6 to 9.3 per cent, and so on. This is consistent with other evidence, which shows that the biggest difference (in cross-country studies) between the relatively unequal and relatively equal countries is observed in their top and bottom decile shares, whereas middle-class income shares are relatively stable (Milanovic




Figure 3.1 The evolution of the bottom, middle, and top deciles' share of total income (percentage of total income)

Note: The unweighted (unbalanced panel) average for 26 economies.

Source: Computed by the authors based on data from household surveys (see Annexe 3.1).

2008; Palma 2006). One can thus expect that a temporal change in inequality, as here, would involve most important swings for the two extreme deciles.

The total number of inequality observations we have is 209. At the beginning of the period (1990 and 1991), we have observations for only six and seven countries, respectively, and at the very end of the period (2005) for nine countries.<sup>3</sup> For all other years in between, the number of countries included ranges between 15 and 21. This is because annual data for each of the 26 countries are not available, either because the surveys were not conducted or (less frequently) because we did not have access to them. The list of countries with their number of observations and the average top and bottom decile shares are given in Annexe 3.1. We therefore have an unbalanced panel where the number of observations ranges from 16 (i.e. available for all years) for Poland to only 2 (for Bosnia, Croatia, and Montenegro). The average number of observations per country is about eight (209 divided by 26 countries). Among our explanatory variables, the one that we are most interested in is a set of policy variables as defined and numerically estimated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We shall use these variables as an indicator both of the average intensity of reforms (taking an unweighted average of all nine EBRD reform indexes) and of each reform separately.<sup>4</sup> Other right-hand side variables are pretty

Annexure 3.1 Average share of bottom and top decile by country, 1990–2005

Country	Country abbreviation	Bottom decile	Top decile	Top-to-bottom ratio	No. of observations
Albania	ALB	3.63	23.40	6.45	3
Armenia	ARM	3.43	26.53	7.74	7
Bulgaria	BGR	3.07	25.39	8.28	14
Bosnia	BIH	3.72	23.27	6.26	2
Belarus	BLR	3.98	21.66	5.44	9
Czech Republic	CZE	4.50	22.29	4.95	6
Estonia	EST	2.58	27.05	10.46	11
Georgia	GEO	2.30	28.70	12.46	11
Croatia	HRV	3.43	24.98	7.29	2
Hungary	HUN	3.51	23.83	6.80	13
Kazakhstan	KAZ	3.26	24.30	7.45	6
Kyrgyz Republic	KGZ	3.59	25.31	7.06	9
Lithuania	LTU	2.94	25.25	8.59	10
Latvia	LVA	3.05	25.70	8.42	11
Moldova	MDA	2.48	29.94	12.05	7
Macedonia	MKD	2.92	24.47	8.37	8
Montenegro	MON	3.21	25.13	7.84	2
Poland	POL	3.01	24.96	8.29	16
Romania	ROM	3.13	24.93	7.96	9
Russia	RUS	2.50	27.52	11.00	12
Serbia	SRB	3.31	24.03	7.26	7
Slovakia	SVK	4.50	21.20	4.71	4
Slovenia	SVN	4.00	20.78	5.20	11
Tajikistan	TJK	3.29	25.70	7.82	3
Ukraine	UKR	3.61	22.45	6.22	11
Uzbekistan	UZB	2.77	27.01	9.77	5
Total		3.21	24.97	7.78	209


Source: See text for explanation.

straightforward. They include annual real growth rate, government expenditure as percentage of GDP, and annual inflation rate as measured by the change in the consumer price index (all three obtained from World Development Indicators). It may be worth briefly mentioning their evolution in time since all three are reflective of the transition process.

The growth rates are available annually for 24 countries.<sup>5</sup> The average unweighted rate at the onset of transition, in 1991 and 1992, was –13 and –19 per cent, respectively.<sup>6</sup> Beginning with 1995, the average unweighted growth rate turned positive, almost monotonically increasing from about 1 per cent in 1995 to more than 6 per cent at the end of the

period. This is a remarkable turnaround, although the depth of the early depression means that the GDPs per capita for the eleven countries are still below their 1990 levels.<sup>7</sup> The population-weighted area's average GDP per capita is now only 2 per cent above its 1990 level, and total real GDP of the area is exactly the same as it was 16 years ago. However, illustrating the recent turnaround we note, for example, that since 2000 there have been only five observations of negative (and mildly so) growth rates while there were 18 observations of growth rates in excess of 10 per cent per annum. At the beginning of the period the situation was exactly the reverse: in the years 1991 and 1992 there were no fewer than 30 observations of double-digit negative growth.

The evolution of inflation is very similar to that of growth: years of low growth were also the years of high inflation, and vice versa. The average unweighted inflation rate for the transition countries decreased from its peak of more than 1,000 per cent in 1992 and just below 1,000 per cent in 1993 to around 6 per cent in both 2004 and 2005. Again, from 1993 the decline in the unweighted inflation rate was monotonical: each successive year saw a lower average rate. The evolutions of unweighted growth rate and inflation are shown in Figure 3.2. The situation is just slightly different with respect



*Figure 3.2* Average (unweighted) growth rate and inflation during transition, 1990–2005

*Note:* GDP growth in percentage per annum (broken line; left axis). Inflation in percentage per annum (right axis). Data are the unweighted average of 26 transition economies.

*Source:* Computed by the authors based on data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

to government expenditure as a share of GDP. Government spending was inelastic, both when incomes dropped severely at the onset of the transition and when they kept on increasing later. Thus, the unweighted government spending as a share of GDP reached its peak of 42 per cent in 1992 and more or less dropped continuously to under 30 per cent by the end of the period.

