Review of *Cold War Freud: Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes*


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BOOK REVIEW


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The history of the psychoanalytic movement will never have come to an end. This is true not only for the banal reason that psychoanalysis continues to evolve and that new chapters in its future development will need to be written. It is also true because the history of psychoanalysis is intractably composite, heterogeneous, and irreducible to the simple linear sequence of a straightforward chronology. Nor does the genealogy of psychoanalytic ideas play out in neat arboresal fashion according to continuous, organically determined lines of development. Each moment in the history of psychoanalysis carries latent significance that may, in recursive interaction with the present, give rise to new versions of the past. A history of psychoanalysis cannot therefore be organized by simple reference to origins, but must account for the social, cultural, and political contingencies that introduce discontinuity, irregularity, contradiction, recurrence, and rupture into the story.

Of course, Freud, in his *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* (1914), is rather anxiously determined to avoid these complications, even to eliminate contingency from the narrative altogether. In a virtuoso political act of remembering, repeating, and working through (the title of his famous essay on technique from the same year), Freud writes his own history of the movement—its beginnings, its expansion, its reckoning with dissent, and its continued growth—in a spirit of willful confidence that psychoanalysis has a single origin and a

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continuous history guaranteed by a set of conceptual shibboleths and by an institutional structure charged with enforcing them. “[P]sychoanalysis is my creation” (Freud, 1914, p. 7), he declares at the outset, staking his absolute claim to priority—and later announcing his means for protecting this priority: “I considered it necessary to form an official association . . . some headquarters whose business it would be to declare . . . ‘this is not psychoanalysis’” (Freud, 1914, p. 43).

The implied model of historiography in Freud’s account here stands in stark contrast to the much more complex models of psychoanalytic temporality that appear in his case studies and theoretical writings as early as the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* in 1895 (Freud, 1895). For in these writings, Freud insists that the history of the desiring subject cannot be reduced to a simple temporal sequence that allows only for the effect of the past on the present. Instead, he argues, the past may, under the influence of a later event, acquire not only new significance, but new force and consequence. I refer, of course, to Freud’s notion of *Nachträglichkeit*, the “deferred action” by which unassimilated, encrypted, past experience is reanimated, revised, and set to work in response to new circumstances. In this scenario, the present may be understood in a certain way to “cause” the past, or more precisely, to stand in a double temporal relation with the past in which the force of causality must be imagined to move in both directions.

For psychoanalysis, in short, the past does not remain past, but may, under the prompting of a later event, erupt with new meaning and efficacy in the present. It should be clear, then, that psychoanalytic time presents a real problem for the historiographer—both for the analyst writing a case history, and for the historian writing an account of the psychoanalytic movement itself. Because events in the history of psychoanalysis are, like the traumatic event, caught in a complex temporal rhythm of anticipation and recollection that may give rise to meanings and effects once neglected or disavowed, the historiographer must be prepared to revise the story in the light of “new” pasts, of past futurities that have hitherto remained unrecognized and untold. As Dagmar Herzog puts it at one point in the book under review, “in the history of psychoanalysis ideas can often take hold and accrue import in the oddest of sequences, not all at once, but selectively in some instances, cumulatively in others—and with lines of connection between concepts and their consequences running backwards and forwards and sideways in time” (p. 181).
Herzog's book presents a fascinating account of several episodes in
the history of psychoanalysis during the postwar period between the
1940s and the 1980s in which Freudian ideas play out in surprising
ways in their encounter with historical events associated with Nazism,
the Vietnam War, American organized religion, sexological research,
Cold War dictatorships, and postcolonial ethnography. The book will
disturb the complacency of anyone who assumes that one's ethical
and political investments should line up neatly with a specific set of
favored psychoanalytic concepts, with a specific clinical orientation, or
with a simple position for or against Freud. Herzog demonstrates, for
eexample, some of the ways in which drive theory has been enlisted in
support of agendas that span the political spectrum, from the norma-
tive-conservative to the liberal to the radically subversive. Psychoanalytic ideas, she makes clear, do not remain fixed in their
originating contexts, but become unmoored, and break free to work
unpredictable effects in new historical settings. Each chapter in Cold
War Freud presents compelling evidence in support of its central claim
that “[t]he history of psychoanalysis . . . has been one of countless
delayed-reaction receptions, unplanned repurposings, and an ever-
evolving reshaping of the meanings of texts and concepts” (p. 14).

