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<tr>
<td>9:30–11:30</td>
<td>PHIL 76600 [27173] <strong>Scientific Realism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Devitt&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>PHIL 77600 [27164] <strong>Political Philosophy</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Cahn&lt;br&gt;Room 3207</td>
<td>PHIL 77100 [27174] <strong>Aesthetic Psychology</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Prinz&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>PHIL 76400 [27175] <strong>Augustine's Confessions</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Grover&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
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<td>11:45–1:45</td>
<td>PHIL 77400 [27169] <strong>The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Papineau&lt;br&gt;Room 7395</td>
<td>PHIL 77000 [27170] <strong>Social Ontology and Democracy</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Gould&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>PHIL 80000 [] <strong>The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Kripke&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>-&lt;br&gt;PHIL 77300 [27176] <strong>Intentionality and the Mental</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Rosenthal&lt;br&gt;Room 5382</td>
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<td>2:00–4:00</td>
<td>PHIL 77000 [27165] <strong>Psychoanalytic Conceptions of Agency, Character and Mind</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Jurist&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>PHIL 77900 [27170] <strong>Social Ontology and Democracy</strong>&lt;br&gt;Prof. Gould&lt;br&gt;Room 7314</td>
<td>PHIL 77300 [27177] <strong>Philosophy of Race</strong>&lt;br&gt;Profs. Alcoff &amp; Kirkland&lt;br&gt;Room 6300</td>
<td>-&lt;br&gt;PHIL 77700 [27177] <strong>Philosophy of Race</strong>&lt;br&gt;Profs. Alcoff &amp; Kirkland&lt;br&gt;Room 6300</td>
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Students may also take courses at other schools in the Interuniversity Doctoral Consortium. Choose a school from the list below to see the course schedule for the current semester (where available).

- [Columbia University](#)
- [Fordham University](#)
- [The New School](#)
- [New York University](#)
- [Princeton University](#)
- [Rutgers University](#)
- [SUNY Stony Brook](#)

The Graduate Center's [Current Student Handbook](#) has information about and instructions for registering for classes at other consortium schools.

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### SPRING 2015 COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

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<tr>
<td>4:15–6:15</td>
<td>PHIL 76800 [27166]</td>
<td>Existence and Non-Existence</td>
<td>Prof. Priest</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PHIL 77800 [27167]</td>
<td>Moral Realism</td>
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<td>PHIL 76500 [27171]</td>
<td>Language and Metaphysics</td>
<td>Prof. Neale</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PHIL 77900 [27819]</td>
<td>Medical Ethics</td>
<td>Prof. Baumrin</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:30–8:30</td>
<td>PHIL 77500 [27168]</td>
<td>The Nature of Law</td>
<td>Prof. Chopra</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PHIL 76200 [27172]</td>
<td>History of Aesthetics: Hegel to Nietzsche</td>
<td>Prof. Lackey</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PHIL 78600 [27168]</td>
<td>Topics in Ethics: Memory, Commemoration and Justice</td>
<td>Profs. Blustein &amp; Ruddick</td>
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Philosophically critical race theory can be mapped out in 3 stages.

1) Prior to 1985, philosophical discussions about race were conducted primarily along normative lines addressing whether and, if so, how moral or ethical salience should be granted to race and to government policy reliant on it in order to allow, legitimately, for differential treatment amongst racial groups of citizens. Generally Bernard Boxill’s Blacks and Social Justice (1984, 1992) was and still remains the standard bearer for those discussions.

2) Between 1985 and 2000, however, philosophical discussions about race hinged on the question of whether or not race is a “real” or “objective” property and what metaphysical commitments fall from that. In short, they contributed to the idea that the metaphysics of race underwrites the political morality of race, such that any question of race’s moral import rests first on resolving the question of whether race is real or not. They increasingly and predominantly focused on whether race was real as essentialist or socially constructed prior to any discussion of either its moral pertinence/impertinence to racial integration, racial identity or to racial nationalism or its legitimacy/illegitimacy in the framing of public policy acknowledging differential treatment along racial lines. If essentialist, socially impertinent, or illegitimate, the goal is “racial eliminativism.” Generally Kwame Anthony Appiah’s In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (1992) and [with Amy Gutmann] Color Conscious [1997] have been the standard bearer on this front.