The broad contours of the changes in our key variables during the transition are remarkably clear. Of course, this holds for the sample as a whole—the evolution for each individual country is bound to show peculiarities of its own. On average, inequality grew between 1990 and 1995, and has remained stable since; growth was negative over the same period and after 1995 increased steadily year after year; inflation peaked in 1992 and 1993 and has since steadily gone down; and government expenditure as a share of GDP peaked around the point where the average output hits bottom (1993 and 1994) and have gone down ever since.

With regard to transitional reforms, most transition countries have made significant progress over the past decade and half (see Figure 3.3 and Annexe 3.2), but two broad patterns have emerged. In the more advanced countries, such as Poland and Estonia, rapid liberalization and sustained macroeconomic stabilization laid the basis for gradual institutional change. The bulk of these changes have been driven by the process of European integration. By 2005 the countries with the highest average EBRD index




Figure 3.3 The evolution of average EBRD reform indicators in EE and the CIS, 1990–2005

Note: Unweighted average.

Source: Computed by the authors based on EBRD data.



*Annexure 3.2* Evolution of the main EBRD transition indices

Country code	EBRD index	1990–5	1996–2000	2001–present
ALB	Large-scale privatization	1.14	2.47	3
	Small-scale privatization	2.29	4	4
	Infrastructure	1.05	1.46	2
	Restructuring	1.29	2	2
	EBRD average	1.58	2.58	2.84
ARM	Large-scale privatization	1.14	3	3.33
	Small-scale privatization	1.71	3.2	3.8
	Infrastructure	1.14	2.07	2.33
	Restructuring	1.14	2	2.26
	EBRD average	1.39	2.61	2.97
AZE	Large-scale privatization	1	1.67	2
	Small-scale privatization	1	3	3.6
	Infrastructure	1	1.4	1.8
	Restructuring	1.1	1.67	1.87
	EBRD average	1.21	2.21	2.55
BGR	Large-scale privatization	1.52	2.93	3.8
	Small-scale privatization	1.52	3.2	3.67
	Infrastructure	1.14	2.2	3
	Restructuring	1.29	2.26	2.53
	EBRD average	1.76	2.81	3.3
BIH	Large-scale privatization	1	1.6	2.4
	Small-scale privatization	2.43	2.07	2.93
	Infrastructure	1	1.46	2.26
	Restructuring	1	1.4	1.87
	EBRD average	1.35	1.84	2.43
BLR	Large-scale privatization	1.29	1	1
	Small-scale privatization	1.43	2	2.2
	Infrastructure	1	1.13	1.33
	Restructuring	1.1	1.13	1
	EBRD average	1.34	1.62	1.78
CZE	Large-scale privatization	2.29	4	4
	Small-scale privatization	3	4.33	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.62	2.73	3.2
	Restructuring	2.14	3.07	3.33
	EBRD average	2.34	3.49	3.71
EST	Large-scale privatization	1.86	4	4
	Small-scale privatization	2.29	4.33	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.86	2.8	3.33
	Restructuring	2	3	3.4
	EBRD average	2.04	3.44	3.77

# PROOF

93

GEO	Large-scale privatization	1.14	3.26	3.4
	Small-scale privatization	1.57	4	4
	Infrastructure	1	1.87	2.33
	Restructuring	1.14	2	2.07
	EBRD average	1.29	2.73	2.95
HRV	Large-scale privatization	1.71	3	3.2
	Small-scale privatization	3.43	4.33	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.43	2.13	2.87
	Restructuring	1.29	2.67	2.8
	EBRD average	2.05	3.07	3.35
HUN	Large-scale privatization	2.43	4	4
	Small-scale privatization	2.19	4.26	4.33
	Infrastructure	2.14	3.33	3.67
	Restructuring	2.29	3.2	3.4
	EBRD average	2.54	3.73	3.88
KAZ	Large-scale privatization	1.43	3	3
	Small-scale privatization	1.76	3.87	4
	Infrastructure	1.1	2	2.33
	Restructuring	1	2	2
	EBRD average	1.4	2.76	2.89
KGZ	Large-scale privatization	1.86	3	3.27
	Small-scale privatization	2.29	4	4
	Infrastructure	1.09	1.33	1.6
	Restructuring	1.29	2	2
	EBRD average	1.63	2.77	2.86
LTU	Large-scale privatization	2	3	3.67
	Small-scale privatization	2.43	4.13	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.1	2.33	2.67
	Restructuring	1.43	2.74	2.93
	EBRD average	1.84	3.11	3.5
LVA	Large-scale privatization	1.57	3	3.47
	Small-scale privatization	2.29	4.07	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.29	2.53	3
	Restructuring	1.57	2.74	2.87
	EBRD average	1.87	3.14	3.49
MDA	Large-scale privatization	1.57	3	3
	Small-scale privatization	1.43	3.27	3.67
	Infrastructure	1	1.93	2.2
	Restructuring	1.29	2	1.87
	EBRD average	1.53	2.67	2.81
MKD	Large-scale privatization	1.43	3	3.13
	Small-scale privatization	3.29	4	4
	Infrastructure	1.28	1.74	2.13
	Restructuring	1.29	2.07	2.33
	EBRD average	1.94	2.67	2.93

