

PSC 76400: Security Studies
Political Science Program, CUNY Graduate Center
Prof. Peter Liberman
Fall 2014 Syllabus

Meets: Thursday 4:15-6:15, Room 3308

Graduate Center Office: 5206, tel. (212) 817-8693 (no messages)

Office hours: Thursday 3:00-4:00 pm or by appointment

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Course Description and Learning Goals

This course examines contemporary theory-testing research in security studies. Topics examined include the sources of peace and war, coercion, strategy, arms races, alliances, and international institutions designed to control arms and conflict. The focus is on states, but we will also examine insurgencies and terrorism insofar as these have international reach. The works studied represent diverse methodologies and theoretical approaches; each week's readings address a common question (or a set of related questions) using different theories and methods. The course also will provide a helpful overview of the international security subfield, making it useful preparation for the IR First Exam.

The course has the following learning goals:

- To familiarize students with a wide range of leading theories on international security issues.
- To expose students to multiple methodological approaches employed in contemporary international relations research.
- To enhance students' ability to critically analyze political science research, especially in the field of international security.
- To enhance students theoretical reasoning and their writing, verbal communication, critical thinking, and methodological skills.
- To prepare students to answer International Security questions on the PhD First Exam in International Relations.

Overview of Topics and Sessions

8/28	1. Overview and introduction
9/4	2. Security studies and disasters
9/11	3. Alliances
9/18	4. Sources of military doctrine
9/25 – no class	
10/2	5. Nuclear proliferation
10/9	6. Nuclear peace?
10/16	7. Coercion
10/23	8. Credibility and reputation
10/30	9. Causes of war
11/6	10. Realisms

11/13	11. Peace institutions
11/20—colloquium	12. Public opinion on war and peace
11/27— no class	
12/4	13. Military occupation, insurgency, and nation-building
12/11	14. Terrorism
12/18	15. Final exam

Course Requirements and Grade Breakdown

1. Careful reading of *all* the required assignments *before* the class meetings and active contribution to class discussion. (25%)
2. 20-page literature review (50% of grade) on a security studies topic chosen by student, after consultation with instructor. The review should go beyond the required readings. The review should identify a central research question, discuss major contributions, identify theoretical and/or empirical flaws, limitations, or unanswered questions, and suggest ways paths for future research to improve these shortcomings. Topic must be chosen by 10/2, students must meet to discuss with instructor by 11/6, paper due 12/11.
3. Final exam, 2 hours in length (25%). Timed in-class essay, drawing on course readings. Students will be given a set of questions and will choose one to answer. Useful for all students for reviewing and mastering subject material, and also useful preparation for the PhD First Exam.

General Questions for Reading and Discussion

The course will pay special attention to hypothesis-testing methods in security studies. In preparing for course discussion you should address the following questions:

1. Arrow diagram the hypotheses tested. How sound are the deductions?
2. What, if any, are the boundary conditions of the hypothesized effects?
3. Does the author select appropriate alternative explanations?
4. Is the selection of historical cases or quantitative data sets appropriate? Why or why not?
5. What other cases or comparisons might have helped test the hypotheses? If you wanted to conduct a challenging test for the theory, what approach would you take?
6. Do the author's measures accurately reflect the variables used in the theory?
7. Does the author use evidence fairly or selectively?

Course Readings

The reading assignments for each week are specified below, under "Agenda." Some of these reading assignments may be changed, with at least 2 weeks advance notice, to accommodate students' interests. Additional suggested readings are provided at the end of the syllabus, divided by issue area.

In order to cover more ground, most of the course readings are articles from peer-reviewed journals rather than books. Some readings not available in book form or online will

also be placed on Blackboard (marked “BB” on the syllabus). Most of the articles are available through the library’s full-text online journal databases, and can be easily accessed from the library website (<http://library.gc.cuny.edu>). Some articles in the syllabus have URLs, but these change from time to time and may no longer work. Google Scholar is an efficient way to obtain the readings, especially if you have logged in and set Mina Rees to be a preferred library. (It is also a very useful research tool to identify influential articles and works that have cited them.) In tracking down readings and doing research, students are encouraged to tap the expertise of Mina Rees librarians, particularly Stephen Klein, the Political Science subject librarian (sklein@gc.cuny.edu; 212-817-7074), as well as to speak to me.

