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<td>9:30–11:30</td>
<td>PHIL 76400 [20564] Philosophy of History</td>
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<td>11:45–1:45</td>
<td>PHIL 76500 [20560] Reason &amp; Religions</td>
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<td>2:00–4:00</td>
<td>PHIL 77200 [21039] The Body in the Mind</td>
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<td>5:00–6:00</td>
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<td>5:00–7:00</td>
<td>PHIL 77500 [20799] Bioethics, Policies &amp; Cases: Medicine &amp; Social Justice Prof. Rhodes Room Mt. Sinai</td>
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<td>6:00–8:00</td>
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<td>6:30–8:30</td>
<td>PHIL 77000 [20562] Evolution &amp; Social Behavior Prof. Godfrey-Smith Room</td>
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<td>PHIL 77700 [20573] Non-Classical Logic Prof. Priest Room</td>
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Students may also take courses at other schools in the Interuniversity Doctoral Consortium. Choose a school from the list below to see the course schedule for the current semester (where available).

- Columbia University
- Fordham University
- The New School
- New York University
- Princeton University
- Rutgers University
- SUNY Stony Brook

The Graduate Center’s [Current Student Handbook](#) has information about and instructions for registering for classes at other consortium schools.

**SPRING 2013 COURSE DESCRIPTIONS**

**WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC REALISM?**

Scientific realism has an existence dimension and an independence dimension. The
existence dimension is that, for the most part, the unobservables that science appears to be committed to—atoms, viruses, photons, and the like—really do exist and have the properties specified by science. This is opposed by those—most notably van Fraassen—who are skeptical that science is giving us an accurate picture of reality. The independence dimension is that scientific entities do not depend for their existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds. This is opposed by those—most notably, Kuhn and Feyerabend—who hold that these entities are somehow "constructed" by the theories we have of them.

The course will start by clarifying this metaphysical "definition" of scientific realism and comparing it with the bewildering variety of definitions to be found in the literature. These include epistemic, apparently semantic, and really semantic definitions.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM VS CONSTRUCTIVISM
Constructivism about science arises in the context of the alleged incommensurability of rival paradigms like the Ptolemaic and Copernican. Arguments will be mounted against constructivism, incommensurability, and the methodology that leads to them.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM VS SKEPTICISM
1. Arguments for scientific realism will be examined. The most famous is the argument from success. Why do the observational predictions of theories tend to come out true? The best explanation, the realist claims, is that the theories are (approximately) true. Indeed, if they weren't, this success would be "a miracle." Laudan and Fine have mounted a sustained attack against this argument. Other abductive defenses of realism will be considered along with arguments from scientific practice.

2. Perhaps the most influential argument against realism is the argument from the underdetermination of theories by the evidence. Any theory is alleged to face many empirically equivalent rivals, rivals equally compatible with all possible evidence. This argument will be criticized by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and to the lack of any known limit to our capacity to create evidence.

3. The pessimistic "meta-induction" is another influential argument: past theories have been mostly wrong; so probably present theories are too. Realist defenses against this powerful argument will be explored.

The course will finish with some critical remarks about van Fraassen's antirealism.

The course is not an introduction to the philosophy of science.
Learning Goals
To identify the nature of scientific realism
To grasp and assess the arguments for and against scientific realism.

Requirements
(i) A brief weekly email raising questions about, making criticisms of, or developing points concerning, matters discussed in the class and reading for that week. 50% of grade.
(ii) A class presentation based on a draft for a paper (topic chosen in consultation with me). The draft to be submitted before Tuesday of the week of presentation. 20% of grade.
(iii) A 2,500 word paper probably arising from the draft in (ii). 30% of grade.

TEXTS

RECOMMENDED

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
The course will survey some standard topics, focus on some issues of current interest, and present some ideas of the instructor.

Two standard topics are skepticism and the definition of knowledge, particularly in light of the gettier problem. We will look at evidentialism and, more broadly, internalism vs externalism—safety theory, tracking theory, virtue epistemology and reliabilism. Tracking will be stressed.

Each has a characteristic approach to skepticism. We will discuss Moore’s common sense response, the semantic response that the demon hypothesis is ill-formed, probabilistic responses (the demon hypothesis is less well-confirmed than its rivals), and responses that accept the irrefutability of the demon; some of the latter approaches reject closure, others, particularly contextualism, accept closure. Two recurring themes will be lotteries and Bayesianism.