Through all the protean movements of its long history, psychoanaly-
sis has staged one of the great dramas in the history of human subject-
ivity. A central aspect of this drama, which plays out on every page of
Herzog’s book, has to do with the conflict of interpretations concern-
ing the complex relationship between psychic interiority and social
context. The story begins of course with Freud, whose cultural writings
demonstrate equally his lifelong interest in matters of art, culture, polit-
ics, and history, and his insistence on the universal, “scientific” status
of psychoanalysis. While Freud strove always to submit the contingen-
cies of culture, politics, and history to certain fixed laws of psychic
operation, his own writings nevertheless establish the basic field of
conflict on which a wide variety of positions would be taken on the
question of the relationship between mind and world—from the most
depoliticized forms of ego psychology, to the social orientation of
Fromm and Horney, the interpersonal approach of Sullivan and
Thompson, the Marxist arguments of Reich and Fenichel, the structur-
alist revision of Lacan, the wide variety of challenges posed by femin-
ist, gay, anti-racist, and anti-colonial thinkers and activists, and the
anarchic, anti-Oedipal model of desire proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1983).

In her introductory remarks, Herzog sketches in the poles of this debate with the help of two addresses to the International Psychoanalytical Association, one by Ernest Jones, who spoke at the first postwar congress, in Zurich in 1949, urging his audience “to focus strictly on ‘the primitive forces of the mind’ and to steer clear of ‘the influence of sociological factors’” (p. 3); and the other by the German psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich, who, according to newspaper summaries at the time, argued at the 1971 meeting in Vienna that “[a]ll our theories are going to be carried away by history unless psychoanalysis is applied to social problems” (p. 4). But the real force of Herzog’s book emerges in the detail of her inquiry into specific instances of the encounter between psychoanalytic theory and practice on the one hand, and the pivotal historical events of the later 20th century on the other. The stakes for psychoanalysis were high, as fundamental Freudian theories—about desire, pleasure, aggression, violence, power, anxiety, guilt, trauma, and human nature itself—were taken up and transformed in such a variety of ways that Herzog can fairly claim that “there was not one Freud circulating in the course of the Cold War Era, and not only a dozen, but rather hundreds” (p. 7). And the impact was great, as Freud’s ideas, put to countless new uses, helped to forge the social and intellectual history of the 20th century.

In an opening chapter devoted to what she calls “the libido wars,” Herzog tells the story of the postwar American flight from Freudian libido theory, arguing that we have not sufficiently recognized the important role that American organized religion, especially Christianity, played in the “desexualization” of American psychoanalysis during the first two decades of the Cold War. Already in the late 1930s to the early 1940s, of course, Sullivan, Thompson, Fromm, and Horney mounted challenges to Freud’s argument for the centrality of sexuality in human experience. While they differed in kind, these challenges all emphasized social rather than biological and sexual factors in the explanation of neurotic difficulty. Rejecting the pleasure principle as the underlying cause of human behavior, the so-called “neo-Freudians” proposed instead a social orientation for psychoanalysis in which the need for security in the face of existential, economic, and interpersonal anxiety was understood to be the primary motivation in
human lives. In effect, they reversed the causal explanation for neuro-
ysis. Karen Horney put the case in concise terms: “Sexual difficulties
are the effect rather than the cause of the neurotic character structure”
(quoted in Herzog, p. 29).

Even as they prepared the ground for more social and political
forms of psychoanalysis that would emerge in the 1960s and 1970s,
the neo-Freudians had lost ascendancy by the late 1940s and early
1950s, overtaken by conservative trends in ego psychology, which
included an emphasis on the need to neutralize the drives in favor of
autonomous ego function; at the same time, they were challenged
from the left, such as when Adorno attacked Fromm and Horney for
promoting, however inadvertently, the goal of social accommodation,
but also for desexualizing psychoanalysis and therefore blunting its
sex-radical political edge. It was against this backdrop that the libido
wars would soon erupt in the popular media, including the pages of
Life Magazine, the New York Times Sunday Magazine, and the Ladies
Home Journal. The debate revolved in significant ways around the
question of whether psychoanalysis is compatible with Christianity.