3) Since 2000, philosophical discussions have, for the most part, settled on race as a social construction. But what is important to the debate now is whether (1) race as a social construction invokes some sort of “ought” claim, some set of normative expectations which racially can be met satisfactorily in social interaction. Or whether (2) race as a social construction is set in the strategically default position for or against “white supremacy” through a “racial contract.” Under (2), normative expectations in (1) regarding race can never truly or effectively have purchase, since “white supremacy” would drape over all things politically, socially, historically and philosophically. Or (1) modifies, on pragmatic or strategic grounds, but does not eliminate, all racial demands, such as calls for “black identity and unity,” which Tommie Shelby’s We Who are Dark (2004) confirms. Generally,
however, Charles Mills’ The Racial Contract (1998) has been the standard bearer on this front.

The gist of this course is to convey and respond to the arguments and issues raised in the last two stages. Works from the fields of Africana and Latin American philosophies (including besides those listed, Douglass, Du Bois, Bolívar, Martí, Mariátegui, Vasconcelos, Anzaldúa, Gooding-Williams, Taylor) will be drawn upon to address whether matters concerning race have normative significance or not and whether such matters are the stuff of so-called ideal or non-ideal theorizing. Although the syllabus will give the specific direction of the course, it will still attest to the idea that a normative commitment to a certain kind of racialism (not all kinds, not any kind) will be on the table.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]

[back to course schedule]

Phil 77600 [27164]
Political Philosophy
Prof. Cahn
4 credits
Mon. 11:45-1:45
Room

A critical examination of major writings in political philosophy, including the work of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Adam Smith, Madison and Hamilton, Tocqueville, Marx, Mill, Rawls, and Nozick. This course does not presuppose previous work in the field but can serve as a basis for adding political philosophy as an area of competence.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]

[back to course schedule]

Phil 77500 [27164]
The Nature of Law
Prof. Chopra
4 credits
Mon. 6:30-8:30
Room
This course will serve as an introduction to theories of natural law, legal positivism, legal realism, critical legal studies, legal pragmatism, critical race theory, and feminist legal theory. Some of the topics to be covered will include: the varieties of natural law, the Hart-Fuller debate, the relationship between legal realism and legal positivism, the political critique of law mounted by critical legal studies and feminist legal theory, the legal construction of race (and science), law as ideology, the nature of pragmatic jurisprudence. There will be, hopefully, an interdisciplinary flavor to our readings and class discussions.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]

[back to course schedule]

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**Phil 76600 [27173]**

**Scientific Realism**

**Prof. Devitt**

4 credits

Wed. 9:30-11:30

Room

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**WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC REALISM?**

Scientific realism has an existence dimension and an independence dimension. The existence dimension is that, for the most part, the unobservables that science appears to be committed to - atoms, viruses, photons, and the like - really do exist and have the properties specified by science. This is opposed by those - most notably van Fraassen - who are skeptical that science is giving us an accurate picture of reality. The independence dimension is that scientific entities do not depend for their existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds. This is opposed by those - most notably, Kuhn and Feyerabend - who hold that these entities are somehow “constructed” by the theories we have of them.

The course will start by clarifying this metaphysical definition of scientific realism and looking critically at the bewildering variety of definitions to be found in the literature. These include epistemic, apparently semantic, and really semantic definitions.

**SCIENTIFIC REALISM VS CONSTRUCTIVISM**

Constructivism about science arises in the context of the allegedly incommensurability of rival paradigms like the Ptolemaic and Copernican. Arguments will be mounted against constructivism, incommensurability, and the methodology that leads to them.

**SCIENTIFIC REALISM VS SKEPTICISM**

1. Arguments for scientific realism will be examined. The answer that overwhelms the
debate is the argument from success. Why do the observational predictions of theories tend
to come out true? The best explanation, the realist claims, is that the theories are
(approximately) true. Indeed, if they weren't, this success would be "a miracle." Laudan
and Fine have mounted a sustained attack on this argument. And it has been criticized for
"neglecting the base rate".

2. There is another argument for realism that has been lost sight of. This is the "basic"
argument, according to which realism explains the observed phenomena. The course will
present some reasons for preferring this argument and forgetting about the success
argument.

3. Perhaps the most influential argument against realism is the argument from the
underdetermination of theories by the evidence. Any theory is alleged to face many
empirically equivalent rivals, rivals equally compatible with all possible evidence. This
argument will be criticized by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and to the lack of any
known limit to our capacity to create evidence.

4. The pessimistic "meta-induction" is another influential argument: past theories have
been mostly wrong; so probably present theories are too. Realist defenses against this
powerful argument will be explored.