A more specific traditional issue to be taken up is our knowledge of the internal world. What does knowledge of our own conscious states amount to? Is it infallible? Does anything about it suggest these states are nonphysical? Here we have an opportunity to pursue the acquaintance/description distinction. I will suggest certain analogies between this topic and problems of space and time.

We will also take up necessity and the a priori. We will try to clarify the empiricist idea that only necessary truths are knowable a priori, and that all necessity resides in language.

Time permitting, we may also discuss alleged chronic lapses of human rationality and the "peer problem" (how if at all should you revise your beliefs if your one new datum is that smart people disagree with you?)

The student will be asked to do a short paper about every 10 days. I will try to post an outline of each meeting by the prior week-end.

Below is a tentative list of assigned, subject to revision.

Meeting I:
Moore, "Four Forms of Skepticism" and "Certainty," in Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath, eds., Epistemology, 2nd ed;

Meeting II-III: Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,"
Goldman, "What is Justified Belief," in Pojman, and also Sosa etc. (333-347);

IV David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”


IX-X. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, sections I-V
L. Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason, 1.4 and chapter 2

XI. Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”
W. Robinson, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness, chapter 2
Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.”

XII: Thomas Kelley, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”

XIII Bovens and Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology, chapter 3.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) has superb articles on all these topics, articles with extensive references. It is always good to consult.

All students taking this course are presumed to be familiar with Descartes’ Meditations, particularly I and II. Students should also tell me as soon as possible what other material on this syllabus they are familiar with. Bayes theorem?

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
(1) The Divine Attributes: Omnipotence, Timelessness, Omniscience, Supreme Goodness, Perfection
(2) Arguments for God's Existence
(3) The Problem of Evil
(4) Prayer; Miracles; Mysticism
(5) Describing the Divine: Religious Language
(6) Religious Belief: Reason and Faith
(7) Beyond Death
(8) Religious Pluralism
(9) Non-Supernatural Religion

Note: Among those who should find the course useful are students planning to teach introductory philosophy courses and expecting to cover issues in the philosophy of religion.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group A]

According to most standard accounts, modern virtue ethics begins with Elizabeth Anscombe's essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958 and develops over the second half of the twentieth century as an alternative to deontological and consequentialist moral theories. Rather than obligation as the centerpiece of moral theory, it is commonly held that virtue ethics focuses on human flourishing and the virtues of character that constitute it. Aristotle is the patron saint of this movement. Over the last ten to fifteen years, some have begun to question what virtue ethics is, how and whether it differs from other types of ethical theory, and even to what extent Aristotle should be called a virtue ethicist. Some now avoid the term "virtue-ethics" and prefer to speak instead of "Neo-Aristotelian" ethics; under this label one might include the work of Julia Annas, Phillipa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Alasdair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Michael Thompson. While all of these philosophers discuss virtue, only some would identify their positions as belonging to "virtue ethics."

We shall examine what sort of ethical theory contemporary Neo-Aristotelian ethics is and how it fits with what we actually find in Aristotle. What does it say about the relationships between agents and actions? How does it contrast with deontology or consequentialism? What does it mean for ethics to be "virtue-based", "character-based" or "agent-based/centered", as opposed to "rule-based" or "act-based/centered"? What is the role of
Knowing How

Prof. Ostertag

4 credits

Wed. 11:45–1:45

The modern literature on knowing how begins with a chapter in Ryle’s Concept of Mind, “Knowing How and Knowing That,” wherein Ryle distinguishes between propositional knowledge – the state attributed to Mary in “Mary knows that Giant Steps is difficult” – and the state or capacity attributed to Mary in “Mary knows how to play Giant Steps” – for lack of a convenient phrase, “know how.” (This echoes, to some extent, an ancient distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge that dates at least to the Republic.) The course will discuss the contemporary literature on knowing how, focusing primarily on two recent volumes: Jason Stanley’s Know How and John Bengson and Mark Moffett’s collection, Knowing How.

We begin with a reading of Ryle’s “Knowing How and Knowing That” and then turn to Stanley’s defense of “intellectualism” – the anti-Rylean view that knowing how just is a species of knowing that. Here we will take up, among other things, the question whether there are “ways of thinking” of propositions and, in particular, whether there is a distinctive
A kind of way – a practical way of knowing – that corresponds to knowing how. We also discuss the role played by de re knowledge of such ways.