## Annexe 3.2 (Continued)

Country code	EBRD index	1990–5	1996–2000	2001–present
MON	Large-scale privatization	1	1.27	2.6
	Small-scale privatization	3	2.2	2.8
	Infrastructure	1.19	1.33	1.6
	Restructuring	1	1	1.67
	EBRD average	1.57	1.5	2.25
POL	Large-scale privatization	2.14	3.26	3.33
	Small-scale privatization	3.43	4.33	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.86	2.93	3.33
	Restructuring	2.29	3	3.4
	EBRD average	2.53	3.47	3.68
ROM	Large-scale privatization	1.62	2.74	3.47
	Small-scale privatization	1.71	3.4	3.67
	Infrastructure	1	2.2	3.13
	Restructuring	1.43	2	2.07
	EBRD average	1.62	2.81	3.13
RUS	Large-scale privatization	2	3.26	3.26
	Small-scale privatization	2.14	4	4
	Infrastructure	1.29	2.13	2.47
	Restructuring	1.24	1.93	2.33
	EBRD average	1.74	2.7	2.88
SRB	Large-scale privatization	1	1	2.07
	Small-scale privatization	3	3	3.13
	Infrastructure	1.19	1.67	2
	Restructuring	1	1	1.87
	EBRD average	1.57	1.46	2.33
	<del>EBRD average</del>	<del>2.23</del>	<del>3.24</del>	<del>3.58</del>
SVN	Large-scale privatization	1.52	2.93	3
	Small-scale privatization	3.43	4.33	4.33
	Infrastructure	1.43	2.4	3
	Restructuring	1.62	2.67	2.93
	EBRD average	2.24	3.18	3.36
TJK	Large-scale privatization	1.14	2.13	2.33
	Small-scale privatization	1.57	2.73	3.74
	Infrastructure	1	1	1.13
	Restructuring	1	1.4	1.67
	EBRD average	1.25	1.94	2.25
TKM	Large-scale privatization	1	1.6	1
	Small-scale privatization	1.1	1.93	2
	Infrastructure	1	1	1
	Restructuring	1	1.4	1
	EBRD average	1.06	1.4	1.3

UKR	Large-scale privatization	1.14	2.33	3
	Small-scale privatization	1.43	3.26	3.8
	Infrastructure	1	1.6	2
	Restructuring	1.14	2	2
	EBRD average	1.31	2.48	2.77
UZB	Large-scale privatization	1.38	2.67	2.67
	Small-scale privatization	1.71	3	3
	Infrastructure	1	1.2	1.67
	Restructuring	1.14	1.93	1.67
	EBRD average	1.4	2.1	2.1

*Source:* See text for explanation.

were Hungary, with a value of almost 4 (out of a maximum of 4.33), and Estonia and the Czech Republic (around 3.8). At the beginning of the transition in 1989, Estonia and the Czech Republic had a reform index at the very minimum level of 1, and Hungary at 1.3. Overall, as Figure 3.3 shows, EE countries remained ahead of CIS countries and the difference has even increased recently. As for the least advanced countries, such as Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, progress in liberalization and privatization has been slow and uneven and stabilization has been jeopardized by the persistence of soft budget constraints. In 2005, Turkmenistan's mean reform index stood at 1.3, Belarus's at 1.8 and Uzbekistan's at 2.1. Thus, reform-wise, they seem to be almost where many of the advanced countries were after one or two years of the transition. For both the EE and particularly CIS countries, the intensity of reforms was greater up to the mid-1990s than afterwards (shown by the steepness of the line in Figure 3.3 and a flexion point around 1995). This is as expected since the reform index is bounded from above (as are, in a more substantive sense, reforms too).

### 3 What explains change in inequality?

An explanation of the increase in inequality during the transition has to rely on very little theory. The reason to some extent is obvious, namely that the transition from communism to capitalism took place quickly and unexpectedly, so no *a priori* theory was developed. After the beginning of transition, and faced with the often dramatic increases in inequality, several studies tried to formalize the factors and mechanisms associated with the increase. These were reviewed earlier in this chapter. Milanovic (1999) increased inequality arising from the transfer of labour force from an egalitarian public sector to a much more inegalitarian private sector. In his view, the structural, or rather ownership, transformation was the primary force behind increased inequality. Similarly, Ivaschenko (2002) links privatization

and structural change expressed as 'deindustrialization' to increased inequality. But, as discussed in the review of the existing literature, other factors were, in a heuristic fashion, also associated with changes in inequality. Noticing smaller increases in Central European countries whose welfare systems 'survived' the first wave of transition much better than those of the former Soviet republics, Keane and Prasad (2002) argue that maintaining social expenditure provided a strong cushion against runaway inequality. In an early article on the political economy of reforms, Hellman (1988) links high levels of inequality to non-completed reforms. In his simple cross-section, both the more advanced reformers in Central Europe and the non-reformers in Central Asia had lower levels of inequality than reformers that stopped 'halfway', like Russia and Ukraine. He ascribes these developments to the entrenched role of the new oligarchic elites.

Following on from some of these insights, we estimate a country fixed-effect model where inequality is associated with the growth rate of the economy (measured by the annual GDI increase), inflation rate (measured by the annual increase in the consumer price index), intensity of structural reforms (measured to be the unweighted average value of nine EBRD reform indices), government spending as a share of GDI, and the level of a country's democracy (as measured by the Polity database). In addition, we control for the type of survey instrument used (income or expenditure) and the survey reference period (whether monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual). From the existing literature, both transition-based and non-transition-based, we can derive assumptions regarding the role of some of the explanatory variables. For example, inflation is generally found to be positively associated with inequality (Bulir 2001). Social expenditure, as already mentioned, is expected to dampen the rise in inequality. Democracy is also generally found to be anti-inequality although the evidence is not very robust (see, e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Li et al 1998; but see also Rodrik 1999). But for a couple of variables we lack strong priors based on theory or existing empirical evidence. For example, different types of reform may be assumed to affect inequality differently. While there is little disagreement that privatization is likely to increase inequality (see in particular Ivaschenko 2002: 155–98), other reforms may have the opposite effect. Thus, financial liberalization, associated with financial deepening and easier access to credit, could be thought to be pro-equality as indeed some influential papers argue (e.g. Li et al. 1998). For this reason, in addition to reforms overall whose effects are explored in this section, we shall look in due course at the effect of each individual reform. Even less *a priori* obvious is the effect of the growth rate of the economy. Its effect cannot even be postulated in advance since some growth-inducing policies may be pro-poor and others anti-poor. Therefore, whether the growth process as such has been pro- or anti-poor, it should emerge as result of empirical analysis rather than be hypothesized in advance.