To those of you unfamiliar with Blackboard, you access it by first going to the CUNY Portal (at www.cuny.edu). Click on "Portal Log-in" on left. If you don't already have a CUNY Portal Username and Password, you can obtain them here there using your GC User ID and password. Once you've logged in to the portal, click on the "Blackboard" button on the left side under “Applications/Resources.” When your Blackboard page opens, click on “International Security” from the list of courses on the right hand side.

We will be reading substantial portions of the below texts, so they are recommended for purchase, and I have requested that they be placed on short-term reserve at the Mina Rees Library.

- Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 2010), chaps 1-3. E-resource
- Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate* 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).
- Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). E-resource and reserve.

Agenda

1. Introduction: What is security studies, and how should it be studied? Discussion of student and professor interests and background.

2. Security studies and disasters

- Paul D. Williams, "Security Studies: An Introduction," in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams (Routledge, 2012).
<http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/9780415782814/data/Introduction.pdf>
- Steven E. Miller, "The Hegemonic Illusion? Traditional Strategic Studies in Context," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 6 (2010).
- Michelle Murray, "Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition before the First World War," *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (2010).

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- PK Rose, "Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950," *Studies in Intelligence* (2001). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article06.html
 - Daniel Byman, "An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?," *Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (2008).
<http://ejournals.ebsco.com/direct.asp?ArticleID=4E2A94792F15A14A94E9>

3. Alliances

- Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540>
- Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization* 44, no. 2 (1990).
- Kevin Narizny, "The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905–39," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003).
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins27.4.html
- Dan Reiter, "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past," *World Politics* 46 (1994). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950716>
- Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00001

4. Sources of military doctrine

- Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1985). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28198422%299%3A1%3C108%3ACRATCO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F>
- Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Excerpt BB.
- John A. Nagl, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War," *World Affairs* 161, no. 4 (1999). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672559>
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 16-46. 30pp BB

5. Causes of nuclear proliferation

- Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), chaps 1-2, 3, 4, 8, 9. JZ5675 .S665 2007 and eresource.

6. Nuclear peace?

- Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate* 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).

7. Military coercion

- R. A. Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15, no. 4 (1992).
- Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," *International Organization* 67, no. 01 (2013).
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," *International Organization* 67, no. 01 (2013).
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000392>
- Ward Wilson, "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima," *International Security* 31, no. 4 (2007).
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/international_security/v031/31.4wilson.html

8. Credibility and reputation

- Gregory D Miller, *The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First World War* (Cornell University Press, 2012), chaps 1-2, 6-7. E-resource.
- Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), selections.
- Alexander B Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, no. 3 (2012).

9. Causes of war

- Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28200203%2996%3A1%3C1%3ATOWIAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1>
- Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 1 (2003).
<http://ejournals.ebsco.com/direct.asp?ArticleID=4794AA9F59E98C8DD896>
- Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap 2. BB
- Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3593025>
- V.M. Hudson et al., "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States," *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2009).
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins.33.3.html

10. Realism

- Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, chaps 1-3. Mina Rees online resource.

11. Institutions and norms

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- V. P. Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization* 57, no. 02 (2003). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594855>
 - William C. Potter, "The Npt & the Sources of Nuclear Restraint," *Daedalus* 139, no. 1 (2010). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed.2010.139.1.68>
 - Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, no. 3 (1998). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601403>
 - C. A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: Nato after the Cold War," 54, no. 4 (2000).
 - Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino, "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 01 (2013).

12. Public Opinion on War and Peace

- Daniel W. Drezner, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion," *Perspectives on Politics* 6, no. 01 (2008).
- Liberman, "Mistaken and Redirected Retribution in U.S. Public Support for War Against Iraq," unpub ms. BB
- Marc Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis," *SS 21/1* (January 2012): 3-42.
- Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L. P. Weeks, "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 04 (2013).

13. Military occupation, insurgency, regime change

- Simon Collard-Wexler, "Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation," *Presented to the Annual Meeting of APSA* (2013). BB
- Seth G Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008).
- David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004). http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins29.1.html
- Jason Lyall, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration," *International Organization* 64, no. 01 (2010).
- Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," *International Security* 37, no. 4 (2013).

14. Terrorism

- Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008).
- Max Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013).