Other themes to be addressed include (but are not limited to): (i) alternative, non-propositional formulations of intellectualism (Bengson and Moffett); (ii) whether know how is subject to Gettier cases (Cath); (iii) whether knowledge of language is best understood as a state of knowing how (Devitt); (iv) the bearing of the distinction on our knowledge of logical principles (Rumfitt). Time permitting, we will consider the relevance of Kripke’s unpublished 1974 lectures on the nature of logic as it bears on (iv).

**Required Texts:**


[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group A or B]

[back to course schedule]
This course proposes to revisit the later Wittgenstein, especially *Philosophical Investigations* and relevant portions of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, and my own interpretation and reaction to them in *Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language*.

As time and our collective mood permit, we will also deal with some of the relevant secondary literature, and perhaps other topics in the later Wittgenstein.

**Counts towards course satisfaction of Group A**

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Much of our mental lives consists of states that exhibit mental qualities—presumably all perceptions and bodily sensations and many emotions. But the nature of mental qualities raises some of the most contentious issues in philosophy of mind today.

It’s typically assumed that qualitative states cannot occur without being conscious; indeed, the term ‘qualia’ is typically used to refer to mental qualities that are essentially conscious. That makes it hard to see how conscious qualitative states might be physical, since it seems that nothing physical has consciousness automatically built in.

More important but seldom noted, that assumption makes it hard to give any useful account of what mental qualities are, because first-person access would by itself trump anything else we might say about them. Indeed, many who hold that qualitative states must be conscious insist we know about mental qualities solely from the way they are conscious, and concede that no informative account cast in distinctively psychological terms is possible.

That in turn encourages the idea that it’s possible (or at least conceivable) that conscious mental qualities are invertible in a way that’s empirically undetectable, and that there could be creatures behaviorally and physically exactly like us that undetectably lack conscious mental qualities. We’ll examine whether these things are possible or even conceivable, and consider other implications of the idea that we know about mental qualities solely by way of consciousness.
The idea that these things are at least conceivable is typically held to rely on theory-independent intuitions. So we'll look at the nature and status of such alleged intuitions, whether they're trustworthy, and how they interact with theory and empirical findings.

We'll also explore an alternative account of mental qualities, on which we know about them by their role in perceiving independent of whether, and if so how, they're conscious. We'll examine whether such an account can be theoretically satisfying and empirically adequate, and evaluate the implications of such an alternative perception-based theory.

We'll evaluate both types of theory—that we know about mental qualities by the way they're conscious and that we know about them by their perceptual role—in connection with such staples of the recent literature as Block’s overflow argument for cognitively unaccessed phenomenal consciousness, Levine’s explanatory gap, Chalmers’s hard problem, Jackson’s Mary argument, Kripke’s modal antimatериалist argument, Loar’s recognitional concepts, the related phenomenal-concepts strategy, and whether qualitative experience is rich (e.g., Block) or sparse (e.g., Noé). And we'll discuss the intentionalism about mental qualities advocated by Harman and Byrne, and Sellars’ argument that the ultimate homogeneity (i.e., dissective character) of conscious mental qualities shows that they aren't physical.

In addition to readings in philosophy that address the foregoing issues, we'll also look at relevant material from perceptual psychology and cognitive neuropsychology.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
focus on the body in cognitive science of the last 20 years. Embodied cognitive science has become an industry but the body itself remains an object rarely explicitly investigated. The embodied approach claims to return the mind to the body. But we need to step back from speculations about the role of the body for the mind and starts at the very beginning by understanding how the mind represents the body.

What makes one’s body so special may be that unlike other physical objects, we have a perception of one’s body from the inside, an internal access that we have to no other bodies. One may conclude from the privileged internal access to one’s body that one’s body is transparent in the sense that one would have infallible bodily self-knowledge. Yet one’s own body can be mis-represented. There is no dimension of bodily awareness that cannot be disrupted, even the feeling of ownership that we experience toward our biological body, as shown by the following two examples. Following brain lesions, some patients suffer from somatoparaphrenia. They deny the ownership of their own limbs, despite still experiencing bodily sensations in them. On the other hand, it is surprisingly easy to induce the reverse phenomenon, namely, self-attribution of external objects, as shown by the Rubber Hand Illusion. Hence, there is no simple equation that systematically associates the fact of ownership and the sense of ownership. Our biological body is not always experienced as our own, and we do not experience only our biological body as our own.