5. The course will finish with some critical remarks about van Fraassen's antirealism.
The course is not an introduction to the philosophy of science. Anyone wishing to take it
who is not a philosophy graduate student should consult with me before enrolling.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
plurality (Arendt, Levinas), and the critique of “atomic” individualism (Taylor); feminist conceptions of relational autonomy (Nedelsky, Stoljar) and intersectional identities (e.g., Meyers); the social connections model of shared responsibility (Young); group agency and deliberative rationality (Pettit); and the conceptions of individuals-in-relations and positive freedom (Gould).

The specific issues we will address include the following:

- Can joint action and group agency be explained in individualist terms? What are the implications for understanding democratic institutions and communities, as well as corporate and other nongovernmental actors?
- The social justifications for democracy and for political obligation (Gould, Gilbert).
- The significance of recent network notions for understanding democratic solidarity and transnational social movements.
- The analysis of domination, oppression, and other forms of one-sided recognition within democracies (Young).
- Diverse understandings of democracy, e.g., African consultative models (Wiredu).
- Group rights—a human right to democracy; cultural rights within democracies and the interpretation of groups in collective or aggregative terms; processes of constitution of social groups and the self-determination of nations.
- The problem of collective responsibility: Can individuals, even dissenting ones, be held accountable for the wrongdoing of their governments? Can nation-states as a whole be responsible for such wrongdoing?
- The role of historical context in the genesis of democratic norms, and whether norms are essentially constitutive of group action.
- The “democratic personality”—The implications of a relational approach for understanding dispositions to empathy and receptivity as they bear on notions of active citizenry and democratic participation.

Seminar members will be encouraged to relate the course materials to their ongoing research projects through oral presentations and analytical term papers, and will be expected to be active participants in the class discussions.

For more information, please contact carolcgould@gmail.com.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group C]

[back to course schedule]
This course has one obvious goal: familiarity with a fascinating and fundamental text. Its other goals include giving students confidence in approaching Latin texts of which there are already good translations; turning their attention to Augustine, one of the greatest arguers ever, so often lopped off Ancient but too early to be Medieval; relating the text to its context, North Africa in the late Roman Empire, now in the grip of the Church; examining Augustine's views on mind and language, and comparing them to the 'traps in thinking' of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations; testing Augustine's solution to the problem of evil.

Here are three of many questions the course will ask:

Can we read philosophically in translation?
This course requires no Latin but will use an online Latin text alongside Chadwick's translation (Oxford World Classics). I have 'schoolboy Latin': this means that I learned Latin as a schoolboy but have since forgotten it. Augustine's Latin is stylized in ways no English translation captures. Passages contain as many internal rhymes as rap lyrics. Like any translator, Chadwick faced tricky issues of word choice. Where word choice is tricky there is often something philosophically interesting at stake. A simple example is the translation of anima as 'soul' or 'mind'.

Is there a Christian Platonism?
Augustine's first real encounter with Platonism came not long before his conversion, when he read some 'books of the Platonists' translated into Latin. These, together with the Epistles of Paul, helped clear away the remaining obstacles to Catholic Christianity in his mind; in particular, to finally settle for him the question, 'Where does evil come from?'

Is the 'Augustinian picture' a picture of Augustine?
Wittgenstein begins the Investigations by quoting Augustine's account of learning to speak. From this a view of language is extracted that Wittgenstein then 'investigates to bits' with the method characteristic of his later philosophy. Is Augustine someone caught in the traps in thinking the Investigations catalogues? Someone, therefore, like the author of Tractatus Logico Philosophicus?

Enquiries to: stephen.grover@qc.cuny.edu

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group D-Ancient]
In this course, we will explore psychoanalytic ideas about the mind, beginning with Freud (the topographical model and the structural model), and then turning to modifications in ego psychology, object relations, relational theory, attachment theory and mentalization theory. We will focus on irrationality as a normal feature of how the mind works and also on the potential insight that comes from understanding pathologies of the mind, reading autobiographical texts about struggling not to lose one’s mind, losing one’s mind, and regaining one’s mind. We will also examine the importance of character types/personality in understanding the mind, with readings from Freud, Reich, Fenichel, Balint, Shapiro, Kernberg, Blatt, and Fonagy. Finally, we will focus on enhanced agency (and perhaps well-being) as the aim of psychoanalytic therapy, integrating theory with clinical accounts and empirical research about autobiographical memories and narratives.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

The course will begin with a summary of Russell’s life history, which is a topic in and of itself. Otherwise the class will be (primarily) about Russell’s contributions to the philosophy of language, especially his theory of descriptions as against alternatives, the importance he ascribed to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, and his essays on the philosophy of logical atomism. We will also discuss some aspects of both editions of Principia Mathematica, in particular how it is important that it be read as a theory of propositions. I will also say something about its mathematical and
meta-mathematical contributions. (I am interested in this because influential writers have denied that Principia has either mathematical or meta-mathematical theorems, especially the latter.) We will also consider Russell’s anticipations of other recent views, such as the Gettier examples.