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- Erica Chenoweth et al., "What Makes Terrorists Tick," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (2009).
 - M. Tessler and M. D. H. Robbins, "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (2007).
<http://jcr.sagepub.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/cgi/content/abstract/51/2/305>
 - Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117613>

15. Final Exam

SUGGESTED READINGS

Suggested on the nature and importance of security studies

- Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?," *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v050/50.1betts.html
- Steven E. Miller, "International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001).
- Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Pinar Bilgin, "The 'Western-Centrism' of Security Studies: 'Blind Spot' or Constitutive Practice?," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 6 (2010).
- Miller, "The Hegemonic Illusion? Traditional Strategic Studies in Context."
- Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? 26 (Fall 2001): 87-102.," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092123>
- Stephen M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (2005).
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=17053609&site=ehost-live>

Notorious security blunders

- Jeffrey Record, *Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons* (Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).

Suggested introductions to methods

- Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chaps. 1-3.
- Richard K Herrmann, "Linking Theory to Evidence in International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002).

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- Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006).
 - Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

Realism

- C Layne, "The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon," *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (2006).
- John Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001). ISBN 0393978397. Call no. D397 .M38 2003
- Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).

Alliances

- Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
- Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703952>
- Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* (2014).
- KT Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," *International Organization* (1996).
- Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 4 (2004).
- Mark L. Haas, "Ideology and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 1930s," *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (2003). BB.
- Mark L. Haas, *Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
- Brett Ashley Leeds, "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties," *International Organization* 57, no. 4 (2003).
- Brett Ashley Leeds, "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," *American journal of political science* 53, no. 2 (2009).
- Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999," *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005). <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09636410591001465>
- Levy and Thompson, "Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?."
- Richard Little, "British Neutrality Versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back," *Security Studies* 16, no. 1 (2007). <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=24827910&site=ehost-live>
- Michaela Mattes, "Democratic Reliability, Precommitment of Successor Governments, and the Choice of Alliance Commitment," *International Organization* 66, no. 01 (2012).

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- John Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), ch. 8.
 - Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
 - Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of Nato," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
<http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz10.html>
 - Glenn Herald Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
 - John Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate* (Prentice-Hall, 2003).
 - Walt, "Alliance Formation."
 - Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
 - WC Wohlforth et al., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 2 (2007).

Coercion, signaling, and credibility

- Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory," *International Studies Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (2011).
- Press, *Calculating Credibility*.
- Alexander B Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66, no. 3 (2012).
- Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- RH Wagner, *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics* (Univ of Michigan Pr, 2007).

Threat perceptions

- Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," *International Security* 38, no. 1 (2013).
- Elizabeth N Saunders, "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy," *International Security* 34, no. 2 (2009).
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Conventional deterrence:

- John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell, 1983).
- Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999).
<http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=5366757>

War Termination:

- Hein E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Part published in

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- Hein E. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, no. 5 (2000).
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/174644>
- Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
 - PL Sullivan, "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 3 (2007).
<http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/3/496>
 - Dan Reiter, *How Wars End* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

Offense-defense theory

- Karen Adams, "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," *International Security* 28:3 Winter 2003.
- Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*.
- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.
- Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Occur," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (1994). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539227>
- Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Nuclear deterrence

- Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).
- Charles Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
- Charles Glaser, "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament," *Survival* 40: 112-28 (Spring 1998).
- R. Rauchhaus, "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009).
- M. Horowitz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009).
- Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978).
- Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
- Sagan and Waltz, *Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, ., *ibid*.
- S.P. Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe," *International Security* 30, no. 2 (2005).

War- and peace-prone states

- Joanne S. Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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- John M. Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
 - James Lee Ray, "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
 - Miriam Fendius Elman, *Paths to Peace : Is Democracy the Answer?*, *Csia Studies in International Security* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
 - John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539197>
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539197>
 - Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001), chaps 2-4.
 - Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).
 - Snyder, *Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition*.
 - Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 321-368. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010542>

War- and peace-prone leaders

- Chaim Kaufmann, "Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (1994). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600865>
- Khong, Yuen Foong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
- E.N. Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* (Cornell University Press, 2011).
- Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," *Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (2008).
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=35537635&site=ehost-live>

Are democracies tougher? Smarter?

- Michael C. Desch "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *IS* 27:2 (Fall 2002).
- AB Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies?: Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (2009).
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins.33.4.html
- Jason Lyall, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration," *IO* 64/1 (Winter 2010): 167-92.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, *Democracies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

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- Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 03 (2011).
http://journals.cambridge.org.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/abstract_S000305541100027X
 - Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah E. Croco, "Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 02 (2010).

Public opinion on war and peace

- Drezner, "Realist Tradition."
- Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *IO* 61/4 (Fall 2007): 821-40.
- Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, "Looking for Audience Costs in All the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access, and Democratic Constraint," *JOP* 76/1 (January 2014): 167- 81.

International norms and force

- Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000/01). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626705>
- Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998).
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