In 1946, Rabbi Joseph Loth Leibman published a book entitled
Peace of Mind in which he tried to reconcile psychoanalysis and reli-
gion, drawing rather indiscriminately on both Freud and Horney, and
arguing for the spiritual value of psychoanalysis. The book quickly
drew the ire of Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen, who gave a sermon in
which he attacked psychoanalysis for giving “no norms or standards,”
for promoting “materialism, hedonism, infantilism and eroticism,” and
for undermining those who seek a life of “purity.” “There are no more
disintegrated people in the world,” Sheen declaimed, “than the victims
of Freudian psychoanalysis” (quoted in Herzog, p. 39). The fight was
on and the reaction was fierce. Lawrence Kubie of the New York
Psychoanalytic Society, Karl and William Menninger, Catholic and
Protestant critics of Freud, priests petitioning for the right to pursue
psychoanalytic training, Catholic psychiatrists, and others—even the
pope himself—all entered the subsequent fray over the place of sexu-
ality in religious life and in the methods of talk therapy. Herzog con-
cludes that although psychoanalysis was often called “the Jewish
science,” it “may be better understood as profoundly Christianized in
the course of the first postwar years” (p. 22). Indeed, in April 1953, at
a conference of psychotherapists in Rome, Pope Pius XII would
bestow his own blessing when, in the words of *Newsweek*, he “formally approved the use of psychoanalysis as a healing device” (p. 52).

Even as American psychoanalysis was struggling to adapt itself in response to pressures from religious quarters, it was hit broadside by the sexual revolution, by feminism, by the gay rights movement, and by sexological research from Alfred Kinsey and Masters and Johnson. Herzog argues that we have not fully appreciated the extent to which these challenges marked the end of the “golden age” of American psychoanalysis and, by inspiring a new pluralism in thinking about erotic desire, exposed its ideological investment in a normative model of human sexuality based upon a denigration of homosexuality and of any assertion of female sexuality outside the bonds of marriage.

The history of homophobia and misogyny in psychoanalysis is not a pretty one. Beginning with Freud’s own homophobia and his stubbornly phallocratic approach to female sexuality, these trends maintained a tenacious hold on psychoanalytic thinking for decades to come. On the subject of homosexuality, Freud was famously ambivalent. In arguing for both the narcissistic basis of homosexual object choice, and for a model of psychosexual development that culminates in genital primacy in the service of reproductive aims, Freud provided broad theoretical grounds for a pathologizing approach to homosexuality. Paradoxically, however, Freud’s claim regarding the constitutive bisexuality of all human beings may also have fueled the sharply defensive homophobia that appears in later psychoanalytic writing. And even as Freud made conformist assumptions about “normal” sexual life, he also argued passionately against a pathological understanding of homosexuality: “Psycho-analytic research,” he declares, “is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character” (quoted in Herzog, p. 59). In the same passage, he insisted that heterosexuality is itself “a problem that needs elucidating” (Freud, 1905, p. 146). Herzog concludes that this progressive strand in Freud’s thinking shows him to be much more curious and tolerant than many who followed him. Indeed, she finds depressing evidence of homophobia, sometimes casual, often virulent, in Ferenczi, Deutsch, Horney, Bonaparte, Jones, Klein, Fairbairn, even the gay Sullivan, and many others.

Sadly, as Herzog points out, when forced to reinvent itself under the impact of objections from sex rights activists and empirical research on
human sexuality, psychoanalysis simply reinvented its homophobia and its misogyny. First, in direct response to the Kinsey Reports, which drew complaints that these documents treated human sexuality “zoo-logically,” without consideration of love, the American psychoanalytic establishment threw its weight behind what Herzog calls “the love doctrine,” which emphasized that sexual behavior is normal only in the presence of genuine love and affection. Interestingly, she notes, “[t]his claim that loveless sex was pathological was a postwar U.S. innovation” (p. 66). And second, with the resurgent interest in pre-Oedipal dynamics in the 1970s, homophobia and sexism would simply migrate into new territory under the flag of Narcissus. In this earlier developmental context, “the pathogenic source” of homosexuality was to be found “not in a failure to ‘navigate’ the straits of Oedipus,” but instead—as Harry Gershman and Charles Socarides among others argued—in the prior failure to establish ‘a sound and solid gender identity’ due to ‘an incomplete resolution from the mother–child symbiosis that precedes the Oedipal period’” (p. 75). In these ways, psychoanalysis simply redeployed its disciplinary moralism in support of traditional family values.