The course can hardly pretend to be a comprehensive survey of Russell’s extensive work, though we will emphasize those topics on which I feel I have something to say. The discussion of Principia is necessarily somewhat technical, though I hope that listeners primarily interested in non-technical topics will also find it of value.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group ]

[back to course schedule]

Phil 76200 [27172]
History of Aesthetics: Hegel to Nietzsche

Prof. Lackey
4 credits
Tues. 6:30-8:30
Room

The modern history of aesthetics begins with Hume and Kant, with Hume studying the features of sensibility as they sharpen over time, and Kant seeking universal principles within sensibility that distinguish aesthetic judgments from subjective preferences.

American aesthetics, post- World War II, took up where Hume and Kant left off, with Arnold Isenberg treading in Hume’s footsteps, and Frank Sibley and others exploring aesthetic properties in the Kantian vein. But there is one excruciating flaw in the subject-oriented aesthetics of Hume and Kant: it is entirely consistent with the non-existence of art. If art had never begun, hardly a word of Kant’s Critique of Judgment would need to be changed.

The post-Kantian romantics would have none of this. Schelling gave art the central role in his metaphysics; Schopenhauer wrote powerfully about metaphysics and music; Hegel in the 1820’s produced four sets of lectures commenting on every period of art history and every genre of art. Nietzsche’s first book focused on Aeschylus and his second book on Wagner. For all these philosophers, the idea that the function of art is to produce pleasurable or exciting sensations was laughable. For all of them the artist was a seer and pioneer, a creator second only to God, an exemplary manifestation of the creative will to power. (Lest this seem extreme, or old fashioned, recall that Nelson Goodman, a philosopher not given much to hysteria, calls artists “worldmakers.”)
This course will introduce the student to the great arc of 19th century aesthetic thinking, the philosophers who took art seriously. These texts are in many ways keys to deep currents in 19th century thought. For each philosopher, the background metaphysics will be sketched in, followed by a deeper plunge into the philosophy of art. All texts will be in English translations.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group D-Modern]

[back to course schedule]

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**Phil 76500 [27171]**

**Language and Metaphysics**

**Prof. Neale**

4 credits

Thurs. 4:15-6:15

Room

In this seminar, we will examine a selection of (1) metaphysical questions that arise in the course of theorizing about language and communication, and (2) metaphysical questions plausibly illuminated by work in semantics. Topics will include: the nature of symbols; aphoncic symbols; the nature and role of context; the natures of utterances, gestures, and inscriptions; the duality of objects and events; facts and correspondence; substitution and non-extensionality; slingshot arguments; metaphysical vs causal determination; and the semantics of artifactual kind terms.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group A]

[back to course schedule]

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**Phil 77400 [27169]**

**The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience**

**Prof. Papineau**

4 credits

Tues. 11:45-1:45

Room

This seminar will focus on the nature of conscious sensory experience. We shall be looking at representationalist, disjunctivist, original-intentionalist and non-relational views of this topic.

[back to course schedule]
There will be a particular focus on ideas of representation and intentionality, and on
different ways of understanding these notions, both within the philosophy of perception and
without. The emphasis throughout will be on the metaphysics of conscious sensory
experience, in the sense that we shall be concerned with the nature of the experiential
states themselves, and not their epistemological significance. Along the way we will spend
time thinking about the richness of experience, cognitive penetrability, broad contents,
intentional objects, consciousness, physicalism and other topics.

Here are some initial readings. There will be a more detailed schedule of one or two
designated readings for each week's seminar. The items below are intended only to give a
general indication of the kind of ground to be covered.