# PROOF

*Branko Milanovic and Lire Ersado* 97

The regressions are run across each decile share defined as the share of  $i$ -th decile (deciles running from 1, the poorest, to 10, the richest) in total survey income (or total survey expenditure, depending on what the survey instrument is). We use the method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), where each individual left-hand side variable is regressed on the same set of explanatory variables.<sup>8</sup> Since the decile shares sum to 1, we impose constraints on the coefficients such that the sum of products of coefficients associated with a given variable and decile shares be equal to 0. In other words, we want to guarantee that an infinitesimal increase in an explanatory variable leaves the sum of income shares unchanged, that is, equal to 1. The regression is written as

$$D_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_{jt} + \beta_2 INF_{jt} + \beta_3 REF_{jt} + \beta_4 EXP_{jt} + \beta_5 DEM_{jt} + \beta_6 DI_{jt} \\ + \beta_7 DS_{jt} + \beta_8 DD_j + e_{ijt}$$

where subscripts  $i$ ,  $j$  and  $t$  denote, respectively, decile, country, and time (year),  $D$  = decile share,<sup>9</sup>  $G$  = real growth rate,  $INF$  = annual inflation,  $REF$  = the average unweighted EBRD reform index,  $EXP$  = total government expenditure as percentage of GDI,  $DEM$  = value of Polity2 variable from the Polity database (ranging from  $-10$  for complete dictatorship to  $+10$  for full democracy),  $DI$  = dummy variable for whether survey is income- or expenditure-based,  $DS$  = dummy variable for survey reference period (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, annual),  $DD$  = country dummy and  $e_{ijt}$  = error term.<sup>10</sup> To control for inter- and intra-country heteroscedasticity the regressions are run with robust (Huber-White) standard errors.<sup>11</sup> Since reforms were, in almost all cases, influenced or imposed from abroad, being at first mostly of the Washington consensus type favoured by the World Bank, the EBRD and the IMF, and later of the milder type favoured by the EU, their exogeneity seems patent—it is very unlikely that they were responding to domestic income distribution concerns.

The results are shown in Table 3.1. As can be seen, there are 177 surveys giving a total of 1,770 data points (for all ten deciles).<sup>12</sup> Each regression is run over 177 points belonging to a given decile. The panel is unbalanced as some countries have many more observations than others. However, since we adjust for unobserved fixed country effects, this should not affect the estimated values of the coefficients. The  $R$ -square runs between 0.5 and 0.6 for the bottom six deciles and the top decile. For the four upper-middle deciles,  $R^2$  is lower, ranging between 0.2 and 0.38. We will consider the results one by one. Growth rate is strongly anti-poor as the coefficients on the two bottom deciles are statistically significantly negative and, likewise, the coefficients on the top two deciles are significantly positive. Across the rest of the income distribution, the higher growth rate is neutral, that is, it

Table 3.1 Explaining decile shares in transition countries (with the overall EBRD index)


Decile	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth	Tenth
Growth rate	-0.265 (2.80)**	-0.066 (0.81)	-0.010 (0.13)	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.20)	-0.004 (0.08)	-0.003 (0.05)	0.135 (1.34)	0.221 (0.58)
Inflation	-0.019 (3.43)**	-0.019 (3.89)**	-0.016 (3.47)**	-0.011 (2.83)**	-0.008 (2.33)*	-0.005 (1.59)	-0.001 (0.48)	0.005 (1.75)	0.021 (3.60)**	0.052 (2.33)*
EBRD_total	-0.067 (3.16)**	-0.072 (3.90)**	-0.059 (3.40)**	-0.038 (2.51)**	-0.025 (1.83)	-0.013 (1.09)	-0.003 (0.29)	0.018 (1.51)	0.084 (3.67)**	0.176 (2.04)*
Exp_gdp	-0.001 (0.85)	0.0003 (0.36)	0.0003 (0.41)	0.001 (0.94)	0.0004 (0.78)	0.0001 (0.16)	-0.0002 (0.50)	0.00001 (0.02)	0.002 (2.17)*	-0.002 (0.62)
Polity2	0.008 (3.01)**	0.008 (3.45)**	0.007 (3.37)**	0.006 (3.19)**	0.005 (3.00)**	0.004 (2.63)**	0.002 (1.73)	-0.001 (0.77)	-0.005 (1.78)	-0.034 (3.20)**
Dincome	-0.013 (0.96)	-0.001 (0.06)	0.007 (0.60)	0.013 (1.27)	0.015 (1.46)	0.016 (1.67)	0.016 (1.65)	0.025 (2.13)*	0.040 (1.69)	0.012 (0.21)
Quarterly	-0.005 (0.09)	-0.015 (0.29)	-0.012 (0.25)	-0.016 (0.36)	-0.018 (0.42)	-0.018 (0.43)	-0.013 (0.31)	-0.005 (0.09)	0.013 (0.13)	0.155 (0.64)
Semi-annual	0.030 (0.47)	-0.004 (0.08)	-0.010 (0.19)	-0.021 (0.42)	-0.020 (0.43)	-0.038 (0.84)	-0.052 (1.14)	-0.065 (1.17)	-0.040 (0.36)	0.153 (0.59)
Annual	-0.005 (0.39)	-0.010 (0.95)	-0.011 (1.02)	-0.013 (1.33)	-0.009 (0.93)	-0.006 (0.67)	-0.001 (0.16)	0.007 (0.67)	0.038 (1.70)	0.091 (1.78)
Constant	0.577 (6.71)**	0.721 (9.61)**	0.764 (10.91)**	0.793 (12.67)**	0.860 (15.01)**	0.937 (18.28)**	1.058 (21.98)**	1.187 (21.36)**	1.202 (11.19)**	1.901 (5.44)**
No. of obs	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177
R <sup>2</sup>	0.546	0.606	0.604	0.589	0.510	0.379	0.200	0.280	0.312	0.539