Herzog then turns her attention to the long shadows cast by Nazism over postwar West Germany, first as they darkened “a grotesque debacle fought out through the 1950s and 1960s over financial compensation for mental health damages among Jewish survivors of life in flight, hiding, or in the ghettos and concentration and death camps” (p. 90). The battle was waged between sympathetic and antagonistic psychiatrists in the United States, Europe, and Israel, and it played out in medical journals and in case reports presented in reparations offices and finally in courts established to adjudicate the claims. Prompted by a 1956 law authorizing modest pensions and therapy to Holocaust survivors, psychiatric evaluators had to show that a claimant’s economic welfare had been damaged under Nazism by at least 25% (p. 94). Unfortunately, the process was tainted by anti-Semitism and hostility to the very principle of restitution, and the psychiatrists appointed by West Germany routinely rejected these claims.

The argument in these cases turned centrally upon the question of whether (even catastrophic) external events in adult life could produce traumatic symptoms independently of either constitutional factors or psychic conflict originating in childhood. It is shocking to us now that
this can have been a question in the first place, but given that it was, Freudian ideas, including the claim that the source of all neurosis must ultimately be found in early life, and the notion of secondary gain, proved to be very useful in the rejection of claims. For if, as one sympathetic evaluator put it, Freud “could be understood as supporting the idea that neurosis attaches itself in a purely external and almost accidental way to the adult trauma, but does not derive in a direct and internal way from it,” then it becomes possible to claim that “the cause of neurosis lay altogether anterior to any persecution” (p. 102).

But whether or not Freud was enlisted to justify a rejection, reasons were invariably found to deny any causal connection between symptoms and external events. And so, a woman who had survived three years in Auschwitz was judged to have “a psychopathic personality with a tendency toward abnormal processing of experience and an inability to deal with life”; and a man was dismissed as hypochondriacal “who had been in one ghetto and three concentration camps, thrown from a truck, and had his mother, sister, wife and four children killed” (pp. 98–99). The outrage that arose in response to these findings was succinctly expressed in an essay by Kurt Eissler, who would later become director of the Freud Archives: “The murder of how many of one’s children must one be able to survive asymptotically in order to be deemed to have a normal constitution?” (p. 107).

Herzog’s rich discussion of the battle over reparations in the wake of Nazism allows her to engage a range of important historical, political, and theoretical issues, including the grotesquerie of postwar anti-Semitism, the reemergence of psychoanalysis in West Germany after the fall of Hitler, the influence of political factors on scientific objectivity, and the question of what a post-fascist government owes to victims of a previous regime. But Herzog also makes an important claim regarding the history of the science of trauma. For the controversy over reparations, she argues, played a significant and often underestimated role in the creation of a new diagnostic category that reflected a fundamental shift in how we understand the etiology of trauma. This shift was made possible by a convergence of a number of other factors, including Eissler’s critique, conferences devoted to the subject of “massive psychic trauma” organized by William Niederland and Henry Krystal, Robert Jay Lifton’s work with the hibakusha in Hiroshima, and growing attention to the emotional suffering of Vietnam War veterans.
The result was the creation of PTSD, “the only condition for which causation would continue to matter in the DSM-III of 1980” (p. 91).