Initial Reading
William Fish Philosophy of Perception
Tim Crane ‘The Problem of Perception’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Michael Tye Ten Problems of Consciousness
Uriah Kriegel ed Phenomenal Intentionality
Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson eds Disjunctivism
David Papineau ‘Sensory Experience and Representation Properties’ Proc Aris Soc 2013

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group A or B]

[back to course schedule]
Phil 77100 [27174]
Aesthetic Psychology
Prof. Prinz
4 credits
Weds. 11:45-1:45
Room

Many core questions in the philosophy of art depend on questions about the mind: Is there such a thing as aesthetic experience? How does art evoke emotions? Do we use general principles in deciding whether a work is good? Is taste universal? What makes pictures look realistic? Is art an evolved capacity? This course takes up such questions, exploring ways in which the study of the mind can inform analytic aesthetics. Philosophical readings will be complemented by readings from psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B or C]

Phil 77300 [27176]
Intentionality and the Mental
Prof. Rosenthal
4 credits
Thurs. 2:00-4:00
Room

Many mental states, perhaps all, are representational. A paradigm of mental representation is the intentional content of thinking, wondering, doubting, expecting, and similar states, content that can be captured by a ‘that’ clause or other sentence nominalization. One can think, expect, assume, or suspect that it will rain, and doubt or wonder whether it will. Those states have in common the intentional content that it will rain, differing in the mental attitude held toward that content. We’ll focus on issues that arise in giving a satisfactory account of the intentional content and mental attitude of such states.

We’ll ask what the logical properties are of ascriptions of intentional states; whether the sentence-sized content of such states is constituted by concept-sized parts; whether the content of each state is fixed independent of all others and if so how, perhaps, e.g., by lawlike or teleological ties each concept has to what it’s about; whether if content is not fixed in that way it’s instead fixed holistically, e.g., by a state’s inferential potential; what
the way content is fixed tells us about how intentional states refer; whether content is in some way linguistic; whether intentional states are merely useful fictions; and what role if any is played by physical environment, social factors, or linguistic practice in determining the content of our thinking.

We'll also discuss the relation of intentional states to speech. Is the intentionality of thinking prior to that of speech acts? If so in what way? Is the intentionality of thinking different in kind from that of speech? Do communicative intentions determine speaker’s meaning? Are they necessary for it? What is it for speech acts to express a speaker’s thoughts?

Relatedly, we'll ask why it’s absurd to say, e.g., 'It’s raining, but I don’t think it is’ (Moore’s paradox), and whether that kind of absurdity has a parallel in thinking. And independent of whatever way the intentionality of thinking is prior to that of speech, we’ll ask whether our conception of what intentionality is relies on the way it occurs in thinking, if not how we do understand it, and what implications that has for the consciousness of intentional states.

We’ll also consider the indirect reflexive (e.g., how referring to oneself simply as oneself differs from referring to oneself descriptively or by name); how the various mental attitudes are individuated; what it is for thoughts to occur in an inference; whether consciousness has a special relation to speech; what conditions must be met to be in intentional states, and whether being able to use language is among them; and why children up to around 3 fail the verbal false-belief task, seeming to assimilate what others think to what is actually the case.

Other issues we might touch on include whether perceiving involves intentional content and if so of what kind; whether the difference among the emotions, e.g., being angry, sad, relieved, or joyous that something happened, is a matter of different mental attitudes being held toward some intentional content; whether the potential of desiderative states to affect action is due to some aspect of their mental attitudes, and if so how; and whether the consciousness of intentional states has some special connection to their mental attitude.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of Group B]

[back to course schedule]
Over the past thirty or so years, a great deal has been written about how to understand the status of normative discourse, and what if anything might make such claims true. Of course, this interest has been pursued largely with respect to moral discourse and moral claims. For many philosophers, a fundamental commitment to naturalism and naturalistic explanation leads either to skepticism or to some form of non-cognitivist expressivism. For some others, to the contrary, the commitment to naturalism requires trying to give a plausible account of how moral properties might strongly supervene upon natural ones. Constructivists, varied as they are, tend to seek an account that is an alternative to both of these camps, an account that is modestly objective, but not realist - categories of description that hopefully will be less opaque by the end of the course. This course will take up a sampling of all of these views, and try to tease out the plausibility and difficulties with them all. There is a great deal of exceptionally imaginative writing on this subject and a great deal of ideology and dogma too. Be prepared to be frustrated as well as intrigued by widely varied (in quality as well content) arguments we will take up.

The main text is the anthology "Moral Discourse and Practice," edited by Darwall, Railton and Gibbard, and the first readings will be the Harman and the Mackie essays found there, but there will be a fair bit of reading taken from more contemporary writers too, such as Tom Ridge and Sharon Street.

[Counts towards course satisfaction of C]