After reviewing different conceptions of the notion of embodiment, we will analyse to what extent bodily awareness is unlike object awareness. In particular, we will show that bodily experiences are constitutively multimodal, based not only on information coming from body senses, but also on visual information. We will then analyse how the mind builds up representations of bodily space. In doing so, we will assess the role of action in shaping body representations, as well as its limits. This will lead us to distinguish between different kinds of body representation on the Perception/Action model. We will determine to what extent body representations are self-specific or shared between self and others. Finally, we will explore the ground of the sense of bodily ownership, its relation to the sense of disownership, as well as evaluate the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily judgments. We will combine philosophical analysis with recent experimental results from cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, and psychiatry.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
Does a social group exist over and above the individuals who make it up? Are individuals constituted by their social relations or are they instead free to choose the relations they have with other people? What are collective intentions or collective actions, and how do they differ from the intentions or actions of individuals? What is a social institution? Are gender and sex socially constructed or are they in some sense natural kinds? And do the answers to these questions have important normative import? These and related issues arise at the intersection of social theory and metaphysics and have garnered interest from both analytic and continental philosophers. It can be suggested too that political theories often operate—tacitly or explicitly—with conceptions of the entities that make up social life—of the nature of individuals and their relations, as well as of groups, processes, and society as a whole, where these conceptions may range from radically individualist to full-blown holistic ones of the community or body politic as a totality within which individuals gain their identities.

This seminar will aim to cast new light on our sociality, on what it means to understand people as social beings, who engage in collective action (or common activity) and have shared intentions. We will draw on both continental and analytic approaches, and will consider feminist relational ontologies and accounts of the social construction of gender and race. The continental tradition emerges from Hegel's provocative master-slave dialectic, followed by Marx's social ontology, through the British Hegelians, to 20th century figures like Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre (especially in the Critique of Dialectical Reason), Arendt, and Levinas. In recent analytic philosophy, the project of social ontology has been connected to the philosophy of action, the philosophy of language, metaethics, and to the development of a “socialized metaphysics.” Helpful analyses have been advanced of collective or joint or shared intentions (e.g., as “We intentions”), as well as of the difficult issues concerning normativity in its relation to social and institutional facts and practices (a theme that can also be found in continental approaches). In addition to accounts of institutions and the practices that make up the “basic structure” of society, attention has been paid to the politically charged question of the nature of corporations (e.g., should they be viewed as persons?). Central too have been notions of collective or corporate responsibility—whether nations or states or corporate entities can be properly regarded as responsible for choices and what the role is of individuals within those collectivities or corporate entities. Philosophers here include Margaret Gilbert, Michael Bratman, David Copp, John Searle, Philip Pettit, and Larry May. Feminist philosophers have drawn on both traditions to advance critiques of essentialism, and of individualist accounts of identity, favoring instead socially constitutive or constructivist approaches (Haslanger), relational ontologies (e.g., Whitbeck), or care theories (e.g., V. Held). In addition to the implications of social construction for understanding oppression and domination, they have attempted to reconstruct norms like autonomy in relational terms (e.g., Meyers, Stoljar).

The seminar will draw on a subset of the above philosophers, integrating continental and analytic approaches in an effort to address specific issues of social ontology and more broadly to conceptualize our social being. It will conclude with a focus on the normative
and political import of these ontological analyses. For example, what are the implications of privileging individual agency or social collectivities for understanding the basis and possibilities of social transformation? What import does a particular social ontology have for helping to explain action and for holding the agents in question responsible for their choices? Can more fully social ways of understanding individuals and their activities help us to theorize new directions for social and political life?

Seminar members will be encouraged to relate the course materials to their ongoing research projects through oral presentations and analytical term papers, and will be expected to be active participants in the seminar discussions.

For more information, please contact carolcgould@gmail.com.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]