Herzog then turns to a second controversy concerning the vicissitudes of a psychoanalytic concept in the postwar German national context, where it was to have a profound impact on the popular and professional reception of the entire psychoanalytic project. This was a conflict over the status of aggression, and the question of whether it was an innate feature of human psychology or merely a response to sexual, economic, or social frustration. The catalyst for the debate was the publication in 1963 of a book by Konrad Lorenz whose title, The So-Called Evil: On the Natural History of Aggression, essentially states his argument— that aggression is not always a negative force but is rather a natural and necessary source of all cultural achievement and effective action (p. 126). Lorenz’s work on evolution, instincts, and behavioral imprinting in animals, and his central claim that aggression is an innate aspect of both animals and humans, generated intense and, some would say, rather suspicious excitement in West Germany—for the work could be used to mitigate the German sense of shame over the Nazi terror by arguing that aggression is a natural component of all human beings, and therefore not a distinctive trait of the German national character.

In any case, the book stirred a deep interest in Freud’s changing and contradictory statements on aggression and the death drive, statements that were used to authorize a variety of arguments promoting a wide range of political agendas. Herzog argues that these arguments, despite many variations, drew inspiration from one of three versions of Freud that had emerged in Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s: a sex-radical Freud whose work could be used to authorize a liberationist and even utopian vision of society; a pessimistic Freud whose tragic vision of the dark forces of human nature could be used to underwrite a regressive political conservatism; and a compromise position developed by Alexander Mitscherlich, whose complex blend of American ego psychology and left-leaning politics gave psychoanalysis new prestige as a moral and political force in Central Europe after the war. Mitscherlich had a deeply conflicted relationship to

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1 We might note, however, that the battle over reparations for Holocaust survivors is but one episode in a much longer story about how not only determinations of compensable injury but also the very definition of trauma, whether it concerns “railway spine,” “shell shock,” or “PTSD,” has always been the result of a conflict between psychological and legal discourses as it has played out in courts of law for more than a century.
Lorenz, and he would vacillate on the innate status of aggression, at times arguing that the question was undecidable, while at other times embracing Freud’s notion of the death drive.

The specter of Nazism and the Holocaust hovered over all of these arguments regarding the sources and value of aggression. Ultimately, it was a dark psychoanalytic vision of human nature that would prevail in the effort to understand the malignant lure of Hitler. In 1973, Lorenz was exposed as a Nazi who had promoted eugenics in a number of writings published during the war. Arguments from the German New Left, that society rather than inborn aggression was the ultimate cause of violence, were dismissed as naïve. Psychoanalytic projects like the self psychology of Heinz Kohut, which was based upon a rejection of drive theory and a claim that aggression was merely a learned response to frustration, seemed inadequate to the post-Nazi experience. By the 1980s, Herzog argues, a fourth approach to the problem of aggression would begin to take hold in West Germany as theoretical interest was shifting from the Oedipus complex to earlier forms of psychic struggle, and as the work of Melanie Klein was gaining new attention through the work of Otto Kernberg, Hanna Segal, and Herbert Rosenfeld. Klein’s darkly imagined Grand Guignol of the pre-Oedipal mind, driven by primitive phantasies of annihilation, dismemberment, burning, poisoning, and envious usurpation, offered a more resonant discourse for capturing the reality of Nazi Germany.

In the final section of the book, Herzog presents two case studies that illustrate how even the most orthodox concepts of Freudian doctrine (the Oedipus complex, for instance) may be challenged, even rejected outright, and yet provide the inspiration for radical rearticulations of the psychoanalytic project. For despite recurrent proclamations of his “death,” Freud will not, it seems, be laid to rest. He is like an unquiet ghost who returns with an uncanny power to disturb settled opinion, his work constantly offering up new resources for the deconstruction of his own dogma.

Of course, the anti-Oedipus tradition did not begin with Deleuze and Guattari. Karen Horney and Erich Fromm had already attacked the concept in the 1930s and 1940s; Max Horkheimer and later Alexander Mitscherlich both argued that the Oedipus story needed to be reconsidered in light of declining paternal authority amidst changing social conditions; Kohut and others helped to shift attention from Oedipal to
pre-Oedipal issues; and even Lacan, who described his work as “a return to Freud,” not only reinterpreted the story of Oedipus as an allegory of the child’s entry into language and the symbolic practices of culture, but declared that “[t]he whole oedipal schema needs to be questioned” (p. 167).

