- Professor, Political Science
- American politics, the U.S. Congress, and methodology, political behavior, legislative politics
Prof. Jones is the author of Political Parties and Policy Gridlock in American Government (Mellen, 2001), and coauthor of Americans Congress, and Democratic Responsiveness: Public Evaluations of Congress and Electoral Consequences (Michigan, 2009). His research has been published in scholarly journals such as The American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, Legislative Studies Quarterly, and Political Research Quarterly. Professor Jones is also a faculty member of the Political Science Program at the City University of New York’s Baruch College. During election seasons he has served as an exit poll analyst for the New York Times and for CBS News.
David R. Jones and Monika L. McDermott, Americans, Congress, and Democratic Responsiveness: Public Evaluations of Congress and Electoral Consequences (University of Michigan Press, 2010)
Voters may not know the details of specific policies, but they have a general sense of how well Congress serves their own interests and how closely politicians pay attention to public approval ratings. David Jones and Monika McDermott show, through new empirical analysis, that both politicians and voters take a hand in reconfiguring the House and Senate when the majority party is unpopular, as was the case during the 2008 elections. Candidates who continue to run under the party banner distance themselves from party ideology, while voters throw hard-line party members out of office. In this way, public approval and democratic responsibility directly affect policy shifts and turnovers at election time. Contrary to the common view of Congress as an insulated institution, Congress is indeed responsive to the people of the United States.
David Jones, Political Parties and Policy Gridlock in American Government (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).
A systemwide analysis of how interaction among the president, Congress, and political parties affects the chances for legislative change or for gridlock<–>the apparent inability of the federal government to do its job effectively. Jones’s (political science, Baruch College, CUNY) model takes into account preferences (as reflected in part by partisanship), numerical party strength, and institutional structure (the Senate filibuster, the presidential veto) and assesses the conditions under which partisanship inhibits or facilitates legislative productivity.