Note: Statistically significant coefficients (at 1 and 5 per cent levels) denoted by, respectively, two and one asterisks. z values in brackets. Dincome is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the survey is income-based and 0 if expenditure- or consumption-based. Quarterly, semi-annual, and annual are binary variables for the survey reference period (the omitted variable is monthly). The inflation rate is expressed in natural logs. All regressions include country dummies.

Source: See text for explanation.

does not affect the decile shares. The implication is that the acceleration of growth has generally left the income share of the poor lower. This does not imply, however, that their average income had gone down since a smaller share might have been counterbalanced by a higher overall income, but it does highlight the concern that advantages of growth were unbalanced and tended to accrue mostly to higher-income groups. ~~And in effect, while~~ statistically significant, the absolute amount of the effect seems to be small. For the bottom decile, acceleration of 1 per cent in growth is associated with a decrease in its income share by 0.026 percentage points. The average income share of the bottom decile is 3.2 percentage points. Thus, to keep the absolute real income of the bottom decile from falling, the growth acceleration needs to be greater than 0.8 per cent,<sup>13</sup> which, as we have seen, is the case by assumption. For the second decile, the outcome is even stronger, as the implicit growth rate needed to keep its absolute income from falling is only 0.13 per cent. We conclude that higher growth tended to increase absolute incomes also of the poorest but did so proportionally less than the rest (see Figure 3.4, left panel).

The effect of inflation is clear. It tended to influence negatively (in a statistically significant way) the income shares of the bottom five deciles, and positively the top two (see Figure 3.4, right panel). This result, as mentioned before, corresponds with our expectations and with earlier findings in the literature. Similar is the effect of structural reforms measured by the EBRD index. A greater level of reforms is strongly negatively associated with the income shares of the four lower deciles, and positively with



*Figure 3.4* The regression coefficients on growth and inflation variables (by decile)  
*Note:* The broken line around the coefficient gives the spread of two standard deviations.



the shares of the top two deciles. For example, one standard deviation increase in the reform index (0.84 EBRD points) is associated with about 1.1 percentage point share increase for the top decile. Note that the top decile receives, on average, 25 per cent of total income, hence the gains from the reforms are not negligible for the top income group. For the bottom decile, on the other hand, one standard deviation increase in reforms reduces the share by 0.4 per cent. Their (bottom decile's) average share in the sample is 3.2 per cent of total income. Accordingly, in order for greater reforms to increase the absolute income of the bottom decile, the increase in total income generated by reforms must be in excess of 12.5 per cent (0.4 divided by 3.2). This is, of course, extremely high growth on a yearly basis and reforms in the short term are therefore very unlikely to be pro-poor in an absolute sense as far as the bottom income decile is concerned.

A somewhat surprising finding is that greater government expenditure seems to be distribution-neutral. In effect, for no decile, except weakly for the ninth decile, does greater expenditure (as a share of GDI) show either a positive or a negative statistically significant coefficient. The effect is generally very strong (including here regressions not in the text) when the run in a cross-country setting dissipates in a model where we control for country effects. In other words, the conclusion that the difference between inequality in (say) Poland and Russia may be related to their governments' spending does not seem to be warranted. Once we control for unobserved country characteristics, we cannot argue that greater government spending in Russia (or in Poland) would result in less inequality. It seems that all of the identification of this variable's effect on inequality comes from cross-country variation. Part of the problem may lie, however, in the fact that government expenditure includes all kinds of expenditure, all of which may not be directed towards the poor or lower middle classes. If one could isolate the social component of total government expenditure (which unfortunately is not possible with the data) it could be that the effect would cease to be insignificant.

The effect of democracy is very interesting. Its pro-equality effect cuts very deeply because it raises the income shares of the bottom six deciles, is neutral for the following three deciles, and is then strongly anti-top decile. The increase by one democracy point on the 21-point Polity scale increases the share of the bottom decile by 0.08 percentage points, which seems small in absolute amounts but not so when we reflect that the average share of the bottom decile is only 3.2 percentage points. In other words, a one-point increase in the democracy indicator is equal to a distribution-neutral growth rate of some 2.5 per cent (0.08 divided by 3.2). The effect is similar for the following two deciles (second and third). An intriguing result is that a combination of modest democratization (increase by 1 Polity point)

and modest acceleration in growth (1 per cent) will, on average, increase absolute incomes of the bottom deciles even if growth per se has a disequalizing effect. However, a very strong negative effect of reforms on bottom decile share cannot be so easily offset by democratization. As a robustness check, we also introduce the ratio between exports of some key natural resources (oil, natural gas, diamonds, gold) and GDI.<sup>14</sup> This is done to test the hypothesis that natural resource exports tend to be associated with more unequal distributions. In this case, however, the coefficient on the natural resource exports variable is insignificant throughout, while coefficients on the other variables are not affected. Finally, the effects of the survey instrument (income or expenditure) or reference period are statistically insignificant throughout.