It was in this context that Deleuze and Guattari launched a direct assault on one of the central pillars of the psychoanalytic edifice in their 1972 classic *Anti-Oedipus*. Drawing eclectically on a wide range of sources, including Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Reich, Klein, Lacan, Artaud, and Fanon (p. 153), the book attacks the theory of the Oedipus complex as a grotesque restriction of the anarchic flow of human desire that, the authors insist, cannot be confined to the repressive geometry of the Oedipal triangle. Deleuze and Guattari propose instead a radically decentered theory of desire that explodes hierarchies, unities, and enclosures, a vision of human subjectivity as driven by an anarchic, dispersive proliferation of energies, a profusion of libidinal flows coursing through the mind, but also the social, political, racial, and economic realms within which the mind is endlessly constituted and deconstituted. Desire is seen here to traverse and expose the false, ideologically imposed boundaries that separate the individual psyche—and the family—from the wider social and political field:

The family is by nature eccentric, decentered. . . . There is always an uncle from America; a brother who went bad; an aunt who took off with a military man; a cousin out of work, a bankrupt, or a victim of the Crash; an anarchic grandfather. . . . Families are filled with gaps and transected by breaks that are not familial: the Commune, the Dreyfus Affair, religion and atheism, the Spanish Civil War, the rise of fascism, Stalinism, the Vietnam War, May ’68—all these things form complexes of the unconscious, more effective than everlasting Oedipus. (quoted in Herzog, pp. 168–169)

Attacking the very foundations of Freudian psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari sought to rescue desire from the stranglehold of Oedipus and simultaneously to produce a manifesto for political liberation from all forms of totalizing power. Foucault recognized the political importance of the book in his preface to the English edition, where he stated that *Anti-Oedipus* may be read as a manual for “this art of living counter to all forms of fascism” (quoted in Herzog, p. 173). But the book is also a significant contribution to the development of psychoanalysis
itself, for it gives powerful, creative expression to an anti-Oedipal trend that appears early in the history of the movement, and that may be seen to define the general direction of its future. Indeed, contemporary psychoanalysis seems to reflect a growing consensus that, regarding their central claim in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari were right: “There is no Oedipal triangle: Oedipus is always open in an open social field. Oedipus opens to the four winds, to the four corners of the social field (not even 3+1, but 4 + n)” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/1983, as quoted in Herzog, p. 167).

The Oedipal triangle was broken open from another angle beginning in the mid-1950s when three radical Swiss psychoanalysts—Paul Parin, Goldy Parin-Matthéy, and Fritz Morgenthaler—left their consulting rooms in Paris to conduct anthropological fieldwork in Mali, Ivory Coast, and Papua New Guinea. While they never dismissed the Oedipal paradigm, and while they relied on familiar ideas regarding ego structure, psychosexual stages, defenses, and intrapsychic conflict drawn from American ego psychology, Morgenthaler and the Parins deployed their psychoanalytic resources self-critically in an effort to understand the many different ways in which the ego may develop in the context of non-Western cultures.

Their cross-cultural case studies not only helped to establish the field of “ethnopsychoanalysis,” but they anticipated the self-reflexive, culturally sensitive approach to anthropological field work that would become standard by the 1980s. Furthermore, in their efforts to work psychoanalytically with non-Western peoples, they developed techniques that predate by decades the clinical posture of contemporary relational psychoanalysis with its emphasis on mutuality and the “real” relationship in the therapeutic dyad. As a result of their decisive break with a racist strain in the history of the long relationship between anthropology and psychoanalysis, their role in forging a new transcultural model of psychotherapy, and their recognition of the subversive power borne by alternate, non-Western stories of human desire, Morgenthaler and the Parins would become heroes to the New Left in Central Europe in the postwar era. Oedipus, meanwhile, was to find himself once again in exile.