[back to course schedule]
This course addresses key issues in the theory and practice of what is known as transitional justice, a conception of justice associated with periods of upheaval and change in the political and social conditions of societies, from dictatorship to democracy and from war to peace. Transitional justice comprises punitive, compensatory, and restorative approaches and we will examine the meaning of each and the distinctive contributions they make to the advancement of a just political transition. The various objectives of transitional justice and the possible tensions between them will be considered: making perpetrators accountable; deterring future human rights violations; providing victims with a means of redress and restoring their dignity; establishing a historical record for future generations; reconciling a traumatized population; repairing damaged political relationships; and creating institutions that foster peace and respect for the rule of law. We will analyze the variety of mechanisms, judicial as well as non-judicial, that states and the international community employ to address large-scale abuses of human rights under repressive, authoritarian regimes, from amnesties and memorials to truth commissions and criminal trials. Specific case studies will be used to illustrate different approaches to transitional justice, including Argentina in the aftermath of the dirty war, post-apartheid South Africa, Rwanda after the genocide, and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the successes and failures of each will be assessed. Though readings will be drawn from the fields of political theory, social anthropology, and international law, as well as political and moral philosophy, emphasis will be placed on exploring the conceptual and ethical issues raised by different options for responding to past human rights violations. Among the authors we will discuss are the following: John Rawls, James Griffin, Colleen Murphy, Margaret Walker, Thomas Brudholm, Linda Radzik, Ernesto Verdeja, and Ruti Teitel.
Justice is a major concern in theoretical ethics and political philosophy and a huge literature is devoted to trying to explain what it entails. In this course our aim will be to examine a broad spectrum of issues in medicine, medical research, and public health that raise questions about justice. In light of these critical examples, we shall review and critique an array of philosophical views on justice. Throughout the seminar we shall be engaged in two activities: (1) using clinical dilemmas and health policies as touchstones for developing a clear understanding of justice, and (2) developing an understanding of how theories of justice apply in different contexts. By going from practice to theory and from theory back again to practice we shall advance our understanding of the theoretical literature as well as the requirements of justice in medicine and other areas of the social world.

This course will begin with an examination of issues that raise questions about justice, and then move on to examining contemporary (John Rawls) work on justice and a review of some theoretical work by authors who focus their attention on justice in medicine (Norman Daniels & Paul Menzel). In the course of the seminar, we shall also develop an understanding of how the U.S. happens to have developed the mechanisms that we now have for the delivery of health care, how medical resources are actually distributed here, elsewhere, and in various contexts. Throughout we shall consider ways in which those allocations do and do not express justice. We shall consider some of the problems that become apparent when you attend to the special needs of social groups (e.g., the poor, children, women, the elderly, African-Americans) and examine dilemmas and conflicts that are raised by issues such as the treatment of premature and compromised neonates.

Text:


[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]
This course examines "classic" and emerging issues in biomedical ethics paying particular attention to the history of medicine and the nature of scientific thought as it relates to medical ethics. While many issues in biomedical ethics seem timeless such as our concerns about the withholding of treatment, abortion, truth-telling—others have arisen out of the development of an increasingly scientific medicine beginning in the 1700s. It is the availability of well confirmed effective treatments that forces us to wrestle with such questions as the propriety of medical intervention over the objection of the patient, the treatment of children over the objection of their parents, the right of all citizens to health care, the regulation of the sale of body parts for transplantation, and numerous circumstances arising out of assisted reproduction. In the not too distant past it would have seemed bizarre to consider the adjudication of competing rights when one woman contracts to rent the uterus of a surrogate to bear through in vitro fertilization the embryo formed from the egg of a third individual. The current revolution in biotechnology, microelectronics and nanotechnology continuously produces new issues. What is the meaning of confidentially in a world where an enormous amount of information about each of us can be extracted rapidly from numerous searchable databases? What is the moral status of the embryonic stem cell derived from a discarded embryo, or a non-human animal? How are we to regulate cloning and our ability to shape and alter the human genome? We now implant electrodes into the brains of patients with Parkinson's disease and essential tremor. Soon we may be treating depression, disorders of impulse control, anxiety and phobias electronically. Does such technology present different issues as compared with today's drug and surgical therapies? We will also be challenged by the products of bioengineering. We already have prosthetics that remarkably link the brain directly to external mechanical devises and further alter the meaning of disability.

In medical ethics both the past and the future need to inform our vision of proper behavior and decision making. In our world of rapidly advancing technology, much medical ethics policies misread and mishandle the present and construct rules with an eye towards an idealized past, while failing to consider a fast approaching future.

An aim of this course is to prepare health care professionals and philosophers to enter into medical institutions with the preparation necessary to be helpful additions to the provision of health care in ethically acceptable ways.

Phil 7700[20562]
Evolution & Social Behavior

Prof. Godfrey-Smith

4 credits
Mon. 6:30–8:30

A look at recent work in a number of fields on the evolution (and evolutionary consequences) of social behavior. The first half of the course will be on cooperation and the second half on communication. Readings from Bowles, Gintis, Sterelny, Tomasello, Skyrms, and others.

Phil 76700[20573]
Non-Classical Logic

Prof. Priest

4 credits
Thurs. 6:30–8:30

In this course we will look at a number of non-classical logics, such as modal logic, conditional logics, intuitionist logic, many-valued logics, relevant and paraconsistent logics. The aim of the course is to engender in those taking it an understanding some of the technical details of these logics—especially their semantics – and the philosophical issues with which these logics engage.