#### 4 The role of individual EBRD reform indicators

In the previous section the intensity of structural reforms in transition countries was measured by the unweighted average of the nine EBRD transitional indicators. However, as already mentioned, it is highly likely that these various components of the EBRD transition index could have different, and even opposing, effects in the evolution of inequality. For example, while large-scale privatization may likely lead to an increase in inequality (Ivaschenko 2002), financial liberalization could have the opposite effect (Li et al. 1998). Hence, in this section we analyse the effect on decile shares of each of the nine EBRD transitional indicators separately.

Table 3.2 presents the coefficients from a seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) of the share of deciles where all nine EBRD transition indicators are used as explanatory variables. Before discussing the results, it is worth mentioning that the other key explanatory variables stayed robust despite introducing a new set of explanatory structural reform variables. For example, both the signs and the significance of growth, inflation, government expenditure, and democracy variables remained robust; that is, the same as they were in the previous regressions (Table 3.1). Therefore, this section discusses the effects on inequality of the EBRD transition indicators only.

Large- and small-scale privatization schemes appear to have opposing effects on the evolution of inequality in the transition countries. The statistically significant and positive coefficients on the bottom five deciles suggest that progress in small-scale privatization is strongly pro-poor. This observation is further strengthened by the statistically significant negative coefficients on the top three deciles. On other hand, large-scale privatization tends to worsen inequality as implied by the negative coefficients

Table 3.2 Explaining decile shares in transition countries (with individual EBRD indexes)

Decile	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth	Tenth
Growth	-0.332 (3.50)**	-0.133 (1.63)	-0.068 (0.89)	-0.047 (0.69)	-0.039 (0.63)	-0.040 (0.75)	-0.006 (0.13)	0.034 (0.65)	0.185 (1.76)	0.446 (1.16)
Inflation	-0.021 (3.68)**	-0.021 (4.14)**	-0.018 (3.87)**	-0.014 (3.26)**	-0.012 (3.11)**	-0.009 (2.65)**	-0.004 (1.48)	0.004 (1.39)	0.025 (3.95)**	0.068 (2.91)**
Large-scale privatization	-0.017 (1.15)	-0.022 (1.72)	-0.010 (0.82)	-0.004 (0.35)	0.002 (0.23)	0.002 (0.23)	0.002 (0.30)	0.012 (1.44)	0.039 (2.32)*	-0.004 (0.06)
Small-scale privatization	0.036 (2.44)*	0.037 (2.94)**	0.033 (2.77)**	0.027 (2.56)*	0.021 (2.17)*	0.014 (1.71)	-0.002 (0.21)	-0.024 (2.96)**	-0.034 (2.08)*	-0.108 (1.82)
Governance and enterprise restructuring	-0.028 (1.38)	-0.021 (1.22)	-0.024 (1.52)	-0.022 (1.56)	-0.023 (1.82)	-0.023 (2.03)*	-0.017 (1.67)	-0.016 (1.42)	-0.010 (0.44)	0.183 (2.27)*
Price liberalization	0.029 (1.69)	0.024 (1.60)	0.018 (1.27)	0.013 (1.06)	0.006 (0.52)	-0.000 (0.03)	-0.006 (0.70)	-0.009 (0.90)	-0.002 (0.10)	-0.073 (1.04)
Trade and foreign exchange liberalization	-0.017 (1.27)	-0.005 (0.43)	-0.002 (0.18)	-0.003 (0.33)	-0.004 (0.48)	-0.004 (0.51)	-0.006 (0.80)	-0.011 (1.50)	0.009 (0.62)	0.043 (0.78)
Competition policy	0.022 (1.31)	0.003 (0.23)	-0.003 (0.20)	0.002 (0.15)	0.009 (0.79)	0.019 (1.98)*	0.021 (2.50)*	0.013 (1.36)	-0.021 (1.12)	-0.065 (0.95)
Banking system liberalization	-0.015 (0.85)	-0.012 (0.81)	-0.013 (0.91)	-0.009 (0.74)	0.001 (0.06)	0.008 (0.86)	0.018 (2.01)*	0.030 (3.09)**	0.018 (0.91)	-0.025 (0.36)

Infrastructural reform	-0.039 (2.32)*	-0.044 (3.06)**	-0.045 (3.32)**	-0.034 (2.85)**	-0.034 (3.12)**	-0.030 (3.22)**	-0.020 (2.29)*	0.005 (0.58)	0.054 (2.91)**	0.187 (2.74)**
Capital market reform	-0.011 (0.70)	-0.012 (0.89)	-0.005 (0.38)	-0.004 (0.34)	-0.005 (0.50)	-0.005 (0.52)	-0.001 (0.12)	0.008 (0.97)	0.011 (0.67)	0.022 (0.35)
Exp_gdp	-0.001 (0.61)	-0.000 (0.24)	0.000 (0.44)	0.001 (0.93)	0.000 (0.74)	0.000 (0.10)	-0.000 (0.41)	0.000 (0.28)	0.002 (1.82)	-0.002 (0.67)
Polity2	0.008 (3.23)**	0.009 (4.08)**	0.008 (4.06)**	0.007 (3.70)**	0.006 (3.43)**	0.004 (2.98)**	0.002 (1.74)	-0.002 (1.41)	-0.006 (2.17)*	-0.037 (3.52)**
Dincome	-0.011 (0.80)	0.002 (0.13)	0.009 (0.71)	0.014 (1.25)	0.015 (1.42)	0.016 (1.67)	0.017 (1.76)	0.024 (2.17)*	0.029 (1.30)	0.015 (0.25)
Quarterly	0.008 (0.13)	0.004 (0.08)	0.003 (0.06)	-0.006 (0.14)	-0.010 (0.24)	-0.010 (0.25)	-0.009 (0.23)	-0.013 (0.26)	-0.016 (0.16)	0.116 (0.49)
Semi-annual	0.048 (0.69)	0.033 (0.53)	0.025 (0.43)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.010 (0.20)	-0.039 (0.82)	-0.061 (1.29)	-0.082 (1.50)	-0.042 (0.38)	0.061 (0.21)
Annual	-0.002 (0.17)	-0.006 (0.56)	-0.007 (0.63)	-0.010 (1.00)	-0.007 (0.70)	-0.005 (0.52)	-0.002 (0.21)	0.003 (0.26)	0.029 (1.36)	0.088 (1.75)
Constant	0.385 (3.33)**	0.515 (5.16)**	0.602 (6.45)**	0.679 (8.10)**	0.800 (10.50)**	0.920 (13.75)**	1.098 (17.81)**	1.309 (19.19)**	1.336 (9.76)**	2.357 (5.05)**
No. of obs	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177	177
R-square	0.579	0.629	0.622	0.602	0.532	0.413	0.263	0.388	0.364	0.567