In 1980, Deleuze and Guattari published a companion volume to Anti-Oedipus entitled A Thousand Plateaus. In its first chapter (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, pp. 3–25), a distinction is drawn between two systems or methods of thinking, writing, and acting. The arborescent
method, as the name suggests, assumes the structure of a tree, a system of root and branch that is organized hierarchically along a genetic or syntagmatic axis, its points of intersection serving as nodes of significance and force gathered into coherence by relation to an origin, a first principle, a unified structure. A rhizomatic system, by contrast, eschews the One for the multiple, for heterogeneity, for dispersive flows of semiotic, material, and social intensities that dissolve settled boundaries between inside and outside, between subject and object, and that resist capture in fixed formations of meaning and power. A rhizome is a decentered, anti-genealogical phenomenon; it develops without taproot; its filiations are adventitious, pluralistic; its lines spread, multiply, diversify, connect, disperse, take leaps, break off, and resume without orientation to any preestablished end or destiny. The rhizome is a kind of anti-system or anti-model, "a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, . . . a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again" (p. 20). For all its complex entanglements with root systems, a rhizome has the power to designify, to disrupt oppressive cultural and political formations, to take new lines of flight, to "detransfer" dominant semiotic, social, economic, and political regimes, to forge new configurations of power, and to create new possibilities for living.

In this context, we might set Freud’s quite arborescent history of the psychoanalytic movement against the more rhizomatic history that Herzog expands in Cold War Freud. But while Deleuze and Guattari tend to place Freud and psychoanalysis wholly on the side of arboreal hegemony, Herzog’s book offers yet another reminder that the Freudian rhizome is deeply entangled with the Freudian root and branch, that in spite of its dogmatisms, Freud’s work has an aleatory, unpredictable, proliferating force that continues to disrupt and disperse the lines of its own history and emergent futures. The Freudian rhizome cuts across the arboreal, genealogical history outlined in Freud’s own account of the movement, giving rise to new multiplicities, new movements, new lines of development in the history of psychoanalysis.

I will conclude, in a mode of mere evocation rather than elaboration, with two references to the Freudian text. The first is to the famous passage in The Interpretation of Dreams in which Freud asserts that there is a point "in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure" because there we encounter "a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be unraveled. . . . This is the dream’s navel, the
spot where it reaches down into the unknown” (Freud, 1900, p. 525). For the dream thoughts, we are told, have no "definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network [in die netzartige Verstrickung] of our world of thought. It is at some point where this meshwork [Geflecht] is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium" (Freud, 1900, p. 525). Marking simultaneously a cut, a separation, and a densely raveled knot, the dream navel is the site at which the dream wish rises up out of an unfathomable tangle that both stymies analysis and calls for analysis interminable.2 Dream wishes for the psychoanalytic movement, for the movement of psychoanalysis, may also be understood to reach down into the rhizomatic meshwork that continues to proliferate on Freudian ground, giving rise to new, multiple, and interminable histories.

In the same text, Freud provides an extensive analysis of his “Dream of the Botanical Monograph,” which he reproduces as follows: “I had written a monograph on a certain plant. The book lay before me and I was at the moment turning over a folded coloured plate. Bound up in each copy there was a dried specimen of the plant, as though it had been taken from an herbarium” (Freud, 1900, p. 169). In his analysis of the dream, Freud characteristically traces often elaborate networks of association linked to each its elements. The “folded coloured plate” reminds Freud of his youthful bookish passion for “monographs,” and especially their “coloured plates,” associations that now spur a vivid memory from his childhood: “It had once amused my father to hand over a book with coloured plates (an account of a journey through Persia) for me and my eldest sister to destroy . . . and the picture of the two of us blissfully pulling the book to pieces (leaf by leaf, like an artichoke, I found myself saying) was almost the only plastic memory that I retained from that period of my life” (Freud, 1900, p. 172). When Freud returns to this dream later in the book, he has a further association to the phrase “leaf by leaf,” which he says was “constantly ringing in our ears in relation to the piecemeal dismemberment of the Chinese Empire” (Freud, 1900, p. 191). Those who would write the history of psychoanalysis would do well to recall the image of the young Freud joyfully tearing the pages, leaf by leaf, from the historical monograph. For as Herzog’s book demonstrates once again, the Freudian monograph is in fact a heterographic text shot through with rhizomatic

2For brilliant discussions of the dream navel and its implications for the entire psychoanalytic project, see Weber (2000) and Derrida (1998).
lines of force that may serve both to expand and dismember the territory of the Freudian Empire.

REFERENCES


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