Note: Statistically significant coefficients (at 1 and 5 per cent levels) denoted by, respectively, two and one asterisks. z values in brackets. Dincome is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if survey is income-based and 0 if expenditure- or consumption-based. Quarterly, semi-annual, and annual are binary variables for survey reference period (the omitted variable is monthly). The inflation rate is expressed in natural logs. All regressions include country dummies.  
Source: See text for explanation.

(albeit not significant at conventional level) on the bottom deciles' income shares.

Another EBRD reform that has significant bearing on the evolution of inequality is progress in reforming infrastructure, which includes electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications, water, and waste. Reforms in these infrastructure and utility sectors have worsened inequality. They appear to benefit mostly those in the top two deciles (that is the richest 20 per cent) of the population. Nearly 70 per cent of the population have seen their share of consumption or income decline as a result of infrastructure privatization and fee changes. This outcome may be partly explained by the fact that infrastructure privatization meant the abolition of monolithic government ownership of these structures that used to provide, at times inefficient yet, subsidized and/or free services to ~~the~~ citizens. The sizes of the two strongly significant effects (pro-poor small-scale privatization and pro-rich infrastructure reform) are such that they almost exactly balance each other out—one point increase in the respective EBRD indexes produces about the same absolute effect.<sup>15</sup>

The rest of the EBRD transition indicators played more or less non-discriminatory roles in the evolution of inequality. Enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive business environment appear to favour those in the middle-income classes, with no significant effect on the poorest and the richest. Improvements in banking laws and regulations, and financial deepening, also benefit more those in the middle- and upper-income brackets. There is some indication that enterprise restructuring tends to favour the very top income class to the detriment of the middle. If job losses following restructuring are concentrated among the middle classes it is not surprising. The rest of the EBRD components are inequality-neutral. But in some cases that neutrality is quite remarkable. Thus price liberalization, and foreign trade and exchange rate liberalization, frequently regarded as anti-poor, at least in the short term, appear to have an entirely neutral effect on income distribution.

## 5 Conclusions

Using for the first time micro data from household surveys in an unbalanced panel framework covering 26 transition economies over a 16-year period, this study has investigated the correlates of inequality increase in post-communist countries. Another feature of the study has been the use of decile shares, which give a much more detailed picture of changes in the entire distribution than a single inequality index like a Gini coefficient. While the Gini coefficient can remain unchanged, for example, with increases in income shares among both the rich and the poor (and a corresponding

# PROOF

*Branko Milanovic and Lire Ersado* 105

decline in the middle), the share-based analysis captures these changes well. Using the SUR method, run for each decile and fixed (country effect)-specification, we find that reforms as measured by the average EBRD index for a given country/year have had a robust negative effect on income shares of the bottom four deciles and a positive effect on income shares of the top two.

The intuitive feeling that reforms in post-communist countries were anti-poor (at least in the distributional sense) is confirmed. Breaking down the reform index into its nine EBRD-defined types of reform, we find that the negative effect on income shares of the bottom decile is associated mostly with infrastructural reforms, which included introduction (or increases) of fees for services, and privatization of electricity, railways, roads, water provision, and so on. On the other hand, small-scale privatization is associated with the opposite (pro-poor) effect. Among the other relevant variables, the most important and significant is the role of democracy, which raises the income shares of the bottom and middle deciles. Not surprisingly, we find inflation to be anti-poor: highly significant for the income shares of both the bottom and the top groups. Growth as such has, on the other hand, been disequalizing. However, this effect is sufficiently small so that growth overall is associated with an increase in real income of the bottom deciles (including the lowest)—that is, even if the bottom decile's income share is reduced. In other words, growth was anti-poor in a relative but not in an absolute sense. Finally, once we control for country effects, we find an absence of association between government expenditure as a share of GDI and inequality. Thus, the often-quoted relationship between government spending and inequality in (say) Poland versus Russia (with spending being high in Poland and hence, it is argued, inequality low) seems to get its entire identification from cross-country level regressions.

What policy implications emerge from this work? First, it is important to look at the reform process in a more nuanced and discriminating way. This refers in particular to the negative role played by infrastructural reform that might often have been pushed onto the population too fast and too hard. The result also shows that the attempts to cushion low-income groups from the effects of such reforms have been unsuccessful. Second, it confirms the importance of small-scale privatization in keeping inequality in check—probably by providing much needed jobs. Third, it shows the crucial role played by democratization and control of inflation. Fourth, it leads us to be much more sceptical in using government spending as a means to redistribute resources towards the poorer strata. Fifth, it shows that growth is crucial for real incomes of all people, including the poor, even if it tends to be (in relative terms) disequalizing. Sixthly, it shows that price and trade liberalization, often regarded as detrimental to the poor, was not so

in the context of post-communist transition—the effect of both is entirely distribution-neutral.

### Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Ruslan Yemtsov, Cem Mete and participants at seminars where this study was presented: World Bank, School for Advanced International Studies in Washington DC, International Economic Association in Istanbul, and UNU-WIDER in Helsinki, as well as to the two referees and the editor of this volume, for useful comments and suggestions. The opinions expressed here are the authors' and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations.

### Notes

1. It includes all the republics of the FSU ~~except~~ the three Baltic republics and, since September 2008, Georgia.
2. Insignificant, and possibly perverse, effect of social transfers on inequality in Russia coincides with the earlier finding by Milanovic (1999: 316).
3. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are not included in the analysis because of the unreliability of their household surveys.
4. The reform areas are the following: large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure reform. The EBRD indices come from the EBRD *Transition Report*, reflecting progress in all of these areas. Each of these individual EBRD indices is reported on a 1 to 4+ scale with higher numbers indicating greater reform progress.
5. We do not have data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.
6. The average unweighted means that each country/year counts as one observation.
7. GDP per capita (and total GDP) is measured at 2005 international prices.
8. Although ordinary least squares estimators are consistent, SURE provides greater efficiency, and efficiency gains increase as correlation between errors across equations goes up (which is the case here; see Greene 2000).
9. In regressions, decile share is expressed as a multiple of the mean rather than as the percentages of the total. Thus, the bottom decile's share of (say) 3 per cent of total income is translated as 0.3 mean incomes. This can be interpreted as the average income of the bottom decile normalized by the mean.
10. Inflation is defined, as usual, as  $\ln(1 + \text{annual inflation rate})$ ; the EBRD index runs from 1 to 4.33. Real growth rate, annual inflation, and government expenditure as a share of GDI are all from the World Bank database (World Development Indicators). *Polity2* variable is from PolityIV database (accessible at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>), and EBRD index is compiled from various annual EBRD reports.
11. We perform the Breusch-Pagan test of independence to see whether correlations are zero or not. The null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.

12. Some of the income distribution (decile) information is lost because of a lack of independent variables for those particular countries and years.
13. Calculated as follows: 1 per cent (0.01) acceleration multiplied by the coefficient of  $-0.265$  and multiplied further by 10 (since decile shares are expressed as the multiples of the mean) and then divided by the average decile share of the bottom (3.2 per cent).
14. The results are not shown here but they are available from the authors on request.
15. Of course, this is merely of econometric rather than real relevance since a one point increase in EBRD index may involve vastly different policies in the case of infrastructure reform compared with the case of small-scale privatization.

## References

- Atkinson, A.B., T. Piketty and E. Saez (2011) 'Top Incomes in the Long Run of History', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(1): 3–71.
- Bollen, K. and R.W. Jackman (1985) 'Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income', *American Sociological Review*, 50: 438–57.
- Bulir, A. (2001) 'Income Inequality: Does Inflation Matter?', *IMF Staff Papers*, 48(1): 139–59.
- Ferreira, F. (1999) 'Economic Transition and the Distributions of Income and Wealth', *Economics of Transition*, 7(2): 377–410.
- Giammatteo, M. (2006) 'Inequality in Transition Countries: The Contributions of Markets and Government Taxes and Transfers', *LIS Working Papers No. 443*.
- Gorodnichenko, Y., K.S. Peter and D. Stolyarov (2010) 'Inequality and Volatility Moderation in Russia: Evidence from Micro-level Panel Data on Consumption and Income', *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 13: 209–37.
- Greene, W.H. (2000) *Econometric Analysis*, 5th edn., Prentice Hall: New York and London.
- Hellman, J. (1988) 'Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions', *World Politics*, 50(2): 203–34.
- Ivanova, M. (2006) 'Inequality and Government Policies in Central and Eastern Europe', paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, 22 March, San Diego.
- Ivaschenko, A. (2002) 'Growth and Inequality: Evidence from Transitional Economies', in T.S. Eicher and S.J. Turnovsky (eds), *Inequality and Growth: Theory and Policy Implications*, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA and London.
- Keane, M. and E. Prasad (2002) 'Inequality, Transfers, and Growth: New Evidence from the Economic Transition in Poland', *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(2): 324–41.
- Li, H., L. Squire and H. Zou (1998) 'Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality', *Economic Journal*, 108(446): 26–43.
- Milanovic, B. (1999) 'Explaining the Increase in Inequality during Transition', *Economics of Transition*, 7(2): 299–341.
- Milanovic, B. (2008) 'Where in the World Are You? Assessing the Importance of Circumstance and Effort in a World of Different Mean Country Incomes and (Almost) no Migration', *World Bank Policy Research Working Papers No. 4493*, World Bank: Washington, DC.
- Mitra, P. and R. Yemtsov (2006) 'Increasing Inequality in Transition Economies: Is There More to Come?', *World Bank Policy Research Working Papers No. 4007*, World Bank: Washington, DC.



# PROOF

108 *Reform and Inequality during the Transition*

- Palma, J.G. (2006) 'Globalizing Inequality: "Centrifugal" and "Centripetal" Forces at Work', *UNDESA Working Papers No. 35*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: New York.
- Rodrik, D. (1999) 'Democracies Pay Higher Wages', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(3): 707–38.
- Sukiassyan, G. (2007) 'Inequality and Growth: What Does the Transition Economy Data Say?', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 35(1): 35–56.